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Abstract 
'Women and Independence in the Nineteenth Century Novel :A 
Study of Austen, Trollope and James', begins with the concept of 
independence and works through the three most common usages of the 
word. The first, financial independence (not needing to earn one's 
livelihood) appears to be a necessary prerequisite for the second 
and third forms of independence, although it is by no means an 
unequivocal good in any of the novels. The second, intellectual 
independence (not depending on others for one's opinion or conduct; 
unwilling to be under obligation to others), is a matter of asser- 
ting independence while employing terms which society recognizes. 
The third, of being independent, is exemplified by an inward struggle 
for a knowledge of self. 
In order to trace the development of the idea of self during the 
nineteenth century, I have chosen a group of novels which seem to be 
representative of the beginning, the middle, and the end of the period. 
Particular attention is given to the characterizations of Emma 
roodhouse, Glencora Palliser, Isabel Archer, Milly Theale and Maggie 
Verver. Whereas in Jane Austen's novels the self has a definite shape 
which the heroine must discover, and in Anthony Trollope's novels the 
self (reflecting the idea of socially-determined man) must learn to 
accommodate social and political changes, in Henry James's novels the 
self determined by external manifestations (hollow man) is posed 
against the exercise of the free spirit or soul. 
Jane Austen's novels look backward, as she reacts against late 
eighteenth century romanticism, and forward, with the development of 
the heroine who exemplifies intellectual independence. Anthony 
Trollope's women characters are creatures of social and political 
adaptation; although they do not derive their reason for being 
from men, they must accommodate themselves to men's wishes. And 
Henry James looks backward, wistfully, at Austen's solid, comforting, 
innocent self and forward, despairingly, to the dark, unknowable self 
of the twentieth century. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
I began this study of women characters in the novels of Austen, 
Trollope and James by looking at the importance of 'independence' not 
only to the heroine within the context of her existence, but also to 
the writer who created the heroine. I found however that during the 
three years that I spent researching and writing about Elisabeth 
Bennett, Emma Woodhouse, Glencora Palliser, Isabel Archer, and their 
sister heroines, I was increasingly drawn toward the centrality of the 
concept of self. I discovered that it was difficult to write about 
women and independence in the nineteenth century novel without delving 
into the changing concept of self, as it relates specifically to women, 
from the beginning of that century to the beginning of the twentieth. 
From the start I resisted the notion of applying a thesis as a 
template upon a selection of novels which would fit the idea. Once 
the novels and specific characters had been chosen, I determined to 
treat the novels as fully and fairly as possible. I wanted my linking 
idea to arise from the material itself. And that linking idea, the 
changing concept of self, does have a logical connection to women and 
independence. But the concept of self needs to be clarified with res- 
pect to the original intent of my thesis. 
So the problem then becomes one of definition. I was agreeably 
surprised to find that the three most common usages of the word 
independence bear usefully upon the critical argument I have developed. 
The categories of financial, intellectual and ontological independence 
derive from these common usages, as I shall explain shortly. I use 
2 
the categories not because they represent the only critical possibi- 
lities (they most certainly do not), but because they provide a help- 
ful starting point. I shall test these categories in each novel in 
order to determine how well the categories hold up and whether they 
remain truly distinct. As it happens, in some of the novels examined 
the terms we start with may cease to be useful, particularly as we 
progress towards a more elastic, metaphysically alarmed concept of 
self in the thesis and in the late nineteenth century. The thesis 
should be seen as interrogative rather than demonstrative :I shall 
use close readings of the novels on their own terms (that is, without 
trying to force them under the categorical grid) to see how they illu- 
minate or complicate our understanding of the categorical distinctions. 
The readings are intended to question, rather than to confirm and 
illustrate, the familiar and distinct categories. 
So, on to the categories. The first and most readily explainable 
category, financial independence, refers to economic self-sufficiency 
(in some cases, this means not needing to earn one's livelihood), and 
often appears to be a necessary prerequisite for the second and third 
categories of independence I use. However in none of the novels 
is 
financial independence an unequivocal good : for Emma Woodhouse, 
Glencora Palliser, Isabel Archer or Milly Theale, wealth can be a 
positive disadvantage. Henry James's attitude toward wealth was cer- 
tainly ambivalent, and of his numerous moneyed relations and 
friends 
he comments: 
'There was clearly no mean, least of all the 
golden one, for it was just the ready, even 
the 
moderate, possession of gold that 
determined, 
that hurried on, disaster. There were whole 
sets and groups, there were 
'sympathetic', 
though too susceptible, races, that seemed 
3 
scarce to recognise or to find possible any 
practical application of moneyed, that is of 
transmitted, ease, however limited, but to 
go more or less rapidly to the bad with it- 
which meant even then going as often as pos- 
sible to Paris. 'l 
Yet economic independence does allow some of these heroines to explore 
the possibilities of independent thought and action or to engage in an 
inward struggle for a knowledge of self. This suggests that such 
explorations and struggles are a luxury afforded more readily by those 
who have never suffered any real hardship. Conversely economic depen- 
dence may compel 'inward struggle' (e. g. Fanny Price, Jane Eyre, 
Maggie Tulliver). 
The second category, of intellectual independence, refers to self- 
sufficiency of opinion, conduct, and obligation, and is a matter of 
asserting one's self in the terms which society recognises. It implies 
a self which makes a material independent assessment of society's 
requirements. The presumption that such an assessment does not alien- 
ate the self from that society changes as the century wears on. 
2 
In 
the novels intellectual independence is what we see the heroines 
doing : it is a reflection of their intellectual choices and consequent 
actions. It is especially true of the earlier novels that often upon 
such exhibited behaviour the heroines are judged to be independent. 
Elizabeth Bennett's decision to hike across the field to visit her 
unwell sister is regarded with horror by Bingley's stuffy sisters, but 
with admiration by Bingley and Darcy, on whom the sharp contrast bet- 
ween Elizabeth's energetic concern and Mrs. Bennett's self-serving, do- 
nothing attitude is not lost. 
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The third category, ontological independence, is exemplified by 
an inward struggle for a knowledge of self. It is with this more 
complex sense of the word that the later novels in this study are 
concerned, but it is the most difficult of the three to elucidate, as 
it must be drawn from the heroines' subjective consciousness. As the 
use of the interior monologue becomes more sophisticated and less 
obvious in the narrative structure of the novel during the nineteenth 
century (a skill at which James excels), the question of what consti- 
tutes 'being independent' becomes more relevant. 
How does independence relate to the concept of self? The defini- 
tion is by no means easy. Perhaps because fully one half of my study 
deals with three of Henry James's novels, I am interested in those 
ideas which may shed light on the complex relation between independence 
and selfhood suggested by his writings. Not that I wish to force a 
Jamesian concept down the throats of Austen or Trollope, for that would 
be unfair to the individual talents of those writers. But James's 
attention to such complexities in his novels and essays lends itself to 
comprehensive backward glances. In this manner I would like to use his 
ideas to delineate the transformation from independence to selfhood. 
The problem of defining independence and selfhood may be illus- 
trated by the difficulty Henry James, Sr. had in squaring independence 
and selfhood. For, as Howard Feinstein writes: 
... he transformed what 
in his prodigal voice had 
been a primary goal -- independence -- into a defect 
that was the essence of man's fallen state ... 
James was eloquent in his disgust with man for 
believing in his own independent powers. 'His fall 
was his elevation in his own conceit, and hence it 
was pure mercy upon the part of God to endow him 
with conscience or the faculty of self condemnation. ' 
Speaking in this voice, he was convinced that natural 
5 
an gives himself 'airs of self sufficiency', 
but is 'a fool' when he 'unlearns his depend- 
ence'. 'The truth of our creatureship', he 
asserted, 'the great truth that in the Lord 
alone we live and move and have our being, 
perfectly reconciles us to the fact of our 
essential and intrinsic destitution, by quiet- 
ing every ambitious aspiration, or divorcing 3 us from all desire to be anything in ourselves. '' 
The elder James's belief in the futility of man's struggle toward 
independence was in a strange way prophetic. But where he believed in 
man's complete dependence on God, later writers believed in the futility 
of the struggle because they saw no God on whom man could depend and no 
independent self on which to rely. The elder James's 'truth' is a 
great lesson in repression (repression for which Alice James and her 
brothers suffered lifelong nervous illnesses) - the truth which 'per- 
fectly reconciles us to the fact of our essential and intrinsic desti- 
tution, by quieting every ambitious aspiration or divorcing us from all 
desire to be anything in ourselves'. The women about whom I write 
share just that desire to be something in themselves. For the writers 
who create them, that aspiration is most definitely not mere illusion. 
In these writings the elder James decisively links independence 
with the concept of self. Independence, by his definition, seems to be 
the 'desire to be anything in ourselves', to be self sufficient, to 
have 'ambitious aspiration'. Each of these activities suggests a self 
struggling to come into being; such struggles were futile for any man, 
let alone any woman. The philosophical problem James raises here was 
considered in terms of man's essential dependence upon God. James's 
view is but one of many that were expressed in the nineteenth century. 
The question of women's independence requires a much greater leap, for 
in James's construct woman doesn't even have a relation with God, 
6 
except indirectly through ean. 
4 
In the work of the novelists how- 
ever the first stirrings of self sufficiency or the desire to be 
something in one's self do not take place on the elder James's exal- 
ted planes but, I believe, in the daily lives of the characters they 
created. Jane Austen, Anthony Trollope, and Henry James, who are 
excellent observers of human behaviour and accurate chroniclers of 
ideas and perceptions in their own time, have an interest in and a 
facility for creating women characters who desire to be something in 
themselves. Furthermore, I would suggest that these women characters 
exhibit the authors' own ideals of independence (putting aside for a 
moment the question of legal and financial constraints) in their indi- 
vidual struggles for identity. 
Of course women were not the only characters in novels who wit- 
nessed this transformation of the concept of self nor the only ones to 
experience it themselves. But the idea of treating women characters 
as though they had an existence not determined in whole or in part by 
men, but as instruments of their own will (at least in the mainstream 
of English novels) was an unprecedented phenomenon. Lionel Trilling 
said of Jane Austen's Emma Woodhouse that she had a moral life as a 
man has a moral life; 
5 
that criterion could be used to describe each 
of the heroines discussed in this study. It is ironic that in the 
nineteenth century women fought for and achieved a degree of socio- 
economic independence at the very time when ontological independence 
was coming into question. The problems are enhanced by the newness of 
the 'independent' heroine : we pay more attention to the difficulties 
and complexities than might otherwise be the case. That these women 
characters are forced to deal with issues which have moral significance 
and philosophical weight, issues which male characters in the novels 
7 
find at least as difficult, makes them all the more extraordinary. 
During the nineteenth century, questions concerning women and 
independence inevitably came down to the unavoidability of marriage 
as a social institution. At the end of the eighteenth century Mary 
Wollstonecraft complained that a woman must sacrifice her time and 
often prostitute her person in order to marry advantageously. By 
implication women were required to marry, for they were not self suf- 
ficient creatures. Critics of feminism in the mid-nineteenth century 
again and again returned to a woman's sole occupation as wife, mother, 
and mistress of the home - even if historians of the period suggest 
that there weren't nearly enough men to marry all the extra women. 
Most nineteenth century feminists who objected to the enforced depen- 
dency of women upon men found no workable alternative to the ultimate 
social contract of marriage. 
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For example, J. S. Mill warns against the destructive tendencies 
of dependence which lead to the perversion of petty influence: 'To 
allow to any human beings no existence of their own but what depends 
on others, is giving far too high a premium on bending others to their 
purposes. '7 But even he ultimately recommends marriage based on a 
community of interests and intellect as the best recipe for personal 
and social fulfilment. Phillip Mallett writes that traditional roles 
in marriage were difficult to transform completely: 
'Even at the end of the century, then, the majority 
of feminists were still seeking to accommodate their 
case to the dominant beliefs and values of their 
society. The task facing the radically-minded fem- 
inist, who could not be persuaded to acknowledge 
these values, was to assimilate into her personality 
a new vision of herself, and of her relation to 
others, in a society generally inclined to look on 
her efforts with suspicion or hostility ... for most 
women in 1900, as for most women fifty years 
earlier, it is still the case that the true 
dignity and special mission of women lay in 
their power to influence the minds and actions 
of the men to whom they belonged; and the most 
fulfilling way to do so was as a wife and 
mother. '8 
In Feminism, John Charvet defines the word as 'the claim to equal 
worth', meaning 'firstly that as free beings individuals are capable 
of directing themselves to ends of their choosing, and secondly that 
in respect of this capacity for self-direction individuals have the 
same worth'. Charvet further defines those feminists of what he calls 
the 'individualist tradition', such as Mill and Margaret Fuller, as 
those who conceive of freedom of self-direction in terms of 'an indi- 
vidual's choices for his own life within a framework of law which 
guarantees an equal right to all to make such choices'. 
9 Margaret 
Fuller's individualist feminism derives from Kant and some of the post- 
Kantians : according to Charvet, the Kantian 'free, self-determining 
individual' engages in 'moral action', which 'consists in the striving 
of rational nature in man to give itself existence and hence to realize 
its infinite worth'. The post-Kantians, however, regard the self less 
as 'pure reason', but take 'a more intuitive and mystical interpreta- 
tion of the inner infinite being of the individual'. 
10 
Fuller's femin- 
ism is based on the claim that: 
... woman is in her deepest nature an 
individual 
exactly like man-- an individual soul, as Fuller 
calls it. This soul is of infinite value in woman 
as well as in man, and the basic conditions of its 
development and fulfilment are the same for both. 
These are the rights to inward and outward freedom. 
Outward freedom consists in the material conditions, 
the civil and political rights, to form one's own 
life; inward freedom is the inner achievement of 
the soul's self-determination through its actual- 
ization in the world. '11 
9 
In his discussion Charvet makes clear that the individualist 
position: 
'... does not as such exclude arguments for 
radical changes in the position of women in 
society and the family, even if the early 
individualist feminists did in fact accept 
the traditional woman's role within an alt- 
ered legal structure of rights and educational 
opportunities. That they did so reflects per- 
haps a sense of the limits of the practicable 
in the nineteenth century, but is not a neces- 
sary implication of individualism. i12 
I have expanded here on the origins of the individualist feminist 
position because it corresponds to a certain degree with my own criti- 
cal viewpoint. Critical assumptions are influenced by personal experi- 
ences, and the fact that not only my mother but my grandmother and 
great-grandmother all attended university (Pembroke and Smith Colleges) 
no doubt contributed to the earnest if naive belief that I could 
achieve whatever I wished by dint of hard work. Consequently I was 
directed toward a critical approach which emphasises similarity rather 
than difference. 
Current feminist methodology - with respect to literary criticism - 
emphasises 'difference', specifically, the difference between male and 
female writing. For example, Ellen Moers's collection of essays 
entitled Literary Women attempts to examine women writers who write 
within a specifically female tradition. She emphasises the separateness 
of female experience from the male as reflected in nineteenth and 
twentieth century literature in her chapter on the Gothic: 
'... Despair is hardly the exclusive province of 
any one sex or class in our age, but to give visual 
form to the fear of self, to hold anxiety up to the 
Gothic mirror of the imagination, may well be more 
common in the writings of women than of men. While 
10 
I cannot prove this statistically, I can offer 
a reason : that nothing separates female experi- 
ence from male experience more sharply, and more 
early in life, than the compulsion to visualize 
the self . 113 
I have to disagree with Moers about her conclusion that giving 
visual form to the fear of self is the exclusive province of women's 
writing. One obvious example of a male writer who visually renders 
the fear of self in both male and female characters is Henry James. 
The Wings of the Dove and The Golden Bowl abound with images represen- 
ting frightened selves :a small grey emergent rock in a vast ocean 
(Merton Densher); a pacing panther (Kate Croy and Charlotte Stant); 
a naked blade and a cup of poison (Maggie Verver). In attempting to 
revise a tradition long dominated by male critical biases Moers is per- 
haps too hasty in categorising experiences and ways of writing about 
them which are neither exclusively female nor exclusively male. Even 
Anthony Trollope (who was certainly no friend of feminism) has his 
heroine Glencora Palliser visualise all kinds of Gothic tortures for 
herself when she believes she cannot accommodate herself to the con- 
straints of the life she is expected to lead. 
Another example is Writing and Sexual Difference, a collection of 
feminist literary criticism edited by Elizabeth Abel, which focuses 
specifically on sexual and textual differences in 
literature and 'how 
critical methods can effectively disclose the traces of gender 
in 
literature'. Abel believes that the recent shift in feminist criticism 
towards emphasis on sexual difference is inevitable and necessary: 
'... feminist critics now often strive to elucidate the acts of revi- 
sion, appropriation, and subversion 
that constitute a female text. ' 
14 
Abel's method, which is obviously shared by most of 
the contributors 
11 
to this collection of essays, is appropriate to some texts more than 
to others. But not all texts benefit from such 'revision, appropri- 
ation, and subversion' because, to begin with, not all texts are 
necessarily exclusively female or exclusively male. Secondly, not 
all women critics (or women readers, for that matter) share this par- 
ticular revisionist feminist critical agenda. Carolyn Heilbrun's 
critical response to Abel's collection suggests another possible 
approach: 
'Surely in emphasizing 'difference' and uniquely 
female culture, we should avoid the trap of 
depriving ourselves of male discourse altogether 
while we attempt to subvert it. The fact is 
that the discourse of males is not all 'male' 
discourse : much of it is human discourse that 
society has denied to women. Feminist theory 
must be able to comprehend that which men and 
women share as well as that which is or is 
accounted, intrinsically feminine. 'lý 
Elaine Showalter, in 'Towards a Feminist Poetics' divides feminist 
criticism into two categories : 'woman as reader', which she refers to 
as 'feminist critique', and 'woman as writer' or 'gynocritics'. She 
characterises feminist critique as being 'essentially political and 
polemical, with theoretical affiliations to Marxist sociology and 
aesthetics'; gynocritics she suggests is 'more self-contained and 
experimental, with connections to other modes of new feminist research'. 
She asserts that an inherent problem with feminist critique is its male 
orientation. Gynocritics, on the other hand, '... begins at the point 
when we free ourselves from the linear absolutes of male literary his- 
tory, stop trying to fit women between the lines of the male tradition, 
and focus instead on the newly visible world of 
female culture'. 
Finally, she asks feminist critics 'to find a new language, a new way 
of reading that can integrate our 
intelligence and our experience, our 
12 
reason and our suffering, our scepticism and our fision'. 
16 
In A Literature of Their Own, Showalter sets out to correct the 
mistaken impression that there hasn't been a literature of women out- 
aide 'indispensable Jane and George', and then attacks the predomin- 
antly male enclave of academic criticism: 
'... it has been difficult for critics to consider 
women novelists and women's literature theoreti- 
cally because of their tendency to project and 
expand their own culture-bound stereotypes of 
feminity, and to see in women's writing an eternal 
opposition of biological and aesthetic creativity 
... Given the difficulties of steering a precari- 
ous course between the Scylla of insufficient 
information and the Charybdis of abundant preju- 
dice, it is not surprising that formalist- 
structuralist critics have evaded the issue of 
sexual identity entirely, or dismissed it as 
irrelevant and subjective. Finding it difficult 
to think intelligently about women writers, aca- 
demic criticism has often overcompensated by 
desexing them. 117 
However her argument for a women's literary tradition requires a certain 
amount of special pleading insofar as she claims that because women have 
constituted a 'subculture', no 'pattern of deliberate progress and accu- 
mulation' in the female literary tradition can be shown. 
Nevertheless 
she resists certain categories which would appear to emphasise 
differ- 
ence: 
'The theory of a female sensibility revealing 
itself in an imagery and form specific to women 
always runs dangerously close to reiterating 
the familiar stereotypes. It also suggests per- 
manence, a deep, basic, and inevitable differ- 
ence between male and female ways of perceiving 
the world. I think that, instead, the female 
literary tradition comes from the still-evolving 
relationship between women writers and their 
society. '18 
13 
Finally, in her conclusion, Showalter cautions against rigid 
political partisanship in feminist writing: 
'The radical demand that would yoke women writers 
to feminist revolution and deny them the freedom 
to explore new subjects would obviously not pro- 
vide a healthy direction for the female tradition 
to take. But the denigration of female experi- 
ence, the insistence that women deal with 'the 
real business of the world', is also destructive. 
In women critics' attacks on novelists who have 
failed so to direct their interests, one senses 
a rationalization of the old self-hatred of women. 
Their theories of the transcendence of sexual 
identity, like Woolf's theory of androgyny, are 
at heart evasions of reality ... The problem of 
autonomy that the women novelist faces is, to 
name the extremes, whether to sacrifice personal 
development and freedom as an artist to a collec- 
tive cultural task, or whether to sacrifice 
authenticity and self-exploration and accept the 
dominant culture's definition of what is important 
to understand and describe. 119 
Showalter is seeking to reconcile individualist feminism with the aware- 
ness that it means something to speak of a 'feminine consciousness' 
the individualist may underplay 'difference' in Mary Jacobus's sense 
20 
but those who emphasise difference say constrain both individuality and 
the development of women writers' response to their society. 
Myra Jehlen argues that the problem in current feminist criticism 
is 'if we as feminists want to address our whole culture ... to deal 
with what we do not like but recognize as nonetheless valuable, serious, 
good. This is a crucial problem at the heart of feminism's wider rele- 
vance. No wonder we have tried to avoid it. '21 Jehlen's argument 
is 
very persuasive: 
'We should begin, therefore, by acknowledging 
the separate wholeness of the literary subject, 
its distinct vision that need not be ours-- 
what the formalists have told us and told us 
about : its integrity. We need to acknowledge, 
14 
also, that to respect that integrity by not 
asking questions of the text that it does not 
ask itself, to ask the text what questions to 
ask, will produce the fullest, richest 
reading. '2 
Jehlen's argument goes on to suggest a theory that the vulnerable (i. e. 
not autonomous) heroine is 'organic' to the novel as a construct, and 
goes so far as to 'require a definition of female characters that 
effectively precludes their becoming autonomous, so that indeed they 
would do so at the risk of the novel's life'. Here Jehlen differenti- 
ates herself from feminist critics who try to justify textually the 
autonomous life of the female heroine. I don't agree with Jehlen's 
conclusion, but I do agree with the assertions she makes as part of 
her argument, especially as they return to the importance of the con- 
cept of self in the nineteenth century novel: 
'The novel, we know, is organically individualis- 
tic : even when it deals with several equally 
important individuals, or attacks individualism 
itself, it is always about the unitary self ver- 
sus the others. Moreover, it is about the gener- 
ation, the becoming of that self. '23 
Jehlen's point is useful because it joins several threads I have tried 
to pick out in this introduction : independence and the self, the indi- 
vidualist nature of the novel (which suggests that an individualist 
feminist like myself might not want to ask questions of the text which 
it does not ask of itself), and the ontological concept of self 
(the 
becoming of self). 
Finally, Nina Auerbach's Woman and the Demon : the Life of a 
Victorian Myth studies the 'mythic' Victorian cultural imagination and 
discovers not just pockets of feminism but an all pervasive feminism 
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'in the broad power of this many-faceted myth of a mobile presiding 
woman'. She suggests that 'we need a freer context for understand- 
ing the complex life of woman in culture, one which welcomes any 
society's capacious avenues of power, as well as excoriating its par- 
ticular conventions of oppression'. She adds that her method, which 
elevates popular Victorian mythology, is liable to offend both 'icono- 
clastic feminists and their more sedate (and generally older) antagon- 
ists', and reflects back to her own beginnings in criticism when in 
the early 1970's she was trained to attack such myths: 
'Gleefully, in the classroom and in print, we iden- 
tified pernicious 'myths' and 'images' of women, 
certain that we knew what the reality was : it was 
us, solid, sullen, and victimized. The allegiance 
of feminism in the early 1970's was to the social 
sciences, whose demographic charts and statistics 
affirmed the reality of our half-life in society-- 
and nothing else. But lives are inspired by 
beliefs before they are immortalized in statistics. 
It may be time for feminists to circle back to 
those 'images' of angels and demons, nuns and 
whores, whom it seemed so easy and so liberating 
to kill, in order to retrieve a less tangible, but 
also less restricting, facet of woman's history 
than the social sciences can encompass. '2+ 
Auerbach's critical perspective isn't dissimilar from my own, especially 
with regard to her idea of the importance of character in the nineteenth 
century novel: 'As the age understood it, character is not the given 
self, but the self as it makes itself. ' Auerbach's conclusion antici- 
pates the ideas I shall refer to in my Afterword: 
'We can never again worship literary character 
with Victorian intensity, for fiction can never 
regain its nineteenth-century primacy; yet the 
idea of character has been part of woman's legacy 
as well as literature's, its very fictionality 
hinting of an unfounded future that includes the 
powers of our unregarded past. '25 
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But I differ from Auerbach in that I believe character remains a 
crucial consideration in contemporary novels, albeit no contemporary 
writer would conceive of character in the same way as the Victorians 
did. 
I have spent some time here-discussing alternative modes of fem- 
inist criticism in this introduction in order to place my particular 
interest in women and independence in the context of current thinking 
and writing about women. As my comments about the various critical 
approaches above indicate, I find it most useful to emphasise simi- 
larity of experience in writing about the concept of self. And while 
'gynocritics' may be entirely appropriate for women writing about women, 
it isn't helpful in studies which include male and female writers writ- 
ing about both men and women. Consequently I use an approach to char- 
acter interpretation, coloured to a large degree by my own peculiar 
individualist feminist experience, which allows me to ask those ques- 
tions the text seems to invite. 
Now I should like to return to the categories defined earlier in 
order to sketch out a map by which we may chart our way through the 
nineteenth century by way of the novels I have chosen to examine. 
Financial independence has been defined as economic self-sufficiency. 
Intellectual independence is defined as asserting one's self in socially 
recognisable terms. There are a number of novels in which characters 
attempt to preserve the self's integrity without relying on financial 
independence : notably, Jane Eyre, Catherine Earnshaw, Romola, Dorothea, 
and Pip in Great Expectations. But the rewards in terms of influence 
for a married woman seem to outweigh the supposed influence-through- 
freedom of the single woman. As Charlotte Stant states the case in 
The Golden Bowl: 
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"Existence, you know, all the same, doesn't 
depend on that. I mean, ' she smiled, 'on having 
caught a husband. ' 
'Oh--existence: ' the Prince vaguely commented. 
'You think I ought to argue for more than mere 
existence? ' she asked. 'I don't see why M 
existence--even reduced as much as you like to 
being merely mine--should be so impossible. 
There are things, of sorts, I should be able to 
have--things I should be able to be. The posi- 
tion of a single woman today is very favourable, 
you know. ' 
'Favourable to what? ' 
'Why, just to existence--which may contain, 
after all, one way and another, so much ... '' (The Golden Bowl : III) 
The case is a difficult one to justify, as the Prince's questions indi- 
cate and Charlotte's own lame responses confirm. For this reason it 
seems that the positive assertion of independent thought and action 
becomes possible (with the exception of Fanny Price) only after finan- 
cial independence has been established. In refusing Wentworth, Anne 
acts according to the presumption that 'advice' preserves the good 
order of society; respect for a form deforms one's inner feelings. 
Isabel Archer is empowered by the Touchett. bequest to make her explora- 
tions and to choose her own fate. Isabel refuses Warburton because she 
cannot give herself up to him and the charmed existence he proposes to 
her as the wife of a wealthy liberal peer of the realm. Action does 
not always imply independence, nor does inaction imply dependence, for 
a refusal to act may be the only means of preserving the self. Fanny 
Price's decision not to act in the play and subsequent refusals to fol- 
low her uncle's wish for her to marry Henry Crawford are deliberate 
attempts to preserve her self integrity. Maisie Farange provides 
another illustration; her decision 'to be employed no 
longer' in her 
parents' personal battles is 'literally a moral revolution'. 
She had 
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been without a past-present-future axis, an axis upon which the sense 
of self is predicated. The recognition of her own self, concomitant 
with the need for concealment, frees her from the child's 'surrender 
to the actual'. (What Maisie Knew, Chapter II) 
Jane Austen's novels are primarily concerned with intellectual 
independence; because the self has a shape which the heroine must 
learn to perceive, perception becomes an issue of moral significance. 
The self which each heroine discovers finds a natural place in society, 
even if it may not be in complete agreement with the expectations soci- 
ety has for it. For Jane Austen, the proper self makes wise moral 
decisions (to marry a manly man) in an orderly society; personal ful- 
filment is found in marriage which is the appropriate (wise, moral) 
goal of the self. But society is not always orderly, nor does it 
always judge appropriately : Lucy and Robert Ferrars are accepted by 
Mrs. Ferrars, while Edward and Elinor are not. Jane Austen values inde- 
pendence of mind; but she also believes in right judgement, and believes 
that society (even as established in 1800) has a good stock of it (a 
Burkean position par excellence). Some heroines arrive independently 
a true judgement (Elinor and Fanny), some have to be helped along the 
way in a process of surrender. This independence per se is exchanged 
for guidance (Emma and Marianne, for example). Anne reverses this : she 
moves from accepting the guidance of Lady Russell to acting independ- 
ently in favour of Wentworth. Fanny resists guidance from her uncle 
(who wishes her to marry Henry Crawford) and even, at times, her beloved 
mentor Edmund. 
Consequently, we see that some of her heroines identify themselves 
with society not as it is but as it might 
be. Fanny Price's desire to 
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preserve the integrity of self requires that she positively refuse to 
act. Her 'ready habit of submission' belies a self constantly strug- 
gling to suppress jealousy, passion, and anger with an imperfect 
equanimity. Fanny defines herself against the decaying moral fabric 
of Mansfield Park. But the promise of a perfect Mansfield is sugges- 
ted by the ending, a platonic ideal society which lies just around the 
corner. The self-reliance which Anne learns in Persuasion is not an 
expression of unlimited freedom but a thoughtful response to suffering 
in isolation from society; her father and elder sister ignore her at 
Kellynch, her younger sister and husband leave her to watch the chil- 
dren. But she enjoys the solitary autumnal strolls for they give her 
time to think about her emotional response to Wentworth when he returns. 
And the strength she gains from communing privately with herself 
becomes a source of strength to others. Anne is able to provide comfort 
to others in difficulty (her sister, Captain Benwick, Louisa Musgrove) 
Mrs. Smith) because she has been able to help herself; those who are 
right with themselves are in a position to give others guidance and sup- 
port. That she gives Wentworth the emotional space to re-experience 
his 
love for her (she refuses to throw herself at his feet) reinforces the 
idea that self-knowledge entails a respect for the self in others, and 
that preservation often means knowing when best to act. 
Her conversa- 
tion with Captain Harville at the White Hart Inn 
is an indirect affirma- 
tion of her deep love for Wentworth and a positive, even revolutionary 
action. Discussing the nature of constancy 
in love with a recent 
acquaintance in a public room within earshot of 
her former fiance is 
both risky for Anne and unprecedented 
in Jane Austen's novels. 
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She 
rewrote the denouement 
in this way in order to emphasize the over- 
whelmingly strong feelings 
Anne has and the trust she is willing to 
place in them. 
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Like Jane Austen, Anthony Trollope uses action as an indication 
of intellectual independence. And like both Austen and James, 
Trollope gives each of his heroines a foundation of wealth, giving her 
the confidence to express her opinions. Trollope extends the concept 
of self to incorporate changes wrought by social and political circum- 
stances. Each of Trollope's heroines must learn to accept her role in 
society, which, as he sees it, means rechannelling her energy and 
intelligence into the career her husband chooses. Consequently, each 
heroine must use prudence in choosing a husband. Marrying for purely 
financial reasons (as does Lady Laura) is not enough; nor is marrying 
in order to have a cause (as Alice Vavasor considers when her cousin 
proposes to her, and as Dorothea Brooke does when she marries Will 
Ladislaw). And once a woman gives her heart she cannot transfer her 
affections (Lady Laura's predicament), or so it seems. But Trollope's 
overt lessons are undermined by his more subtle characterization of 
Glencora Palliser, who on the surface flouts these rules : her husband 
is chosen for her in order to preserve her massive inheritance; she 
must transfer her affections from Burgo to Plantagenet; she takes up 
her husband's cause in order to occupy herself. 
In this way, Trollope's novels clearly reflect the paradox of the 
socially conservative narrator working within a general framework of 
liberalism. Patricia Thomson notes the paradox in Trollope's position: 
'It was on reading Trollope that Victorians must have felt their ideal 
of wifely submission was at its finest hour. ' Nevertheless, Thomson 
admits that Trollope's ideal social contract closely resembles that of 
J. S. Mill's, and that all of Trollope's heroines 'take with them into 
marriage intelligence, self-sufficiency and a certain proud conscious- 
ness of their own value which makes 
them reluctant to demand that which 
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should be theirs by right'. 
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Alice Vavasor's dilemma neatly sums up the question of intellec- 
tual independence: 'What should a woman do with her life? ' She wishes 
to act as an individual because she doesn't believe marriage will ful- 
fil her, yet Trollope presents her with no viable alternative occupa- 
tion. Alice's reluctance to marry John Grey (who as a 'manly man' is 
rather dull) is less prudish than fearful; because the men she knows 
(her father, her cousin, her fiance) refuse her the right to know her- 
self, she is faced with the terrible prospect of having to relinquish 
responsibility for herself. We can forgive Alice for being hard on her- 
self because she intelligently grasps the paradox of being prevented, 
as a woman, from acting independently in an age when, to quote J. S. 
Mill, 'conduct and conduct alone entitles to respect'. 
28 
Trollope the 
narrator tells us that she must learn to act through and in support of 
her husband. The process of forgiveness, which Trollope hopes we will 
grant, is based upon his thorough presentation of Alice's tortured sub- 
jective consciousness. Jane Austen's notion of the integrity of self, 
which brings the heroine from error into prudence, has become a somewhat 
ominous process of self-sacrifice in Trollope, a process of relinquish- 
ing responsibility to a 'manly man' in order to preserve the self from 
destruction. Mr. Knightley in Ewa is not far from Trollope's John 
Grey; but while 1Cama's submission to Mr. Knightley's guidance is seen 
as an unequivocal good, Alice's submission to Grey involves both gain 
(no more Georges) and loss, registered by Trollope's sympathetic hand- 
ling of her reluctance to accept Grey. 
For Henry James both financial independence and intellectual inde- 
pendence are prerequisites for the exploration of 
the self. Conse- 
quently he allows his heroines 
to cultivate 'their own intentions'. 
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He appears to question Jane Austen's belief that merely to make a 
wise floral decision to marry a 'manly man' constitutes a sufficient 
cause for self fulfilment : in the three novels analysed here the 
equation between love and marriage is not at all straightforward. 
What is clear, however, is the importance James gives to perception, 
an emphasis he shares with Austen. Trollope, as we have seen, doesn't 
expect of his heroines that they should be very perceptive (although 
Madame Max is an obvious exception); he expects a 'manly man' to 
guide, direct and dispose the hearts of each of his passionately active 
women. 
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Isabel Archer, the heroine of The Portrait of a Lady who has 
'intentions of her own', wishes to decide her own fate. Isabel believes 
the self is limited only by what one dares to achieve. Her refusal to 
see that others conceive of self in terms of external manifestations 
such as material possessions (Mme. Merle's collection of teacups) cre- 
ates immense difficulties for her. At the same time, because her aes- 
thetic sensibility directs her moral judgments, she is easily deceived 
by surfaces : she assumes that since her friends have exquisite taste 
they must also be as deeply thinking and as generous as herself. She 
ignores Henrietta's generosity precisely because she finds the surface 
her former friend projects distasteful. Whereas in Jane Austen's novels 
the self has a definite shape which the heroine must discover, and in 
Anthony Trollope's novels the self must learn to accommodate social and 
political changes (socially-determined man), James poses the self deter- 
mined by external signs 
(the hollow self represented by Osmond) against 
the free spirit Isabel wishes to exercise. Independent thought and 
action, outward manifestations of intellectual 
independence, may or may 
not prove the existence of an inner self 
(or soul), as Isabel discovers 
to her horror. 
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Now we turn to ontological independence, which is exemplified 
by an inward struggle for a knowledge of self. Because Jane Austen 
disliked the romantic notion of the completely self-absorbed indivi- 
dual in search of private truth, she tends to confront the heroine's 
erring consciousness with the need to exist happily in society. In 
Jane Austen's novels the inward struggle for self occurs at a point 
in which the heroine, recognizing her love for the hero, suddenly 
knows herself and knows him. In the letter sequence from Pride and 
Prejudice, Jane Austen, through Elizabeth, attempts to associate the 
recognition of the limits of self (the humbled vanity) with the recog- 
nition of self in others (the admitted justice of Darcy's explanation). 
The process of knowing herself and seeing the self in others is simul- 
taneous. In Emma, the connection between perception and morality 
becomes important to Emma's awareness of self. It is not until she 
can accept the importance of other centres of consciousness that she 
can learn to love. In all of Jane Austen's novels this identification 
of a solid, discoverable self is important. Perception is an issue of 
moral consequence precisely because it involves the discovery of self. 
The Victorian critic R. H. Hutton is both perceptive and sentimen- 
tally reflective when he compares Anthony Trollope's concept of self 
with that of Jane Austen. He wistfully recalls the 'rural life of Miss 
Austen's pictures' in which: 
'Everyone is what he is by the natural force of his 
own nature and tastes. You hardly ever see the 
crush of the world on anyone. The vain man's van- 
ity sedately flowers; the dull man's dullness runs 
to seed; the proud man's pride strikes its roots 
deep; even the fidgettiness of fidgetty persons 
appears to come from within, not from the irrita- 
tion of external pressure. ' 
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But half a century later, 'the rush of commercial activity, of the 
competitiveness of fashion, of the conflict for existence' has changed 
this quiet rural world: 
'Turn to Mr. Trollope, and everything is changed. 
The atmosphere of -affairs is permanent. The 
church or the world, or the flesh or the devil, 
seems always at work to keep men going, and pre- 
vent them from being exactly themselves. Miss 
Austen's people are themselves alone. Mr. 
Trollope's people are themselves so far as the 
circumstances of the day will allow them to be 
themselves, but very often are much distorted 
from their most natural selves. '30 
I would like to suggest that Hutton overstates the case in much the same 
way that Trollope overstates the case in his novels. Trollope starts 
not far from Jane Austen's idea; he still believes in a discoverable 
self, but his novels show a self which exists only tenuously as a con- 
sequence of ceaseless adaptation to social and political circumstances. 
Both Hutton and Trollope imagine and long for a stable self which has 
been abandoned and must be rediscovered, a sentiment expressed by 
Matthew Arnold in 'The Buried Life': 
'I knew the mass of men conceal'd 
Their thoughts, for fear that if reveal'd 
They would by other men be met 
With blank indifference, or with blame reproved; 
I knew they lived and moved 
Trick'd in disguises, alien to the rest 
Of men, and alien to themselves--and yet 
The same heart beats in every human breast! ' 
Arnold here expresses what Hutton meant by 'the atmosphere of affairs', 
the impress of 'the flesh or the devil' upon men which prevents them 
from being 'exactly themselves'. In the midst of 'the din of strife', 
however, Arnold continues: 
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'There rises an unspeakable desire 
After the knowledge of our buried life, 
A thirst to spend our fire and restless force 
In tracking out our true, original course; 
A longing to inquire 
Into the mystery of this heart that beats 
So wild, so deep in us, to know 
Whence our thoughts come and where they go ... And long we try in vain to speak and act 
Our hidden self and what we say and do 
Is eloquent, is well--but 'tis not true: ' 
Later in the poem Arnold expresses the difference the touch of a lover 
makes. All of a sudden the stream is laid bare and the self rediscov- 
ered: 
'A bolt is shot back somewhere in our breast 
And a lost pulse of feeling stirs again: 
The eye sinks inward, and the heart lies plain, 
And what we mean we say, and what we would, we know. '31 
James gives a similar significance to the image of the 'slipped bolt'; 
it appears in The Portrait of a Lady when Osmond admits to Isabel his 
love for her: 
'The tears came into her eyes : this time they 
obeyed the sharpness of the pang that suggested 
to her somehow the slipping of a fine bolt-- 
backward, forward, she couldn't have said which. ' 
(XXIX) 
For Arnold, the slipped bolt allows the true, buried self to emerge, 
and complete understanding between two people to occur. Here Arnold is 
very close to Austen's notion of love (for Elizabeth Bennet and Emma 
Woodhouse) : the simultaneous recognition of self in others with a know- 
ledge of one's own heart (although Arnold's love is momentary and not 
always easily turned into the institution of marriage). The cruel 
irony of Isabel Archer's recognition is that Osmond's declaration of his 
love for her is not all that it appears to be; and Isabel, deceived by 
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a charging appearance as Fanny Price was never deceived by Henry 
Crawford, believes his sincerity. The bolt slips, leaving Isabel 
vulnerable to the soulless aesthete. Arnold fervently believed in 
the existence of the buried heart that beats in every breast; James 
shows us that some people have no heart. 
Trollope is more hopeful than James. His idea involves accommo- 
dation and compromise, imagining a self in flux which must adapt to 
changing social and political circumstances in order to survive. 
Glencora Palliser is a master of such political adaptation ... 
Trollope transforms Glencora from a child imbued with romantic notions 
of self (she bares her soul to Alice at midnight in the Priory ruins) 
to a woman more politically astute than her husband who believes that 
romance and poetry are stuff and nonsense. Glencora's great extension 
of self, her willingness to sacrifice her self for Palliser, signals 
her transformation. The self in these novels is defined by relations 
with others, for the self extends through love to encompass the changes 
wrought by love. Glencora's struggle to discover and maintain a sense 
of self reflects Trollope's idea of an elusive, buried self. Glencora 
sacrifices herself entirely to promote her husband's political greatness. 
That Glencora dies before the start of The Duke's Children does not 
necessarily imply that her search, which leads to emptiness at the pin- 
nacle of social and political success, had all been for nought. For the 
Duke discovers in that novel just how important to him, personally and 
politically, she had been. Trollope began to suspect that the self he 
and Hutton and Arnold had believed buried disintegrates as a consequence 
of forever playing social and political roles and of sacrificing the 
self for another. Not until he writes the bitter The Way We Live Now 
does Trollope appear to give up altogether on the buried self : Felix 
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Carbury and Augustus Melmotte are hideous creations. 
Robert Langbaum, who conceives the self not in private terms 
(inward struggle) but in larger social terms, writes of the change in 
the concept of self between the 'romanticists', who: 
... broke down the socially defined outline 
of character in order to liberate a vital and 
authentic self the existence of which they 
firmly believed in., 
and 'writers nowadays', who 'In attempting to liberate the individual 
from the social and moral categories that define him, (have) somehow 
dissolved him out of existence'. 
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Langbaum's implicit assumption is 
that the self is determined in the context of society as having form 
and substance only because it is bounded by social and moral rules. 
It is as if he saw the self thus unfettered as the gas which is let out 
of a balloon : once the balloon is pricked the gas escapes into the air 
and dissolves into nothing. 
But Henry James sees the self as having a form of its own, inde- 
pendent of society for its existence. It is this self which engages in 
inward struggle. That this self may be frightening James does not deny. 
But he does believe that it is possible for one to preserve the soul's 
integrity if one recognizes, wrestles with and resolves the conflicts 
which inevitably arise from the social and moral demands made upon it. 
Henry James's concept of self assimilates moral vision and aesthetic 
vision (a modern version of sense and sensibility) and accepts good and 
evil as a part of the whole. In The Wings of the Dove, Kate Croy's 
preoccupation with surfaces and outward actions is posed against Milly's 
intense inward protection of self. Milly's way of seeing involves inward 
struggle. She subsumes her idea of self into the role Kate creates for 
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her (that of a dove) because she recognizes in her mortality the 
consequent material value she represents to others and is terrified 
that her real fearful self might be discovered and exposed. That she 
becomes a spiritual presence for Merton Densher and for Kate results 
from the very act of self sacrifice she makes to them. The self in 
The Golden Bowl engages in an intense private struggle for a knowledge 
of love and a discovery of the whole self. That James renders Maggie's 
consciousness in such detail emphasizes his concern with the self's 
inward struggle. James shows us that the result of Maggie's struggle 
is a self which recognizes and accepts responsibility for her actions, 
which reconciles the innocent with the guilty, the darker side with the 
light. When Maggie accepts and loves what is good and bad in her self 
she can then accept, forgive and love her husband as he needs (if not 
deserves) to be loved. 
As Robert Langbaum's argument suggests, the idea of a solid and 
discoverable self becomes more tenuous during the nineteenth century 
until it appears to disintegrate altogether in the early twentieth 
century. Such an argument would be supported by evidence in this pas- 
sage from Mrs. Dalloway (1925): 
'She had the oddest sense of being herself in- 
visible; unseen; unknown; there being no more 
marrying, no more having of children now, but 
only this astonishing and rather solemn progress 
with the rest of them, up Bond Street, this being 
Mrs. Dalloway; not even Clarissa any more; this 
being Mrs. Richard Dalloway. ` 
But Mrs. Dalloway does have a self. This passage speaks of her in the 
objective sense, as being seen, or not being seen. But at the same time 
she has a very sharp, private sense of self, a dark, frightening self 
she wishes no one else to see: 
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'It rasped her, though, to have stirring about in 
her this brutal monster! to hear twigs cracking 
and feel hooves planted down in the depths of 
that leaf-encumbered forest, the soul; never 
to be content quite, or quite secure, for at any 
moment the brute would be stirring, this hatred, 
which, especially since her illness, had power to 
make her feel scraped, hurt in her spine; gave 
her physical pain, and made all pleasure in beauty, 
in friendship, in being well, in being loved and 
making her home delightful rock, quiver, and bend 
as if indeed there were a monster grubbing at the 
roots, as if the whole panoply of content were 
nothing but self love! this hatred! '33 
Jane Austen continually suspected the romantic notion of self as an 
excuse for self-worship; thus Emma's sin of self-esteem is corrected. 
Clarissa Dalloway suspects herself of the same. And 'this brutal mon- 
ster' recalls the pacing panther which Milly sees in Kate and which 
Maggie sees in both Charlotte and herself. But each of these women 
must suppress the pacing panther, the brutal monster, if they are to 
preserve any outward semblance of orderly existence. No, the self 
hasn't disintegrated, but it has turned wild and unpredictable. In 
order to allow for this new perception of the self, the novelist had 
to re-define 'character' and accordingly reshape the forms of fiction. 
In a letter to Edward Garnett, D. H. Lawrence writes of his idea of 
character in the novel (1911+): 
'I don't so much care what the woman feels--in 
the ordinary usage of the word. That presumes 
an ego to feel with. I only care for what the 
woman is--what she is--inhumanly, physiologically, 
materially--according to the use of the word ... 
You mustn't look in my novel for the old stable 
ego of the character. There is another 2&o, 
according to whose action the individual is un- 
recognizable, and passes through, as it were 
allotropic states which it needs a deeper sense 
than any we've been used to exercise, to discover 
are states of the same single radically unchanged 
element. (Like as diamond and coal are the same 
pure single element of carbon. The ordinary novel 
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would trace the history of the diamond--but 
I say, 'Diamond, what! This is carbon'. And 
my diamond might be coal or soot, and my theme 
is carbon. )'34 
And in To The Lighthouse less. Ramsay thinks of herself: 
'To be silent; to be alone. All the being and 
the doing, expansive, glittering, vocal, evapo- 
rated; and one shrunk, with a sense of solemnity, 
to being oneself, a wedge-shaped core of darkness, 
something invisible to others ... '35 
The present study is, however, devoted to the development of an 
idea in nineteenth century literature. Jane Austen seems to me to pro- 
vide a reasonable starting point. Her writing looks backward as she 
reacts against the late eighteenth century romantics and looks forward 
with her development of the heroine who exemplifies intellectual inde- 
pendence. Anthony Trollope is an excellent representative of the mid- 
Victorian paradox; his women characters (unlike those of Charles 
Dickens) do not derive their reason for being from men. Rather, they 
accommodate themselves to men's wishes, a subtle distinction but an 
important one. And Henry James looks backward, wistfully, at Austen's 
solid, comforting, innocent self and forward, despairingly, to 
the dark, 
unknowable self of the twentieth century; a self which, had 
they known 
what was to come, would have made Anthony Trollope and 
R. H. Hutton 
shudder. 
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Chapter II 
Jane Austen and the Business of Getting 
Husbands : The Self in Agreement with Society 
Because Jane Austen's novels deal with the subject of courtship 
and marriage repeatedly in different guises, they have a deceptive 
simplicity which may divert the reader from moral issues disguised in 
quotidian detail. Rachel Trickett notes that this 'deceptive simpli- 
city' is 'not easily discussed in our critical terms'. We have, she 
claims, a bias towards the 'difficult' subject: 'Today we generally 
feel that the more complex the surface of a work, the more worthy it 
is of attention. '1 Trickett's point bears directly upon how we appre- 
hend the moral criteria implied by each of the novels. The subject 
(how the heroine, wittingly or unwittingly, goes about the 'business 
of getting a husband') may be repeated endlessly, but the content (what 
the author gets out of the subject) varies with the use of different 
narrative techniques which influence the reader's perception of moral 
issues. 
Jane Austen's novels are fundamentally comedic, but that should 
not prevent the reader from discerning the moral issues in question. 
Ian Watt's insight is useful here: ' ... we may fail to recognize 
the 
great issues of life in their humourous garb unless we are prepared to 
view the comic mode as an entertainment which can be both intellectually 
and morally serious. '2 Although many critics have argued either that 
moral issues are absent, or that they are raised but surreptitiously 
fudged, I shall discuss the novels from the standpoint that moral 
issues are not only raised but also responsibly handled. The issues 
handled include the relation between perception and morality, 
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self-knowledge and independent action, imagination and distorted 
reality, free ethical choice and forced compromise. 
The importance of money in Jane Austen's novels to the future 
happiness of her heroines is taken for granted by the narrator. At 
the same time the narrator does not completely endorse marriage for 
purely practical reasons. In A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 
Mary Wollstonecraft writes: 
'In the middle rank of life ... men, in their 
youth, are prepared for professions, and 
marriage is not considered as the grand feature 
in their lives; whilst women, on the contrary, 
have no other scheme to sharpen their faculties. 
It is not business, extensive plans, or any of 
the excursive flights of ambition, that engross 
their attention; no, their thoughts are not 
employed in rearing such noble structures. To 
rise in the world, and have the liberty of run- 
ning from pleasure to pleasure, they must marry 
advantageously, and to this object their time 
is sacrificed and their persons often legally 
prostituted. ' 
The point Mary Wollstonecraft raises here figures explicitly in Sense 
and Sensibility when Marianne chides her sister for placing such 
importance on money in marriage: 
'Money can only give happiness where there is 
nothing else to give it. Beyond a competence, 
it can afford no real satisfaction as far as 
mere self is concerned. '' (SS: II: XVII 
The question of 'competence' (a sufficiency of means for living) is a 
significant factor in Fanny Price's being encouraged to marry Henry 
Crawford, in Edmund's interest in Mary Crawford, and in Anne Elliot' s 
being persuaded by Lady Russell's reasoning not to marry Wentworth: 
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'Anne Elliot, so young; known to so few, to be 
snatched off by a stranger without alliance 
or fortune; or rather sunk by him into a 
state of most wearing, anxious, youth-killing 
dependence! ' (P: I: IV) 
Arnie, unlike Marianne, makes no immediate reply in defence of sensi- 
bility; she follows Lady Russell's prudent advice, although she 
later regrets having done so: 
'How eloquent could Anne Elliot have been--how 
eloquent, at least, were her wishes on the 
side of early warm attachment, and a cheerful 
confidence in futurity, against that over- 
anxious caution which seems to insult exertion 
and distrust Providence l She had been forced 
into prudence in her youth, she had learned 
raznance as she grew older--the natural sequel 
of an unnatural beginning. ' (P: I: IV) 
Jane Austen allows passion to take the ascendant over prudence in 
marriage, albeit sardonically, near the end of Persuasion: 
'When any two young people take it into their 
heads to marry, they are pretty sure by perse- 
verance to carry their point, be they ever so 
poor, or ever so imprudent, or ever so little 
likely to be necessary to each other's ultimate 
comfort. This may be a bad morality to conclude 
with, but I believe it to be truth; and if such 
parties succeed, how should a Captain Wentworth 
or an Anne Elliot, with the advantage of 
maturity of mind, consciousness of right, and 
one independent fortune between them, fail of 
bearing down every opposition? ' (P: II: XII) 
With such an avowal it is not surprising that Mark Schorer categorizes 
Persuasion as an economic novel: 
... this is a novel about marriage as a market, 
and about the female as marketable, and that 
the novel makes the observation that to senti- 
mental scruple and moral fastidiousness, as they 
are revealed to us in the drama, much property 
is not necessary, but some is essential ... '5 
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It could be said that because Jane Austen provides the returning 
hero with the only thing he lacked eight years earlier to marry the 
heroine, she has fudged the issue of prudent marriage. But Marianne 
was right when she tells her sister (with no contradiction or other 
qualification from the narrative) that: "Money can only give happi- 
ness where there is nothing else to give it. Beyond a competence, it 
can afford no real satisfaction as far as mere self is concerned. '' 
(SS: II: XVII) 
The exploration of the morality of the 'prudent' marriage is no 
less important to Pride and Prejudice. The 'desire of being well- 
married' matters less to Elizabeth than marrying someone she esteems 
and loves. Doubtless Mr. Bennet' s poor choice of spouse reminds 
Elizabeth perpetually of the importance of her own decision. Her 
father urges her to consider carefully the business of 'getting 
hu sb ands' : 
''I know that you could be neither happy nor 
respectable, unless you truly esteemed your 
hu sb and; unless you looked up to him as a 
superior. Your lively talents would place 
you in the greatest danger in an unequal 
marriage. You could scarcely escape discredit 
and misery. My child, let me not have the 
grief of seeing you unable to respect your 
partner in life. You know not what you are 
about. '' (LIX) 
While Elizabeth fully realizes the finality of such a decision and 
approaches the business with great caution, Charlotte's philosophy is 
far more pragmatic and much less hopeful, and bears great sirdlarity 
to Mary Crawford' s invective against the 'take in': 
''Happiness in marriage is entirely a matter of 
chance. If the dispositions of the parties are 
ever so similar before hand, it does not advance 
. >o 
their felicity in the least. They always 
continue to grow sufficiently unlike after- 
wards to have their share of vexation; and 
it is better to know as little as possible 
of the defects of the person with whom you 
are to pass your life. ' (VI) 
Elisabeth begins to question the 'economies' of marriage when she 
sees Charlotte's satisfaction with her 'parish and her poultry'. And 
when Wickham chases after a woman with a small fortune she declares 
in his defence: "Pray, my dear aunt, what is the difference in 
matrimonial affairs, between the mercenary and the prudent motive? 
Where does discretion end and avarice begin? " (XXVII) 
Jane Austen's novels show that the freedom to choose depends on 
financial security; the use made of that freedom depends on the quali- 
ties of intellectual independence. Clear judgment and accurate percep- 
tion are outward manifestations of intellectual independence. For this 
reason the ability to perceive one's fellow man accurately has important 
moral consequences for the heroines of Jane Austen's novels. Susan 
Morgan emphasizes Jane Austen's ability in fiction to distinguish 'the 
problem of perception from that of individual fallibility and moral 
improvement'. 
6 
The reader must disentangle the heroine's conscious- 
ness from the possibly critical narrative voice. In each case Jane 
Austen sets the heroine's interested and subjective perspective against 
a more objective narrative voice. Differences of narrative approach 
in each of the novels highlight different aspects of the problem of 
perception. All of the heroines possess active imaginations, most 
readily impute motives to other characters, and some make the 
imagin- 
ative leap of sympathy to other centres of consciousness. 
In her 
novels the self has a shape which the heroine must 
discover, a self 
which finds a natural place in society, even if 
it may not be in 
39 
complete agreement with society's expectations for it. The proper 
self in Jane Austen's novels makes wise moral decisions in an orderly 
society; personal fulfilment is found in marriage which is the 
appropriate goal of the self. 
1 
In Pride and Prejudice we see the expansion of the heroine's 
consciousness primarily through her perspective. The challenge 
Darcy represents to Elizabeth provides the main interest in the novel. 
In spite of her energetic dislike her curiosity prevents her from 
ignoring him. She derives 'the highest kind of pleasure' from study- 
ing at close range a most intricate character, a pleasure similar to 
that which Ralph Touchett derives from observing his cousin Isabel 
Archer (see Portrait of a Lady, Chapter VII). And like Isabel, 
admirable as her analytical powers may be, Elizabeth does not see 
that her life choices are severely limited, a limitation upon which 
Marvin Mudrick comments: 
'Her own pride is in her freedom, to observe, to 
analyze, to choose; her continual mistake is 
to forget that, even for her, there is only one 
area of choice--marriage--and that this choice 
is subject to all the powerful and numbing pres- 
sures of an acquisitive society. 17 
Mudrick's comment applies to several of the women characters we shall 
study here. What makes their individual cases interesting is the way 
in which their creators have explored the dilemma. 
Elizabeth 'archly' challenges Darcy's social expectations. She 
refuses to grovel or fawn; her resistance raises her to the level of 
her opponent upon a common battlefield of wit and irony. That she 
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refuses to succumb to his belated attentions denies the power of his 
attractiveness for her and exposes him to the effect his critical 
reserve has on others. Elizabeth justifiably cheats his 'premedita- 
ted contempt' and exacts revenge for his earlier insult, but the 
revenge shields her from emotional involvement. Revenge does not 
give way to self-doubt until Elizabeth's verbal assault on Darcy 
prompts his explanatory letter. It is a turning point for both of 
them. He is brought to realize that his coldly critical reserve pre- 
disposes people to dislike him; Elizabeth is brought to realize that 
the failure to revise her first impressions leads to a seriously mis- 
taken apprehension. Elizabeth's rational mind must accept evidence 
which her emotional response to him (that of intense dislike) would 
otherwise suppress. Marilyn Butler comments on this point that: 
'In Pride and Prejudice and Emma the rational has 
more prestige than the irrational, the outer 
world of evidence more than the inner world of 
imaginings. Jane Austen's method of presentation 
is meant to explode the sentimentalists' claim 
that sub j ectiye experience is the individual's 
tS whole truth. ' 
The passage in which Elizabeth acknowledges her error ostensibly 
represents her speech, but the prose is too self-consciously 'drama- 
tic', and is unlike the Elizabeth we have seen in the previous chap- 
ters. It is as though Jane Austen wrote about the change in the 
narrative voice, then decided to insert it as a speech. We have not 
so much a rendering of consciousness as an awkward soliloquy in a 
country lane: 
''How despicably have I acted! ' she cried. -- 
'I., who have prided myself on my abilities! 
who have often disdained the generous candour 
of my sister, and gratified my vanity, in 
useless or blameable distrust. --How humilia- 
ting is this discovery ! --Yet, how just a 
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humiliation! --Had I been in love, I could not 
have been more wretchedly blind. But vanity, 
not love, has been my folly. --Pleased with the 
preference of one, and offended by the neglect 
of the other, on the very beginning of air 
acquaintance, I have courted prepossession and 
ignorance, and driven reason away, where either 
were concerned. Till this moment, I never knew 
myself. " (XxXVI 
Only the last sentence in this passage actually sounds like Elizabeth. 
Jane Austen, through Elizabeth, attempts to associate in this passage 
the recognition of limits of self (the humbled vanity) with the recog- 
nition of self in others (the admitted justice of Darcy' s explanation). 
She claims at the end of the passage that she has not known herself; 
but she began by stating ho, % until them she had never known Darcy or 
Wickham. The process of recognizing her self and the self in others 
is simultaneous; the recognition implies the existence of a stable, 
discoverable self. 
Susan Morgan writes that the change in Elizabeth's attitude is 
crucial to her Future freedom: 
'Gratitude, then, is the response by means of 
which Austen seeks to define freedom and intel- 
ligence within the binding circumstances of 
emotions, partial understandings, and incom- 
plete truths. '9 
Elizabeth needs Darcy to help her to enlarge the vision of life which 
the Bennet household has severely limited. He needs Elizabeth to help 
him to understand how he affects other people. 
That Elizabeth does marry Darcy in the end has more to do with 
an act of self-knowledge 
(in recognizing kinship with others) than 
with a vindication of 'prudent' marriage as the only proper career for 
her or any woman. What disturbs Elizabeth about Charlotte's marriage 
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is that she believes Charlotte can't possibly know what Mr. Collins 
will be like as a husband. She watches with astonishment as 
Charlotte adjusts to her new life without any regret. Elizabeth's 
attitude anticipates Violet Effingham's complaint that ''men expect 
that women shall put on altogether new characters when they are 
married, and girls think that they can do so". (PR: III) Elizabeth's 
recognition of Darcy's worth comes gradually: 
'She began now to comprehend that he was exactly 
the man, who in disposition and talents, would 
most suit her. His understanding and temper, 
though unlike her own, would have answered all 
her wishes. It was a union that must have been 
to the advantage of both; by her ease and 
liveliness, his mind might have been softened, 
his manners improved, and from his judgment, 
information, and knowledge of the world, she 
must have received benefit of greater 
importance. ' (L) 
The extension of understanding between them will allow each to sympa- 
thize with and live in the world a little more. Part of our pleasure 
in the novel derives from the apparently impossible surmounting of 
constraints of character and circumstance. In Emma we shall see how 
the main issue of Pride and Prejudice, that self-knowledge which 
entails a concern for others, is raised to the nth degree. 
2 
In Mansfield Park Fanny Price embodies the idea of self which 
preserves its integrity outside society until it grows confident 
enough to adumbrate its values to that society. In the end 
Fanny is 
what Mansfield Park always ought to have been. 
But when we first meet 
Fanny she possesses no degree of self-importance whatsoever; on the 
contrary she effaces herself as much as possible. 
She wants very much 
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to belong to Mansfield Park, but for a long while her habit of self- 
effacement bars her from any active role besides that of the passive 
female. Indeed her only tangible connection with the family consists 
of Edmund's intermittent kindnesses. 
Denis Donoghue writes that Mansfield Park develops from the con- 
cept of 'the moral sense and the possibility of improving it or cor- 
rupting it'. 
10 The issue has relevance for the Bertrams and the 
Crawfords, but Fanny's commitment to the full use of her moral sense 
never wavers. Her progress is rather towards greater independence of 
thought and action. Whereas Elizabeth and Emma discover limitations 
of self and centres of self in others, Fanny learns the possibilities 
of self and develops reliance on self rather than others. 
But first Fanny must go through a difficult passage. Her initial 
dependence on Edmund - '... if Edmund were not there to mix the wine 
and water for her, [she] would rather go without it than not' - becomes 
a territorial claim upon his attentions. Her failure to acknowledge 
a more than cousinly emotional involvement with Edmund is dangerous 
in that it distorts her vision of those (such as Mary Crawford) who 
might properly receive his attentions. Fanny's moral criteria prevent 
her from publicly admitting to a jealous love. But because the nar- 
rator allows us to see her shortcomings, Fanny's determination 
to 
overcome difficulties is all the more impressive. 
It would be easy 
for us to write Fanny off as being too boringly nice, were 
it not for 
the fact that Jane Austen is too morally realistic to allow 
Fanny to 
love Edmund without feeling jealousy in the presence of a rival. 
Con- 
sequently we see Fanny repressing 
her feelings and venting her frus- 
tration through criticism. 
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Fanny anxiously attempts to acquit Edmund of responsibility 
for the theatricals by placing the blame upon Mary's persuasive 
arguments. Yet she does not stop to think about his principles (or 
lack of them) nor why he is attracted to Mary. Fanny refuses never- 
theless to concede to Mary her emotional claim on Edmund, despite 
her knowledge that Mary has a better claim. Mary's claim on Edmund 
is based on sound fundamentals : she is well-provided with a fortune, 
she is attractive, intelligent, and eager to please. Furthermore she 
knows that he is attracted to her, which gives her the right to show 
her interest in him more clearly. Fanny is technically 'out of 
bounds' for Edmund not only because she has no fortune but also 
because she is his first cousin, and such marriages were still regar- 
ded with some suspicion. Is Jane Austen indulging Edmund, or indeed 
Fanny, at the expense of Mary? If this is so, then it is possible to 
see why Kingsley Amis was provoked to comment in Mansfield Park on 
' ... the Austen habit of censoriousness where there ought to be indul- 
gence and indulgence where there ought to be censure'. 
11 
Even when Fanny knows and trusts her intuitions she doesn't trust 
herself enough to expose them; consequently she mast act a role. She 
must not explain to her uncle why she refuses Henry Crawford, for then 
he might discover that she harbours an intense affection for Edmund; 
an affection dangerous not just because of their kinship but also 
because Edmund does not bear the same affection for Fanny. And in the 
world of Mansfield Park, the man must always declare his affections 
first. Here Jane Austen's technique renders Fanny's consciousness 
while making oblique narrative references to previous occurrences in 
the novel: 
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'His niece was deep in thought likewise, trying 
to harden and prepare herself against farther 
questioning. She would rather die than own the 
truth, and she hoped by a little reflection to 
fortify herself beyond betraying it. ' (XXXII) 
The choice of the infinitive 'to harden' is a specific reference to 
acting : Edmund speaks of 'good hardened real acting' (XIII) and Mary 
says of her part "I I do not think I could go through it with him, till 
I have hardened myself a little". (XVIII) Consequently, Fanny 
resorts to the very thing she deplores - creating a role, a decep- 
tion - in order to divert attention from herself. But, as she has 
already admitted, she certainly cannot act, so it does not surprise 
us that her portrayal is unconvincing. Sir Thomas finds her indepen- 
dent manner 'offensive and disgusting', and condemns her severely: 
''... you have now shewn me that you can be wilful 
and perverse, that you can and will decide for 
yourself, without any consideration or deference 
for those who have surely some right to guide you 
--without even asking their advice. '' (XXXQI) 
Sir Thomas might well wonder what Fanny is trying to achieve. Her 
refusal of an offer to him appears to be the delusion of an ill woman, 
insofar as she has no viable alternative to marriage : no money, little 
education, a delicate constitution, and a tremendous need to be taken 
care of. Because Sir Thomas thinks he has 'done his duty' by Fanny 
long enough, he considers it her duty now to marry well. 
In connection with Fanny's emerging independence, Lionel 
Trilling's discussion of the paradox of self is useful. He writes 
that 'the self may destroy the self by the very energies that define 
its being, that the self may be preserved by the negation of its own 
, 12 energies . Fanny's preservation rests on 
her 'ready habit of sub- 
mission', her long practised ability to repress her feelings and 
energies. We recognize Fan y's desire for protection as well as her 
desire to preserve the integrity of self. Her fear of acting stems 
from the unwillingness to put her integrity to the test. When Fanny 
hardens herself to prevent the others from discovering her real rea- 
son for refusing Henry Crawford, we see the difficulty with which 
she acts and the unconvincing portrayal she gives. She senses that 
something is wrong, and that she must get away from Mansfield so that 
she won't have to act anymore. Portsmouth may adversely affect her 
physical health, but it gives her the necessary perspective to estab- 
lish the possibilities of self. 
John Lauber writes that: 'Integrity and self-defense, in the 
deepest sense, are the major concerns of the novel, but freedom is 
essential, and for all her timidity Fanny judges freely and acts upon 
her judgements. ' 
13 Fanny's newly-found independence of thought and 
action entails the problem of isolation. Yet Fanny has always been 
isolated, and her independence gives her the strength to carry on 
regardless. Others begin to depend on her for strength : her sister 
in Portsmouth, Lady Bertram on her return, Edmund in his confusion. 
In two important ways Fanny's emergence as the vindicated heroine 
is justified. First, despite the attempts to hide it, Fanny's attach- 
ment to Ednund is the single most important emotional tie in the 
novel. Mary Crawford's feelings have no such depth; she seems to 
care for no one but herself. Fanny by comparison cares not only for 
her adopted family but also for the preservation of values which she 
adumbrates to Mansfield Park. The second important way in which 
Fanny's vindication is justified is her defence of strongly held 
principles. Mary's values change with the fashion in London, unlike 
46 
i 
47 
Fanny's. Mary will concede to the wishes of others if it suits her 
purpose (her eagerness to join in the play, the glee singing, the 
London social wrirl). Mary's defiance is more perverse than purpose- 
ful, as D. D. Devlin convincingly argues: 
... What gives pathos and interest to Mary 
Crawford is that she considers herself emanci- 
pated, free from convention, from belief, from 
everything that restricts the growth of person- 
ality ... Her want of freedom appears in her 
inability to see that free choice is even 
possible. ' 14 
Mary's bravado foreshadows Louisa. isgrove's determination to act 
firmly regardless of consequences at Lyme Regis. But where Louisa 
suffers an actual fall, Mary falls only from grace in Edmund's eyes, 
a fall foreshadowed by her first appearance at Mansfield. Mary hasn't 
changed, but the Mary Edmund wanted to believe in has. Until she 
meets Edmund, Mary views marriage with expectations of deception and 
betrayal : 
''.. , there is not one in a hundred of either 
sex, who is not taken in when they marry ... 
'tis, of all transactions the one in which 
people expect most from others, and are least 
honest themselves ... it is a manoeuvring 
business. I know so many who have married in 
the full expectation and confidence of some one 
particular advantage in the connection, or 
accomplishment or good quality in the person, 
who have found themselves entirely deceived, 
and been obliged to put, up with exactly the 
reverse ! What is this, but a take in? '' (V) 
Marriage requires both submission and moral superiority from Mary, 
neither of which she will accept. Like Kate Croy in The Wings of the 
Dove she does not recognize moral distinctions and is consequently 
rendered unfit to marry in the eyes of the man she loves. 
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Fanny, in the end, demonstrates her independence in thought and 
action. She doesn't believe in improvement merely for the sake of 
change. But we know that she derives pleasure from the process. On 
the subject of 'improving' parks she exclaims: '' It would be delight 
ful to me to see the progress of it all. " (VI) Fanny defines herself 
against the decaying moral fabric of Mansfield Park. But the ending 
of the novel suggests the promise of a perfect Mansfield, a platonic 
ideal society which lies just around the corner: 
'On [the death of Dr. Grant] they removed to 
Mansfield, and the parsonage there, which under 
each of its two former owners, Fanny had never 
been able to approach but with some painful 
sensation of restraint or alarm, soon grew as 
dear to her heart, and as thoroughly perfect in 
her eyes, as everything else, within the view 
and patronage of Mansfield Park, had long been. ' 
(XLVIII) 
From her vantage at the living of Mansfield she will make of Mansfield 
Park what it hasn't been : she will give it the moral principles it 
lacked. That everything else had long appeared 'thoroughly perfect' 
in Fanny's eyes implies that she never saw, or had chosen not to see, 
Mansfield Park's imperfections. But because Fanny chooses to make her 
life at Mansfield, it is perhaps her way of coping with hardship : to 
see only the good in people and places. Henry James revises this kind 
of attitude with Maggie Verver in The Golden Bowl. 
3 
In Pride and Prejudice and Emma we see how Jane Austen advocates 
the coincidence of the self's expectations with those of society. In 
Mansfield Park, she illustrates the self against society, a self whose 
integrity is preserved by remaining outside the fold. Jane Austen 
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wasn't entirely happy with the idea of self reconciled to social 
expectations. Where she has been hard on Marianne Dashwood for 
clinging to an idea of self which depends upon feeling as a guide 
to conduct (the innate moral sense), in Persuasion she treats Anne 
Elliot's sensibility mach more generously. Where before she had 
burlesqued feeling, now she burlesques the kind of 'firm resolve' 
exemplified by Louisa Musgrove's anxious attempts to win Wentworth's 
approval. A number of issues discussed between Elinor and Marianne 
are re-examined in Persuasion. "What have wealth or grandeur to do 
with happiness? " asks Marianne. Elinor's reply resembles the reason- 
ing used by Lady Russell: "Grandeur has but little, but wealth has 
mach to do with it. '' (SS: II: XVII) It is no coincidence that Anne's 
age matches that mocked by Marianne in Sense and Sensibility: 
"A woman of seven and twenty', said Marianne, 
after pausing a moment, 'can never hope to feel 
or inspire affection again, and if her home be 
uncomfortable, or her fortune shall, I can sup- 
pose that she might bring herself to submit to 
the offices of a nurse for the sake of the pro- 
vision and security of a wife. " (I: VIII 
And the narrator's words in Persuasion reverberate, it seems, for the 
creator of character herself as well as for Anne Elliot, both of whom 
were 'forced into prudence' in their youth and learn romance only as 
they grow older. Thus Persuasion is Jane Au sten' s natural sequel to 
what she now sees as an unnatural beginning. Marianne has been be- 
trayed by her creator, as Marvin Mudrick suggests, 
15 
and as Marianne's 
own words indicate: ''Elinor, I have been cruelly used; but not by 
Willoughby. '' (II: VII) The narrative betrayal begins two chapters 
later with these words: 
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'Like half the rest of the world, if more 
than half there be that are clever and good, 
Marianne, with excellent abilities and an 
excellent disposition, was neither reasonable 
nor candid. She expected from other people 
the sate opinions and feelings as her own, and 
she judged of their motives by the immediate 
effect of their actions on herself. ' (II: IX) 
Marvin Mudrick views Marianne more sympathetically than her creator 
does. He believes her problems arise from a 'bold but incomplete 
awareness'. It is the kind of incomplete awareness which, as we 
shall see, Isabel Archer possesses. Mudrick describes Marianne's 
problem as being the '... interpretation of personality : the dis- 
crimination ... of substance from plausibility', and goes on to 
praise her for her efforts: 
'The prcble:.., though its solution is complicated 
for Marianne by her ardor, her eager suscep- 
tibleness to first impressions, is an adult one; 
and on the whole she does very well with it, 
hardly less well than Elinor--or than the author 
herself. ' 16 
Marianne Dashwood deserves a better fate than Col. Brandon, and 
Jane Austen does atone for her narrative cruelty in Sense and 
Sensibility by giving Anne Elliot a second chance with the dashing 
Captain Wentworth. (No, not another wicked anti-here, like 7+illoughby 
or Wickham, nor boring and uninspired, like Edward Ferrars or Edmund 
Bertram. ) Wentworth shows none of Henry Tilney's clever condescension, 
or Darcy's haughty reserve, or Mr. Knightie;; 's father-like affection. 
Wentworth is 'brilliant' and 'headstrong', giving him a 'dangerous 
character' in Lady Russell's eyes. here at last Jane Austen gives us 
a hero she need make no apologies for. 
Anne Elliot is an outsider like Fanny Price, and like Fanny s- e 
never directly confronts her lover with her feelings; she works the :L 
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out rather in meditative reflection or in conversations with trusted 
third parties like Captain Harville. But by articulating the full 
force of her feeling to such a recent acquaintance at a public inn 
in a strange town Anne is a revolutionary character; for all 
Austen's scepticism about romanticism and reliance on sensibility she 
still approves of Anne when she allows her feelings to modify her pru- 
dential judgment. Unlike her earlier heroines, Jane Austen has given 
Anne a very full consciousness; the other characters leave Anne for 
the most part to her own devices. She learns independence through 
solitude, but she defers nevertheless to the preference of others in 
all things. All of Austen's heroines observe others, but Anne also 
makes, without any preliminary coaching, the imaginative leap of sym- 
pathy to other centres of consciousness. Austen renders these leaps 
in such a way that, even if Anne's surmises are incorrect, we see 
Anne's constant love through the screen of rational disavowal: 
'She understood him. He could not forgive her-- 
but he could not be unfeeling. Though condemning 
her for the past, and considering it with high 
and unjust resentment, though perfectly careless 
of her, and though becoming attached to another, 
still he could not see her suffer without the 
desire of giving her relief. It was a remainder 
of former sentiment; it was an impulse of pure, 
though unacknowledged friendship; it was a proof 
of his own warm and amiable heart, which she 
could not contemplate without emotions so com- 
pounded of pleasure and pain that she knew not 
which prevailed. ' (I: X) 
There is a strong current of emotion running between Anne and Wentworth, 
although it may not be obvious to the reader because even Anne deceives 
herself about her emotional involvement with Wentworth. She continu- 
ally tries to wish it away with magical incantations 
(''It is over! 
it is over! ''), but to no avail. Marvin Mud-rick writes persuasively, 
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on the other hand, of Anne's true propriety, consisting of 'discre- 
tion and judgement', which, he argues, 'have nothing to do with mere 
caution, conformity, moral sluggishness: 
'Certainly, without money and the leisure it 
provides, Anne could not have become what she 
is; money is the foundation of true as of 
false propriety, and without it Wentworth 
does not deserve Anne. Her error was to let 
Lady Russell persuade her against his destiny, 
against the temper and fiery ambition that 
virtually guaranteed it. The sailor's life 
quite suits Jane Austen's purposes because 
his attitude toward money is the right one : 
direct, unpretending; as towards sails and 
keels, lifeboats and yardarms--whatever a 17 
sensible man would much rather not do without. ' 
Anne considers marrying William Elliot because the idea challenges 
her to restore the family once again to Kellynch ... But in the face of 
the real Mr. Elliot the idea vanishes. Her judgment against him touches 
on both his perceived moral and emotional weaknesses: 
'She never could accept him. And it was not 
only that her feelings were still adverse to 
any man save one; her judgement, on a seri- 
ous consideration of the possibilities of 
such a case, was against Mr. Elliot ... 
'He certainly knew what was right, nor could 
she fix on any one article of moral duty evi- 
dently transgressed; but yet she would have 
been afraid to answer for his conduct ... Mr. 
Elliot was rational, discreet, polished--but 
he was not open. ' (II: V) 
Anne's judgment reflects what eight years' experience has taught her; 
she inclines toward the feeling of the heart now more than before. 
Logically, William Elliot would have made her a good husband by elim- 
inating, with his wealth and land, her economic difficulty. But the 
missing emotional ingredient outweighs logic. The self-reliance Anne 
learns does not encompass the idea of unlimited freedom. Anne attempts 
a solution which transcends the constraints of money, time, class, and 
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inclination. That Anne gives Wentworth the emotional space to 
re-experience his feelings for her emphasizes the importance Austen 
places on the respect for self in others. Sandra Gilbert and Susan 
Gubar argue convincingly for the covert action Jane Austen describes 
in her late novels. Overtly, Anne must gain Wentworth' s approval 
and protection as her father has literally turned her out of the 
ancestral house. Covertly, she recognizes Wentworth's space and 
refuses to enter it until he perceives of his own free will that only 
she can fill the space: 
'Austen's propriety is most apparent in the overt 
lesson she sets out to teach in all of her mature 
novels. Aware that male superiority is far more 
than a fiction, she always defers to the economic, 
social, and political power of men as she drama- 
tizes how and why female survival depends on 
gaining male approval and protection ... Whereas 
becoming a man means proving or testing one's 
self or earning a vocation, becoming a woman 
means relinquishing achievement and accommodating 
oneself to men and the spaces they provide. '18 
Wentworth refuses to return because he believes Anne ought to have 
trusted in his 'mere self'. The test of eight years shows two things : 
first, that Anne admits she should have trusted in him but felt morally 
compelled to follow the advice of Lady Russell, who kindly acted in her 
mother's stead; second, that their love remained steady even in their 
separate states of isolation. 
In Jane Austen's novels, the question of self-knowledge, wYdch is 
brought about through an awareness of self in others, is linked to 
independence of thought and action. The question is hung on the frame- 
work of marriage in all the novels, but its resolution varies with 
each heroine. Elizabeth's rebellious independence against 
Darcy is 
redirected toward a compassionate understanding of 
him. Fanny's timid 
moral sense is fortified by trial until she achieves independence 
of thought and action. And Anne, who possesses self-awareness, 
consciousness of self in others, and independence, learns not to defer 
to others' wishes but to trust in her own good judgment. In the next 
chapter we shall see how Emma' s overly-confident trust in self is 
chastened through recognition of the needs of others. 
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Chapter III 
'Emma' : Morality and the Failure of Perception 
1 
In Jane Austen's novels, rational judgment and perception are 
outward manifestations of intellectual independence. Although Austen 
believes that wealth is by no means an unequivocal good, she makes 
clear that without a certain amount of economic independence none of 
her heroines would be in a position to explore the possibilities of 
intellectual independence. She is clearly aware of the precarious 
financial position of women in Emma, for all except the heroine are 
constrained in thought and action by their relative poverty (except, 
of course, the absent Mrs. Churchill). In the novel, the dependence 
of intellectual independence upon wealth has moral consequences for 
Emma. But many critics argue that Jane Austen fails to resolve 
honestly the moral issues raised by the novel, and are severe in their 
criticism of the author for this presumed failure. E. N. Hayes dis- 
dainfully refers to the superficiality of Emma's 'intellectual and 
psychological understanding', and claims that its small number of 
characters gives it 'little meaning beyond the particularities of 
bourgeois courtship' in Jane Austen' s time. He accuses the author of 
failing to address her reader with 'any conception of the essential 
nature of man and society' which he considers to be 'the ultimate sub- 
ject of any good novel'. 
1 
In a similar vein John Wiltshire attacks 
the author for her failure 'to make the kind of criticism of Highbury 
life and its inhabitants, including Emma, that seems to need malting'. 
Darrel Mansell refers to the failure of the novel to 'make moral 
2 
points that apply directly to the reader's world', and in an am, sing 
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personification speaks of the novel's being 'content for the most 
part to pursue its own disinterested aesthetic purposes inside its 
own close little world'. 
3 
Bernard Harrison, on the other hand, 
would have us enter this world so completely as to understand the 
novel's moral criteria not just in the context of Emma's world but 
also of our own world. He claims that Emma 'may succeed in altering, 
for a time or even permanently, one's whole moral outlook'. But we 
should not be so swift to accept Emma's moral outlook, for the narra- 
tive does indulge Emma at the expense of Jane Fairfax for no other 
reason than that without her 'cold reserve' Jane might have engaged 
more of the reader's sympathy than she does already. 
The first three critics have not only made a judgment that 
, 
Emma 
fudges the issues, but that the novel is necessarily limited by this 
treatment. The assumption underlying their judgment is that a great 
novel will handle moral questions responsibly. And it is with this 
same point that Rmma's defenders make their claims for the novel's 
greatness. F. R. Leavis insists that without her 'intense moral pre- 
occupations' Austen wouldn't be the great novelist he reckons she is. 
In opposition to Mansell's claim that the novel pursues only 'its own 
disinterested aesthetic purposes', Leavis argues that it is impossible 
to separate the ''aesthetic' value' from its 'moral significance'. 
5 
In other words, he claims that aesthetic fineness incorporates moral 
fineness. 
David Lodge criticizes F. R. Leavis for discussing Emma not with 
'literary' concepts so much as 'ethical' concepts. He argues that the 
critical discussion ought rather to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
author's communication, but Lodge himself evades the link between the 
moral and aesthetic by equivocating: 
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'In the last analysis, literary critics can 
claim special authority not as witnesses to 
the moral value of works of literature, but 
as explicators and judges of effective commu- 
nication, of 'realization'. 
'This does not mean that critics can or should 
refrain from discussing the moral dimensions 
of novels in the course of reaching a literary 
evaluation. But their criteria of moral health 
must be controlled and modified by the aesthe- 
tic experience. '6 
Lodge implies that those critics (e. g., Hayes, Wiltshire, Mansell) who 
spend their time arguing about insufficiently addressed moral issues 
are missing the point of the 'aesthetic experience'. But all critics 
engage in a moral appraisal as part of the aesthetic appreciation of 
the work. Arnold Kettle's arguments support this view. He cites Jane 
Austen's 'passionate concern ... for human values' as evidence against 
the argument that she is 'morally neutral'. He admits the problem of 
limitation in Emma discussed by Wiltshire: ' ... the question at issue 
is not Jane Austen's failure to suggest a solution to the problem of 
class divisions but her apparent failure to notice the existence of 
the problem'. But he rejects the arguments which deny the importance 
of the moral in favour of the aesthetic: 'Those who try to divorce 
the values of art from those of life and consequently morality will 
not admit that the delight we find in reading Emma has in fact a moral 
basis. '7 
Edgar Shannon concedes the difficulty the reader may have in 
choosing the moral criteria with which to judge Emma: 'In Emma she 
presents her lessons so astutely and so dramatically, with such a 
minimum of exposition, that she places extreme demands upon the rea- 
der's perceptiveness. '8 One mast disentangle and examine the criteria 
present in the novel but not explicitly stated. And Stein Haugom Olsen 
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discusses a related difficulty for the reader in the evaluation of 
characters' moral values: 
'Though sympathy has long since been discredited 
as an explanatory principle in philosophy, it 
lingers on in literary criticism as one of its 
governing assumptions ... That is, sympathetic 
characters are exponents of acceptable moral 
standards; unsympathetic characters embody 
negative moral values. '9 
Olsen sensibly argues against allowing sympathy to determine our liter- 
ary evaluation of Emma; it is too easy to prejudge unsympathetic 
characters and consequently to miss the important issues raised by the 
novels themselves. 
10 
There are some critics who take the middle ground on the impor- 
tance of moral criteria per se in Austen Is novels. Graham Hough argues 
that the implied morality is 'eminently practical', and admirable, 
though limited, but does not believe that it 'makes her a novelist at 
all'. 
11 
Susan Morgan links morality to perception, placing the impor- 
tance on the character rather than on the principle: 
'Morality, in Emma, as in all Austen's novels, is 
not a code, or a norm, or principle, which one 
can live and die by. Instead, it is a way of 
seeing which includes within its definition some 
sort of candor or affection. '12 
Morgan's idea of morality as a 'way of seeing' is an important one, for 
it brings the 'problem' of perception into the 'moral' sphere. Darrel 
Mansel l' s comment that in the beginning of each of Au st en' s novels 'the 
heroine is under a spell that prevents her from seeing the world as it 
really is'13 is true, but he doesn't seem to view the failure of per- 
ception as an issue of moral consequence. Nor does r, mma herself at 
the outset of the novel: 
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'The real evils indeed of Emma' s situation were 
the power of having rather too much of her own 
way, and a disposition to think a little too 
well of herself; these were the disadvantages 
which threatened alloy to her many enjoyments. 
The danger, however, was at present so unper- 
ceived, that they did not by any means rank as 
misfortunes with her. ' (1) 
That these 'misfortunes' are 'at present so unperceived' should alert 
us to the possibility that there will be a time when Emma will per- 
ceive her danger. Austen's gentle irony may deflect the reader from 
making the connection between perception and morality, but this con- 
nection will become important to Emma's awareness of self. Unlike 
Mansell, Malcolm Bradbury does see Emma's failure of perception as 
having serious moral consequences: 
'The social and moral universe ... takes on all 
the weight of its significance here, for it pro- 
vides a context in which Emma's faults are not 
peccadilloes to be regarded with indulgence, but 14 
total violations of a whole worthwhile universe. ' 
But Ian Watt makes an important distinction between sight and moral 
perception: 
'It is surely mistaken to assume ... that aware- 
ness and insight, so often, and rightly, 
ascribed either to Jane Austen as narrator or 
to her major characters, are self-sufficient 
virtues : for how one sees is surely not more 
important than what one makes a point of see- 
ing, or not seeing. '15 
Indeed Emma' s failure of perception is a moral issue resolved in the 
novel by having her confront the very characters whose importance she 
has hitherto failed to perceive. It is not until she can accept the 
importance of other centres of consciousness that she can learn to 
love. Morality by no means makes the novel but forms a part of the 
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total 'aesthetic experience' of subsequent, if not initial, readings 
of Emma. 
2 
Jane Austen provides Emma with several opportunities to compare 
her own existence with that of the other women in Highbury. Not only 
do these women, through example or direct influence, enable Emma to 
break out of her cradle of self-absorption, they also allow the nar- 
rator to bring sharply into focus the idea of marriage as a practical 
necessity. With the exception of Miss Bates, whose high good humour 
and kindness often shield her from the abuses heaped upon the heads of 
old maids, virtually all the females in the novel are or will be 
engaged, married, or widowed, and all challenge, in their own way, the 
fairness of the rules established for them by a conforming society. 
16 
It is ironic that even the novel's heroine challenges the forced neces- 
sity, for she is the most eligible match of all. John Lauber pointedly 
distinguishes Emua's problem from that of the women around her: 
. .. there is no conflict between Emma and 
her 
society; there is no question of society inter- 
posing any barrier between her and whatever she 
might desire. Unlike any of the other heroines, 
Erna herself has social authority, and this 17 
authority proves dangerous to herself and others. 
Emma would not be in conflict with society, for she has been given many 
of society's advantages : social eminence, a P-30,000 fortune, attentive 
friends, a happy upbringing. She doesn't realize that the social res- 
ponsibility she bears is great. Here I agree with Lauber that such 
authority 'proves dangerous to herself and others'. But beyond Emma's 
responsibility or understanding are the other women in the story who 
must make do with far less. 
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When Emma's governess Miss Taylor marries Mr. Weston, Mr. 
Knightley has difficulty convincing Emma's father that miss Taylor 
needs independence from Hartfield. Mr. Woodhouse would have preferred 
that she stay on indefinitely as Emma's companion. But, in an attempt 
to widen Emma Is narrow, egocentric perspective, Mr. Knightley replies: 
'... she knows how much the marriage is to Miss 
Taylor's advantage; she knows how very accep- 
table it must be, at Miss Taylor's time of life, 
to be settled in a home of her own, and how 
important to her to be secure of a comfortable 
provision ... ' 
(I) 
Emma cannot comprehend any life situation but her own. It never occurs 
to her that an unmarried Miss Taylor would be set adrift without finan- 
cial certainty should 2°r. Woodhouse die and Emma marry. One infers 
from the narrative that Miss Taylor made a wise move in becoming Mrs. 
Weston, even though her position as governess was far more fortunate 
than most for which we have accounts. 
Miss Bates makes the best of a very bad situation. Her 'blessings' 
place her at the other end of the spectrum from Emma: 
'Miss Bates stood in the very worst predicament 
in the world for having much of the public 
favour; and she had no intellectual superiority 
to make atonement for herself, or frighten those 
who might hate her into outward respect ... her 
... life was 
devoted to the care of a failing 
mother, and the endeavour to make a small income 
go as far as possible. And yet she was a happy 
woman, and a woman whom no one named without 
goodwill. ' (III) 
Emma hasn't the imaginative transference of sympathy to appreciate 
Miss Bates's efforts to survive in a tough world. We know that she has 
Miss Bates in mind when she describes an old maid, although she has 
to qualify her description to exclude her; it is an excellent example 
of Jane Au sten' s complex narrative mode: 
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It ... it is poverty only which makes celibacy 
contemptible to a generous public. A single 
woman, with a very narrow income, must be a 
ridiculous, disagreeable, old maid! The proper 
sport of boys and girls; but a single woman, 
of good fortune, is always respectable, and may 
be as sensible and pleasant as anybody else. 
And the distinction is not quite so much against 
the candour and commonsense of the world as 
appears at first; for a very narrow income has 
a tendency to contract the mind, and sour the 
temper. Those who can barely live, and who 
live perforce in a very small, and generally 
very inferior, society, may well be illiberal 
and cross. This does not apply, however, to 
Miss Bates; she is only too good-natured and 
too silly to suit me; but in general, she is 
very much to the taste of everybody, though 
single and though poor. Poverty has certainly 
not contracted her mind :I really believe, if 
she had only a shilling in the world, she would 
be very likely to give away sixpence of it; and 
nobody is afraid of her : that is a great charm. ' 
(X) 
I 
Surely Emma is not threatened by Miss Bates; but her generous interest 
in others outshines Ram 's public charitable visits to the poor. And 
Miss Bates is forced to be more brave in the face of circumstances than 
Emma will ever have to be. 
Harriet Smith, the young woman about whom no one seems to know 
anything, is in an even more socially precarious position than Miss 
Bates. She is the illegitimate daughter of someone who pays the bills 
and refuses to come forward until the day she marries. Because she has 
nowhere to go upon completing her schooling in Highbury, she stays on 
at the school as a 'parlour boarder'. She has just two friends from 
school, the Martin sisters, with whom she has stayed for long visits. 
Had Emma left Harriet alone, Harriet would have married Robert Martin 
a year earlier than she does. Emma ignores Harriet's predicament 
because she doesn't understand the negative consequences of Harriet's 
unknown parentage. Jane Austen characteristically sets the heroine's 
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interested and subjective perspective against a more objective narra- 
tive voice, but sometimes it is hard for us to distinguish between 
them. When Emma says 'Such a heart--such a Harriet: ' (LIV), we 
might also suspect that this is Austen's judgement. Emma nearly 
ruins Harriet's chances by her failure to perceive the real consequen- 
ces of her little matchmaking games. She even goes so far as to cri- 
ticize Harriet for thinking well of herself - 'How Harriet could ever 
have had the presumption to raise her thoughts to Mr. Knightley: --How 
she could dare to fancy herself the chosen of such a man till actually 
assured of it! ' - until she remembers her role in the mischief: 'Who 
had been at pains to give Harriet notions of self-consequence but 
herself? --Who but herself had taught her, that she was to elevate her- 
self if possible, and that her claims were great to a high worldly 
establishment? I (XLVII) 
Jane Fairfax possesses superior education, talent, and elegance, 
but because her options are severely limited by lack of money, she poses 
no threat to Emma. Upon her father's death she inherits an insignifi- 
cant portion, and is brought up by her father's friend to be a governess, 
'the means of respectable subsistence hereafter'. 
(XIX) Jane's view of 
the life ahead of her is grim: 
'With the fortitude of a devoted novitiate, she had 
resolved at one-and-twenty to complete the sacri- 
fice, and retire from all the pleasures of life, 
of rational intercourse, equal society, place and 
hope, to penance and mortification for ever. ' (XX) 
''There are places in town, office, where inquiry 
would soon produce something--offices for the sale 
--not quite of human flesh--but of human 
intellect 
... I did not mean, 
I was not thinking of the slave- 
trade ... governess-trade ... was all 
that I had in 
view; widely different certainly as to the guilt 
of those who carry it on; but as to the greater 
misery of the victims, I do not know where it 
lies. ' (XXV) 
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John Lauber comments on how Jane's situation affects our view of 
Bmma : 
'Jane is almost the victim of her society; the 
odds against her are insuperable and can be over- 
come only by an act of Providence, not by any 
possible action of her own. For this reason, 
among others, she never challenges Emma's posi- 
tion in the reader's interest, although she is 
undoubtedly the more admirable character. 'l7 
By surrounding Emma with women in threatened circumstances Jane Austen 
indulges her heroine. But it is not just the author's intention that 
we should be more sympathetic to Emma than to Jane, for it is money and 
Mrs. Churchill which keep Jane Fairfax in the background. Jane would 
not have had to take the inferior position were it not for the 'black- 
mail' being applied to Frank by the capricious old woman at Enscombe. 
Jane receives the gift of Providence but she is prevented by another's 
whim from making the gift public. The little we are allowed to see of 
Jane Fairfax illustrates effectively her helplessness and resentment 
as an intelligent, elegant woman without a fortune. Like Kate Croy, 
Jane must get by in her world as it is, and in this respect her situa- 
tion might provide a correspondingly sharp perspective on that world. 
But Austen's strategy doesn't allow Jane to vent her feelings often 
enough in the course of the narrative. Where Bernard Harrison believes 
in the novel's ability to raise our level of understanding by altering 
the reader's moral outlook, I would suggest that Jane Austen bypasses 
the reader's moral outlook here, for she skilfully enlists our sympathy 
for Emma by suppressing what might lie underneath Jane's reserve. 
Emma does not like to take risks, and marriage represents a very 
large one for her; it is a state which she must approach with a great 
deal of caution. She dares to imagine a life without marriage: 
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''I have none of the usual inducements of women 
to marry. Were I to fall in love, indeed, it 
would be a different thing; but I never have 
been in love : it is not my way, or my nature; 
and I do not think I ever shall. And, without 
love, I am sure I should be a fool to change 
such a situation as mine. Fortune I do not 
want; employment I do not want; consequence 
I do not want; I believe few married women 
are half as much mistress of their husband's 
house as I am of Hartfield; and never, never 
could I expect to be a so truly beloved and 
important, so always first and always right 
in any man's eyes, as I am in my father's. '' 
(X) 
Emma is of course in an unusually fortunate position which gives her 
the freedom to speak her mind. Mr. Knightley believes Emma Is resolve 
to amuse herself as a spinster with music and carpet work is merely 
silly when he says ''She always declares she will never marry, which, 
of course, means just nothing at all''. 
19 (V) But he excuses her for 
her lack of experience: ''But I have no idea that she has yet ever 
seen a man she cared for. " 
Emma does not consider or mention love when she discusses her 
reasons for marriage. Her advice to Harriet is pragmatic and rational: 
''It will give you everything that you want--consideration, independ- 
ence, a proper home. '' (IX) Nevertheless Emma is hostile to the notion 
that women should accept the first prudent offer that comes their way. 
To Mr. Knightley she exclaims: "... it is always incomprehensible to 
a man that a woman should ever refuse an offer of marriage. A man 
always imagines a woman to be ready for anybody who asks her. '' (VIII) 
Although Emma turns out to be wrong about Robert Martin, her retort 
highlights the powerless position of women. Given that women in the 
first decade of the nineteenth century were responsible for little 
more than childbearing, were often married for dowries over which they 
would have no control, and needed protection, it is not surprising 
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that Emma should comment sarcastically to fir. Knightley about the 
view men must have had about women's choices. How dare a woman 
refuse! - especially a woman like Harriet Smith with neither family 
nor fortune. (We must remember that in Pride and Prejudice Charlotte 
Lucas doesn't refuse. 
Emma first thinks about marriage for herself when Frank Churchill 
appears. He charms her with his looks and attentions, and she knows 
that the Westons look kindly on the match. But Emma senses the super- 
ficial nature of his interest and her sensible comment foreshadows the 
qualities she looks for in a husband: 
'Emma perceived that the nature of his gallantry 
was a little self-willed, and that he would rather 
oppose than lose the pleasure of dancing with her; 
but she took the compliment, and forgave the rest. 
Had she intended ever to mr him, it might have 
been worth while to pause and consider, and try 
to understand the value of his preference, and the 
character of his temper; but for all the purposes 
of their acquaintance he was quite amiable enough. ' 
(XXIX) 
At the Highbury Ball the social advantage of being married occurs 
to her, but the humour is more important than the thought: '[She] 
must submit to stand second to Mrs. Elton, though she had always con- 
sidered the ball as peculiarly for her. It was almost enough to make 
her think of marrying. ' (XXXVIII) Frank Churchill's comment at Box 
Hill on the dangerous consequences of superficial, impulsive attach- 
ments undercuts Emma's earlier non-serious attitude: 
' ... for as to any real 
knowledge of a person's 
disposition that Bath or any public place can 
give--it is all nothing; there can be no know- 
ledge. It is only by seeing women in their own 
homes, among their own set, just as they always 
are, that you can form any just judj, ement. 
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Short of that, it is all guess and luck--and 
will generally be ill-luck. How many a man has 
committed himself on a short acquaintance, and 
rued it all the rest of his life. ' (XLVI) 
Frank's point is taken by Jane Fairfax. At the same time the 
reader realizes that the acquaintance between Emma and Mr. Knightley 
is by comparison the stuff of which proper marriages are made. She 
has known him all her life. But Emma won't acknowledge her love for 
him until she believes that he loves another: 'She touched--she 
admitted--she acknowledged the whole truth ... It darted through her, 
with the speed of an arrow, that Mr. Knightley must marry no one but 
herself! ' (XLVII) Having admitted her love, she nevertheless stubbornly 
refuses to give up her parent - it would be desertion - in much the same 
way that Maggie Verner refuses to give up her father. Emma tells her- 
self that: 
'Marriage, in fact, would not do for her. It would 
be incompatible with what she owed to her father, 
and with what she felt for him. Nothing would 
separate her from her father. She would not marry, 
even if she were asked by Mr. Knightley. ' (XLVIII) 
At first it may appear that Emma is afraid of physical and intel- 
lectual submission in marriage. In fact what Emma has not yet realized 
but what Austen shows us in the narrative is the huge gap between her 
rational, thinking self and her emotional self. And until she recog- 
nizes her emotional self she cannot possibly extend that recognition to 
another; she cannot love anyone else. Austen renders the moment of 
recognition brilliantly with a degree of narrative distance. We can 
easily imagine Emma chastising herself silently, but never confessing 
her faults to those she has sinned against: 
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'It darted through her, with the speed of an 
arrow, that 1r. Knightley must marry no one 
but herself l 
'Her own conduct, as well as her own heart, was 
before her in the same few minutes. She saw 
it all with a clearness which had never blessed 
her before. How improperly had she been acting 
by Harriet l How inconsiderate, how indelicate, 
how irrational, how unfeeling had been her con- 
duct! What blindness, what madness, had led 
her on! It struck her with dreadful force, and 
she was ready to give it every bad name in the 
world. ' (XLVII) 
The last sentence indicates Emma's hesitation before the act of self- 
criticism, for she is ready to name her conduct, but not necessarily 
ready to act upon it. 
Mr. Knightley in his own kind way convinces her that marriage will 
not change her life drastically; it will in fact have certain benefits, 
mentioned sardonically in the narrative: 
'This proposal of his, this plan of marrying and 
continuing at Hartfield--the more she contempla- 
ted it, the more pleasing it became. His evils 
seemed to lessen, her own advantages to increase, 
their mutual good to outweigh every drawback. 
Such a companion for herself in the periods of 
anxiety and cheerlessness before her! --such a 
partner in all those duties and cares to which 
time must be giving increase of melancholy. ' 
(LI) 
Austen's use of vocabulary here is amusing for a future marriage : 
Mr. Knightley will do much more than relieve her of 'anxiety', 'cheer- 
lessness', and 'melancholy'--because he loves her more profoundly than 
any other character in the novel. Robert Polhemus rightly points out 
that their marriage is a positive social affirmation: 'Emma ... offers 
marriage as the hope of intimacy and a potential remedy for the incom- 
pleteness of personality in an individualistic age. 120 Emma undergoes 
growth and change in the novel. Recognizing that marriage is a growing 
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process rather than an end in itself, Austen justifies Emma's 
marriage by convincing us that, despite the real objections to the 
state of marriage raised along the way she will better herself by 
marriage. The novel persuades us that she chooses a husband emin- 
ently qualified to be her moral guide, who encourages in her the 
development of imaginative sympathy and an appreciation of the gifts 
of others. It is for this reason that we take pleasure in EIIma's 
destiny. 
3 
Emma' s recognition of self canes in fits and starts. She mist 
experience several setbacks, by which her self-esteem is chastened, 
before she may acknowledge her faults and feelings. Emma's self- 
reliance and self-absorption make difficulties for herself and others, 
and it is only when something she values highly is at stake that she 
begins to recognize the contribution others make to her awareness. 
Somerset Maugham sees Emma's failure of perception as a major drawback: 
'The heroine is a snob, and the way she patronizes those whom she looks 
upon as her social inferiors is repulsive. #21 But the other characters 
in the novel, who represent aspects of life which Emma refuses to face, 
serve to develop her limited consciousness. Although we are being told 
her story from her point of view, the narrator intends to prove that 
both Emma and the unwary reader who may fall into Emma' s patterns of 
thought have wrongly judged the other characters in the novel. 
D. W. Harding comments that in Emma Jane Austen: 
'continues to see that the heroine has derived from 
the people and conditions around her, but she now 
keeps clearly in mind the objectionable features 
of these people; and she faces the far bolder con- 
clusion that even a heroine is likely to have 
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assimilated marry of the more unpleasant possi- 
bilities of the human being in society. 22 
As much as Emma would like to see herself above everyone else, she is, 
as Harding says, a product of her environment. People are contained 
in that environment, and Emma learns to view both the people and the 
environment with compassion. How much the other characters contribute 
to this learning process - how effective they are in bringing about a 
change in Emma's perception - is the subject of this discussion. 
Susan Morgan writes that Emrna's education is a process of self- 
knowledge, which results in an extension of her perception into the 
world and out of herself: 
'For Emma, growing up is learning the limits of 
self : as her domain shrinks the real world 
enlarges. Emma learns that the recognition of 
this personal existence, this self in someone 
else, is the necessary requisite for morality 
and for love. '23 
Emma won't grow up until she is forced to by changing circumstances - 
little events in Highbury which alter her carefully managed and orderly 
life. 
Mrs. Weston, Emma' s former governess and friend, might be expected 
to have had an influence over Emma' s perceptual development. But: 
'the mildness of her temper had hardly allowed her 
to impose any restraint; and the shadow of autho- 
rity being now long passed away, they had been 
living together as friend and friend very mutually 
attached, and Emma doing just what she liked; 
highly esteeming Miss Taylor's judgement, but 
directed chiefly by her own. ' (I) 
Emma will always listen to Mrs. Weston, but she continues to do as she 
pleases because of her security in the knowledge of her friend's unco:. - 
ditional love. 
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Mr. Woodhouse clearly has no restraining influence on Emma. He 
looks to her for comfort and support, and gives her his undivided 
admiration and affection. In his eyes Emma can do no wrong. Isabel 
Knightley, Emma' s sister, is so much like her father that she cannot 
possibly influence Emma either. Isabel's husband John Knightley 
coolly perceives Emma's shortcomings, but he lacks the charm which 
might persuade Emma to listen to him. Mr. Weston is too kind and good- 
natured to take any part in influencing Erma. And Harriet Smith, 
Emma' s protegee, has no will of her own actively to influence Emma, 
even if she wanted to. No one but Mr. Knightley will criticize Emma. 
Of him we shall have more to say later on. 
One circumstance which alters Emma's life is Jane Fairfax's 
return. Emma dislikes her because she tires of hearing her praises 
sung. But Highbury is a small village and two such elegant young 
ladies are certain to end up at the same parties. Eventually Emma 
admits to herself that her dislike stems from the fact that she mast 
compete with someone practiced in the art of pleasing others: 
'Why she did not like Jane Fairfax might be a 
difficult question to answer; Mr. Knightley told 
her it was because she saw in her the really 
accomplished young woman which she wanted to be 
thought herself; and though the accusation had 
been eagerly refuted at the time, there were 
moments of self-examination in which her con- 
science could not quite acquit her. ' (XX) 
These 'moments of self-examination' occur more frequently as time goes 
on, but they do not always produce self-knowledge as a result. She 
senses the importance of trying to understand other people, but she 
finds it hard to make the effort. Marilyn Butler gives Emma more 
credit than most critics on this score: 
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'Emma makes mistakes in the first instance 
because, like all other human beings, she is 
fallible. She also makes more than she need, 
because for much of the novel she underrates 
the need for objective self-criticism, and 
positively shins the best method of achieving 
it, which is the submission of oneself and one's 
actions to the honest, searching criticism of a friend. The fact remains that within the con- 
servative ethic to which Jane Austen adheres, Emma's is a character of real moral superiority 
and precisely because of its underlying truth. ' 
Although the novel is told through Emma's perspective, an objec- 
tive distance between the reader and the heroine (a crucial judgmental 
distance) is created when we realize what Emma is doing to the other 
characters. And when we see Emma play the 'imaginist' with them we 
disapprove : the author has taken care that the other characters are 
sufficiently interesting to make us care about them. 
D. W. Harding argues that it is precisely what Emma does not see, 
the depth of feeling in other characters, which constitutes her error 
in perception and judgment. 
25 
Emma's understanding extends only to 
those people in whose eyes she will be most important. Readers who 
believe that the other characters lack depth are seeing them through 
Emma's eyes only : exactly the kind of trap Jane Austen sets up for us 
when she so closely associates the telling of the story with Emma's 
consciousness. Wayne Booth views this trap benignly : he argues that: 
'By showing most of the story through Emma' s eyes, 
the author insures that we shall travel with Emma 
rather than stand against her ... the sustained 
inside view leads the reader to hope for good for- 
tune for the character with whom he travels, quite 
independently of the qualities revealed. '26 
But Booth's argument doesn't allow for the last pages of the novel, 
where Jane Fairfax is not revealed to us as she might have been, even 
when we understand the position that the old lady from Enscomb e has 
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placed her in. John Wiltshire rightly believes that Austen did not 
go far enough in her efforts to distinguish 'Emma's perception of the 
other characters from our own. But Wiltshire goes on to argue, per- 
haps unnecessarily, about whether this prevents the novel from being 
'great'. He uses Jane Fairfax as an example: 
'Jane Austen's and our attitude towards Jane 
Fairfax is not as different as it should be from 
Emma's : like hers it is inquisitive, curious, 
detached; and although Jane Austen disapproves 
of Emma's hostility, she can't suggest very 
firmly what there is in Jane to invite anything 
else. What we get is not generosity or openness 
but the intelligence which makes a deliberate 
self-correcting effort towards openness : it is 
worth a lot, but it means that something we 
demand from a great novel is not there ... we 
never get any liberating or humbling sense of 
what can't be deliberately known by the con- 
scious detective mind ... '27 
The issue of critical importance here is narrative distance. 
Graham Hough explains the importance of narrative distance in Emma in 
distinguishing between Emma's thoughts and the objective authorial 
viewpoint: 
'When the objective narrative is noticeably intru- 
ded upon by the subjectivity of the characters, 
it is always a sign that the characters are depar- 
ting from the norm. If they were not their subjec- 
tivity would be identical with the narrator's, and 
so undetectable. '28 
The following passage clearly indicates Emma's hostility towards Jane, 
and the distance between Emma and the reader: 
... Jane's offences rose again. 
They had music; 
Emma was obliged to play; and the thanks and 
praise which necessarily followed appeared to her 
an affectation of candour, an air of greatness, 
meaning only to shew off in higher style her own 
very superior performance. She was, besides, which 
was the worst of all, so cold, so cautious! There 
was no getting at her real opinion. Wrapt up in a 
cloak of politeness, she was disgustingly, was 
reserved. ' (XX) 
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Emma's jealousy is obvious in this passage. Austen has taken care to 
distinguish the character's consciousness from the authorial voice. 
Along with Emma we experience a lack of knowledge about Jane Fairfax. 
Jane Austen never quite allows Jane Fairfax to lose her reserve. But 
whether we go along with Emma's consequent assumptions about Jane 
depends upon our confidence in Emma's perceptive ability. If Emma is 
wrong about simple characters like Harriet and Elton mightn't she also 
be wrong about the mysterious and far more intricate characters like 
Jane? Unlike Elizabeth Bennet, who finds intricate characters the 
most amusing, Emma has no interest at all in them - perhaps because 
intricate characters are not likely to submit to Emma's will. Marvin 
Mudrick believes that Emma's hostility towards Jane stems from Jane's 
unwillingness to submit to Emma: 
'Emma is neither fatuous nor unperceptive. She 
mast play the idol and the confidante but she 
requires some evidence of idolatry; and she 
builds up a vindictive dislike of Jane Fairfax 
precisely because it is clear that Jane will 29 
worship or trust neither her nor anyone else. ' 
Emma senses something not quite right about Jane's reserve, but her 
overactive imagination leads her into inappropriate speculation about 
her silence: 'What happens to a young woman when she is in love with 
her best friend's husband? ' Enna imagines Jane to be in love with 
Mr. Dixon, the husband of Miss Campbell, with whom Jane has been raised. 
Emma's conscience operates ineffectually upon her self-esteem. After 
the Coles' dinner party: 
'She doubted whether she had not transgressed the 
duty of woman by woman in betraying her suspicions 
of Jane Fairfax's feelings to Frank Churchill. It 
was hardly right; but it had been so strong an 
idea that it would escape her, and his submission 
to all that she told was a compliment to her pene- 
tration, which made it difficult for her to be 
quite certain that she ought to have held her 
tongue .' 
(XXVII 
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Emma's concern for the harm her words might have done flees before 
the apparent vindication by Churchill of her perceptive abilities. 
Emma has no sympathetic tenderness to attach. 
Frank Churchill is only too happy to oblige Emma, as it will 
effectively divert suspicion from his secret engagement with Jane. 
Patricia Beer professes surprise at Emma's involvement with Frank: 
'It is one of the ambiguities of this novel that 
Frank Churchill, the immature, brash young man, 
is the one who has the confidence to take on the 
intellectual young woman whose brains and whose 
talents are intimidatingly superior to those of 
any company we see her in. '30 
But I do not give Emma credit for as niich intellectual talent as does 
Beer. Emma believes she is superior in intelligence and confidently 
approaches each situation with the same attitude as Frank Churchill, 
who she rightly points out, 'takes on' Emma. Frank sees in Emma some- 
thing of himself, and trusts to her capacities to see him through the 
deception he must carry out. Frank is rather more perceptive of Emma 
than she is of him. 
Emma's impressions of Frank change as she becomes disillusioned 
by the unsteadiness of his supposed admiration for her (and the passage 
reflects ironically back upon Emma): 
'Of pride, indeed, there was, perhaps, scarcely 
enough; his indifference to a confusion of rank 
bordered too roach on inelegance of mind. ' (XXN) 
'Enna' s very good opinion of Frank Churchill was 
a little shaken the following day, by hearing 
that he was gone off to London, merely to have 
his hair cut. ' (XXV 
And when, finally, she 'entertains no doubt of her being in love' with 
him, and assumes he feels the same, she proceeds to convince herself 
that he is not quite right for her: 
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"I do not look upon him to be quite the sort of 
man--I do not altogether build upon his steadi- 
ness or constancy. His feelings are warm, but 
I can imagine them rather changeable. Every con- 
sideration of the subject, in short, makes me 
thankful that my happiness is not more deeply 
involved. '' (XXXI) 
Emma notes the irregularity of Frank's behaviour -a signal that his 
deception is not altogether successful. Frank actually believes that 
Emma knows the truth, thus giving her credit for more perceptive abi- 
lity than she has. Emma's habit of seeing people and circumstances 
only in terms of her own life prevents her from understanding Frank's 
attempts to tell her the truth - she thinks he might be proposing to 
her. Marvin Mudrick attacks Frank because of his approach to life: 
'He has no scruples, for he needs none : charm and wealth excuse every- 
thing. '31 But Frank honestly believes he is 'safe' with Emma. He 
takes it for granted that Emma's toughness could handle the circumstan- 
ces, that her unwillingness to involve herself emotionally with anyone 
allows him to act out his part with her, that her 'superior understand- 
ing' grasps the whole game. But she doesn't understand. 
Emma knows something is wrong at Box Hill but she lays the blame 
upon her having fallen out of love with Frank. She feels 
'less happy 
than she had expected', she laughs because she is 'disappointed'. 
(XLIII) She sensibly tells him that he ought to be responsible for 
himself: ''it is best to believe your temper under your own command 
rather than mine. '' Emma begins to lose command when 
Frank's 'lively 
impudence' takes over the party. She laughs 'as carelessly as she 
could' when he demands, on her account, to know everyone's 
thoughts. 
Frank puts into words what Emma has secretly thought about the 
Highbury set - that they are really a 
dull bunch - and it is this 
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half-cruel, half-comedic impulse which brings about her indiscretion. 
She 'could not resist' making a public display of Miss Bates's 
inferiority. The missile fired in fun is a direct hit. Emma's gay 
thoughtlessness has gone beyond the limits of decency. 
32 
Miss Bates cannot react angrily, for no one dares contradict 
Emma publicly, but her pain is obvious to the reader. To Mr. Knightley 
she admits: 'I must make myself very disagreeable, or she would not 
have said such a thing to an old friend. ' The pain Emma causes Jane 
Fairfax is unintentional for she cannot have known about the engage- 
ment; but she might otherwise have understood the tenor of Jane's 
remarks and noticed her unhappiness. Far worse is Emma's treatment of 
Harriet, whom she has been told is in love with Frank. Either Jane 
Austen has been nodding, or she is showing us that Emma thinks so 
little of her friend as to disregard her feelings on the grounds that 
everyone must give way before Emma's pleasure. Emma is blameable for 
insensitivity. 
Emma's initial response to Mr. Knightley's reproach is to laugh 
it off: 
''Nay, how could I help saying what I did? -- 
Nobody could have helped it. It was not so very 
bad. I dare say she did not understand me. 
(XLIII) 
Emma's words indict her as a snob, confident that her opinions will be 
confirmed by the rest of her world. Mr. Knightley breaks through her 
wall of complacency; she is 'overcome' by his words. 
Mr. Knightley is not without flaws in his perceptive abilities; 
it is ironic that Emma should see in him a want of charity in his 
opinion of Frank: 
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'To take a dislike to a young man, only because 
he appeared to be of a different disposition 
from himself, was unworthy of the real liber- 
ality of mind which she was always used to 
acknowledge in him; for with all the high 
opinion of himself, which she had often laid 
to his charge, she had never before for a 
moment supposed it could make him unjust to 
the merit of another. ' (XVIII) 
Emrna doesn't realize that Mr. Knightley is jealous of Frank Churchill. 
Mr. Knightley does not remember that he had hoped to " see Emma in 
love, and in some doubt of a return; it would do her good" (V) - or 
perhaps he unconsciously imagines only himself as that object of love. 
Emma goes through a process of unconscious recognition to conscious 
admission. At the Coles's dinner party Mrs. Weston posits a match 
between Jane Fairfax and Mr. Knightley; she wants to play Emma's game. 
Emma exclaims her abhorrence of the idea (' 'every feeling revolts'') 
but does not admit to herself why he must not marry: 
''Mr. Knightley does not want to marry. I am sure 
he has not the least idea of it. Do not put it 
into his head. Why should he marry? --He is as 
happy as possible by himself; with his farm, and 
his sheep, and his library, and all the parish to 
manage; and he is extremely fond of his brother's 
children. He has no occasion to marry either to 
fill up his time or his heart. " (XXVI5 
Mrs. Weston's persistent, good-natured questioning of Emma's argument 
draws Emma out and exposes to the reader (although Emma does not see it) 
the attachment which until now Emma has taken for granted : Mr. Knightley' 
attachment to her. Emma delights in having Mrs. Weston's surmise proven 
wrong by Mr. Knightley himself: 
'Jane Fairfax has feeling ... I do not accuse her 
of want of feeling. Her sensibilities, I suspect, 
are strong--and her temper excellent in its power 
of forbearance, patience, self-controul; but it 
wants openness. She is reserved, more reserved, 
I think, than she used to be. --And I love an open 
temper. ' (X)XIII) 
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Another circumstance which alters Emma' s highly ordered life 
is the discovery of the secret engagement between Jane and Frank. 
Emma's reaction to Yrs. WWeston's news is at first surprise, horror 
and disbelief. After Mrs. Weston's subsequent explanations: 
'Emma scarcely heard what was said. --Her mind 
was divided between two ideas--her own former 
conversations with him about Miss Fairfax; and 
poor Harriet; --and for some time she could only 
exclaim, and require confirmation, repeated con- 
firmation. ' (XLVI) 
It is important to notice that Emma immediately focusses not upon the 
wrongness of Frank's deception and his treatment of her, but rather 
upon her own bad conduct in the affair : her mistaken assumptions about 
Jane, which she betrays to Frank, and her mistaken ideas about Frank, 
which she betrays to Harriet. Emma's fantasies could easily have denied 
Jane even the career of a governess. Emma reproaches herself without 
any instigation from Mr. Knightley. Frank's announcement comes upon 
the heels of Emma's lesson at Box Hill, and precipitates Emma's com- 
plete acknowledgement of her dependence on Mr. Knightley. 
Only hr. Knightley is finally successful in bringing home to 
Emma her characteristic unconcern for the feelings of others. Perhaps 
one of his most endearing qualities is the manner in which he gives 
Emma advice. He never criticizes to hurt but to help her, he never 
does so unless they are alone, and he acknowledges the privilege gran- 
ted by his doing so. His reproof at Box Hill exemplifies his kind 
behaviour even when she is quite cruel: 
' 'Emma, I mast once more speak to you as I have 
been used to do :a privilege rather endured 
than allowed, perhaps, but I mast still use it. 
I cannot see you acting wrong, without a 
remonstrance ... 
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'This is not pleasant to you, Emma--and it is 
very far from pleasant to me; but I mast, I 
will, --I will tell you truths while I can, sat- 
isfied with proving myself your friend by very 
faithful counsel, and trusting that you will 
some time or other do me greater justice than 
you can do now. '' (XLIII 
Emma is particularly affected by Mr. Knightley's reproof because she 
cares for his esteem. She pays more attention to his reaction to her 
than to the substance of his remarks: 
'Never had she felt so agitated, mortified, 
grieved, at any circumstance in her life. She 
was most forcibly struck. The truth of this 
representation there was no denying. She felt 
it at her heart. How could she have exposed 
herself to such ill opinion in anyone she 
valued! And how suffer him to leave her with- 
out saying any word of gratitude, of concur- 
rence, of common kindness. ' (XLIII) 
Marvin Mudrick claims that Emmas response to such criticism was to 
sink 'easily into the luxury of an acknowledged defeat ... the act of 
self-abasement that claims sin, in order to avoid the responsibility 
of self-knowledge. 
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M-idrick denies, then, that Emma comes to know 
herself. Robert Gari s, on the other hand, places great importance on 
Emma's learning 'the act of sustained self-criticism'. 
34 
I agree that 
Emma learns the act but she needs help in sustaining it; she needs a 
source of approval. Brigid Brophy claims that Emma neither needs nor 
receives any help in this process of self-criticism: 
'Emma (with great psychological truth) is suffi- 
cient to her own salvation--through education. 
Mr. Knightley can only wait for her to achieve 
it and then concur in what she had achieved; 
his own part in the process goes scarcely beyond 
urging her--ineffectually--to get down to some 
serious reading. '35 
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But this denies the influence that Mr. Knightley mast have had over 
Emma continually since her childhood, and especially at Box Hill. 
It is true that Mr. Knightley never goes beyond Emma's conscience, 
for she admits to herself that she has wronged Miss Bates. If we did 
not care about Miss Bates, then Emma' s remark to her would never have 
resulted in our censuring Emma's behaviour and approving Mr. Knightley's 
reproach. Mr. Knightley does however give her the incentive to turn 
self-criticism into reformed behaviour: 
'it mortified her that she was given so little 
credit for proper feeling, or esteemed so little 
worthy as a friend but she had the consolation 
of knowing that her intentions were good, and of 
being able to say to herself, that could Mr. 
Knightley have been privy to all her attempts of 
assisting Jane Fairfax, could he even have seen 
into her heart, he would not, on this occasion, 
have found anything to reprove. ' (XLV) 
She wishes he were able to look into her heart for evidence of the 
change he had wrought. We feel sympathy for Emma because we know 
Mr. Knightley to be worth her admiration and hope, with her, that she 
may recover his esteem. 
It is crucial to our understanding of Emma that the other charac- 
ters are developed to the extent that we feel for them as well, despite 
the mysteries which may still lurk behind the simple facade with which: 
we are presented. Harriet, the simple, 'natural' daughter, always 
acts naturally, and in love she is no different. She isn't clever 
enough to reason out her response to men; she either falls 
in love 
with them because they are nice to her, or she doesn't. And this 
is 
why Harriet is so important to Emma's recognition of self : because 
Harriet feels everything. When Harriet falls in love with Mr. Knightley 
she triggers Emma's emotional response. Just by being 
herself Harriet 
teaches Emma something.. Nevertheless Jane Austen is hard on Harriet 
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because she isn't clever. Over and over again we see her being 
sacrificed to Emma's importance. 
The Box Hill incident shows Emma that human situations are far 
more complex than she had ever allowed. Emma eventually admits to 
being a bit more like other people than she had thought herself at the 
beginning of the novel. She could not have made such a humble admis- 
sion without the help of the other characters. The admission is a 
large step toward self-awareness : knowledge of self in others and the 
limits of one's own self. Emma makes the imaginative leap of sympathy 
to recognize other centres of self. At the same time she recognizes 
her own shortcomings and possibilities. In Middlemarch George Eliot 
writes of self-knowledge: 
'We are all of us born in moral stupidity, taking 
the world as an udder to feed our supreme selves : 
Dorothea had early begun to emerge from that stu- 
pidity, but yet it had been easier to her to 
imagine how she would devote herself to Mr. 
Casaubon, and become wise and strong in his strength 
and wisdom, than to conceive with that distinctness 
which is no longer reflection but feeling--an idea 
wrought back to the directness of sense, like the 
solidity of objects--that he had an equivalent 
centre of self, whence the lights and shadows must 
always fall with a certain difference. ' 
(XXI 
Emma is just waking from moral stupidity : not only has she ceased to 
continue in folly, she has also begun to be wise about others. The 
understanding had always lain there, if ill directed : all she lacked 
was sympathy. Emma remains a comedy; the narrative at the end ensures 
a comedic response: ''Very little white satin, very few lace veils; a 
most pitiful business! --Selina would stare when she heard of it. 
" 
Austen doesn't ask us to believe that Emma will never again make mis- 
takes, but she does assure us, and we have no difficulty believing her, 
of the 'perfect happiness of the union'. 
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Already the categories of independence are beginning to show 
greater shades of complexity than a simple three part framework 
would indicate. This is because in the novels the categories are 
interrelated. The heroine's freedom to choose depends on financial 
security, and the use made of that freedom depends on the qualities 
of intellectual independence displayed. Perception (an outward mani- 
festation of intellectual independence) becomes an issue of moral con- 
sequence because it involves a self struggling for 'true wisdom'. To 
discover the discernible shape of the self is an important task for 
the heroine. Marriage provides the framework for this discovery as 
well as personal fulfilment insofar as it expands the heroine's con- 
sciousness in recognising other centres of self. 
Emma learns to recognise, in part at least, that others are other, 
and in doing so she is brought up against their vulnerability and her 
own relative power. She perceives that she needs guidance if she is 
to fulfil this responsibility; this recognised dependence on another's 
fund of wisdom is a tribute to her ability to become as near to being 
independent as Jane Austen would want. Austen, like Edmund Burke, was 
unwilling to have her heroines each rely on her own private stock of 
reason. They would do much better to avail themselves of the 
'general 
bank and capital of nations and ages' - that stored wisdom which 
Elinor recognises in the life of the clergy, which Elizabeth sees 
in 
the library at Pemberley, which Fanny adumbrates to the structure of 
Mansfield Park, and which Emma recognises in Mr. Knightley's ideal 
gentleman. 
There are times, however, when Austen suggests that society is 
morally bankrupt. In such cases the stock of wisdom 
has become tainted 
86 
and the heroine cannot docilely submit to the prevailing social wis- 
dom. Neither Fanny nor Anne can take society on trust; each has to 
take instead a line of resistance. The union of Anne and Wentworth 
reflects a new emergent wisdom - not a revolt against the old but an 
exercise of independence, 'in service and perfect freedom', which 
will enable a more healthy society to sustain itself. For Anne and 
Fanny wisdom involves both resistance to bad advice ('not acting') 
and submission to that wisdom upon which society is ultimately based. 
The 'truths' are still 'self evident' but sometimes one must dig deep 
to find them. 
Jane Austen believed that there was a medium in which 'we live 
and move and have our being' - the established church and social order. 
The struggle for this buried wisdom of which each heroine must avail 
herself is, no matter how demanding, (and despite the comic form) 
rewarded ultimately by the certainty of its existence. There is a 
stable self which must be won and defended; one can achieve a union, 
blessed by church and in society, which reinforces the discovery of 
that self. 
The heroine's crucial task is to establish right judgement; this 
in itself can be held to be an achievement of independence insofar as 
it involves a greater measure of freedom from error 
(i. e. freeing the 
self from prejudice), which is a prerequisite of selfhood. 
In doing 
so she aims not at independence per se but to recognise the right 
kind 
of dependence on the Burkean fund of wisdom. The 
implied existence of 
a true self in a true society answers for Jane Austen ontological 
questions which were to prove a good deal more 
difficult for Trollope 
and, pre-eminently, for Henry James. 
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Chapter 
Women and Independence in the Palliser Novels : The 
Accommodating Self 
In Trollope's novels, financial independence is almost taken for 
granted; without it none of his heroines would be in a position to 
explore the possibilities of independent thought and action or to 
engage in an inward struggle for a knowledge of self. As I have sug- 
gested, this assumption implies that such explorations and struggles 
are a luxury afforded only by those who have never suffered any real 
hardship. Trollope uses outward actions in the same way as Jane Austen, 
as manifestations of intellectual independence. In Trollope's novels, 
the self has to come to terms with changes wrought by social and poli- 
tical circumstances. Although the outer person may be 'Trick'd in 
disguises, alien to the rest/Of men'1 he believes that the 'buried 
life', the 'hidden self' may be rediscovered through love. 
Trollope's Palliser novels began to appear in serial form in Janu- 
ary 1864 and ran until July 1880, a period during which Gladstone's 
ministries engineered a number of important reforms to education, the 
military, the government, the church, and the ballot. Whilst the 
advocacy of woman's rights did not immediately bring about enfranchise- 
ment it did considerably enhance respect for women's personal liberty 
and the right to useful education. The society in which Trollope lived 
attempted to preserve the idea of feminine purity, a virtue which 
desired protection and guided by example. A paradox which particularly 
affected women began to emerge out of the conflict between political 
reforming zeal and deeply entrenched social conservatism. As Carol 
Dyhouse succinctly puts it: 'A society that enshrined independence as 
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one of the highest human virtues constantly emphasized the desira- 
bility of women being kept in a totally dependent role. '2 In an age 
of achievement women were barred from making any significant contri- 
bution. 
Trollope's work reflects exactly this paradox. The stance he 
takes as narrator (like that of the public figure who made speeches) 
is hostile and anti-feminist. The narrative voice suggests that the 
main role of women is to support men in a society rightly dominated 
by men; except via men women have no other outlet for their energies. 
If women are given enough rope, he suggests, they will hang themselves. 
Part of Trollope endorses this view. Nevertheless the women he creates, 
who impress the reader with their energy, intelligence and resilience, 
seem to demand more sympathy and freedom to express themselves than 
the narrative permits. In such situations, Trollope's divergent 
impulses - those of the socially conservative narrator vs. those of 
the liberal creator of character - are evident. In the presentation 
of Alice these divergent impulses lead to a fissure in the novel. 
Because he simply has her submit, and muddies the presentation of the 
submission, he appears to be neither sympathetic to nor interested in 
his heroine - he merely gets fed up with Alice and ditches her. Per- 
haps a finer mind would have wanted to concentrate more intensely on 
these divergent positions, but Trollope's position as a social being 
and a novelist was essentially a pragmatic one. He was willing to 
live with both divergent impulses; and not particularly concerned 
with working them out. But in the other cases we shall discuss the 
presence of this conflict between assumptions about the role of 
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women and responsiveness to their energies, serves to enrich the 
novels' texture. 
1 
The critical reaction to Can You Forgive Her? represents on a 
small scale what Bradford Booth refers to as the 'chaos of criticism' 
about Trollope as a novelist and artist. Henry James, in one of the 
earliest reviews of the novel, found so little to recommend it that he 
plumps for the novel which Trollope might otherwise have written: 
'When it is proposed to represent a young girl as 
jilting her lover in such a way as that the moral 
of the tale resolves itself into the question of 
the venality of her offence, it evinces in the 
novelist a deep insensibility to his opportuni- 
ties that he should succeed, after all, in making 
of the tragedy but a simple postponement of the 
wedding-day. '3 
James accuses Trollope not only of failing to rise to the occasion, but 
also, more importantly, of being insensitive to Alice's moral dilemma, 
the dilemma that Alice's energies aren't easily fulfilled in marriage. 
But the amount of time which Trollope spends in describing these ener- 
gies belies his insensitivity. Trollope the narrator4 takes the anti- 
feminist stance, as illustrated by Alice's consideration of the ques- 
tion: 'What should a woman do with her life? ' Trollope's narrator 
endorses the conventional view: 'Fall in love, marry the man, have 
two children, and live happy ever afterwards. I maintain that answer 
has as much wisdom in it as any other that can be given, --or perhaps 
more. ' (CYFH: XI) The title of the novel implies that we are asked 
to 
forgive Alice not only for jilting her 'worthy' lover, but also for 
presuming to indulge herself in the notion, supposedly arising 
from a 
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'flock of learned ladies', that she ought to do something with her 
life besides merely marrying, mothering children and maintaining 
middle-class morality. 
The anti-feminists of Trollope's day came down heavily against 
such presumptions. In an article appearing in The Saturday Review 
the writer (unidentified) argues for female dependence: 
'Married life is woman's profession; and to this 
life her training--that of dependence--is 
modelled. Of course by not getting a husband, 
or losing him, she may find that she is without 
resources. All that can be said of her is, she 
has failed in business; and no social reform 
can prevent such failures ... 
'It is not the interest of States, and it is not 
therefore true social policy to encourage the 
existence, as a rule, of women who are other 
than entirely dependent on man as well for sub- 
sistence as for protection and love. '5 
Alice's reluctance to marry John Grey is not as incomprehensible 
as some critics believe. She wishes to exercise free will, despite the 
fact that Trollope places before her no real choice between reasonable 
alternatives. She resists to the end the loss of her identity in 
wifely submission. George Levine rightly emphasizes Alice's interest 
for us, but does not see that by rendering Alice's rebellion Trollope 
brings into question the self-effacement hisbands require of their 
wives: 
'Our interest in her is precisely in her resis- 
tance to the perfect marriage, and in her rea- 
sons for resistance. She self-consciously 
asserts her will in a vague and indecisive 
rejection of love. But her latent reasons are 
thoroughly incomprehensible :a fear of and 
consequent resistance to power, even to the 
power of goodness. It is symptomatic that as 
Trollope shifts his own interest, he begins to 
be unclear himself about why Alice rejected 
John Grey and thus fudjes all the issues he 
had delicately and insightfully raised. '6 
A. 
Juliet McMaster thoughtfully raises the point that Trollope has 
created in Alice a character who has lost touch with herself, and 
that the vagueness of her reasons for rejecting John Grey was neces- 
sary to that portraiture: 'She has come to think differently from 
what she feels, and she has lost the ability to reconcile the various 
contradictory impulses of her consciousness. '? Alice convinces her- 
self that she is unfit to be John Grey's wife, that she does not 
possess 'the love and perfect faith which she owed to the man who was 
her affianced husband'. (XI) When she explains herself to him, we 
sense the frustration she has when he refuses to listen to her reasons, 
and attributes her decision to illness: 
''Must you not be ill when you seek to put an end 
to all that without any cause assigned. ' 
'You will not hear my reasons', --she was still 
kneeling before him and looking up into his face. 
'I will hear them if you tell me that they refer 
to any supposed faults of my own. ' 
'No, no, no. ' 
'Then I will not hear them. It is for me to find 
out your faults, and when I have found out any 
that require complaint, I will come and make it. 
Dear Alice, I wish you knew how I long for you. ' 
Then he put his hand u on her hair, as though he 
would caress her. ' (XI) 
Were this speech to come from George Vavasor, the reader would 
have sufficient evidence of his unreasonableness in refusing to listen 
to Alice. Neither Trollope nor John Grey allow that Alice has any 
judgmental ability. Grey regards Alice's attempts at self-criticism 
as a form of insanity, whilst refusing to acknowledge Alice's selfhood. 
In this scene and later in Switzerland (LXXIV) he attempts to get Alice 
to agree to his proposal by ignoring her words and asserting his 
sexuality. 
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Alice wishes to become politically involved in a cause. 
Trollope describes her aspirations in a vein similar to the one he 
uses to describe the events which later involved Lacs- Glencora: 
' ... she had undoubtedly a hankering after some 
secondhand political manoeuvring. She would 
have liked, I think, to have been the wife of 
the leader of a Radical opposition, in the time 
when such men were put into prison ... ' 
(XI) 
George Vavasor's Radical politics agree with her romantic notion of a 
cause. He attempts to flatter Alice into believing the sincerity of 
his political pursuit: 
"... Alice ... I do hope I shall have all your 
sympathy in any political career that I may 
make, and all your assistance also. ' 
'cy sympathy I think I can promise you. Icy 
assistance, I fear, would be worthless. ' 
'By no means worthless, Alice; not if I see 
you take that place in the world which I hope 
to see you fill. Do you think women nowadays 
have no bearing upon the politics of the times? 
Almost as much as men have. ' In answer to 
which Alice shook her head; but, nevertheless, 
she felt in some way pleased and flattered. ' 
()oa) 
'Almost as much' influence certainly stretches the point. The only 
influence Alice has is in the fortune which she will give to George 
to enable him to further himself. Were she to marry, 
her influence 
would disappear because he would control her fortune. 
We will see a 
variation of this theme with Glencora and with Madame ,: ax; 
both women 
provide their husbands with enormous fortunes which greatly enhance 
their political careers. 
Trollope recognizes Alice's desire for intellectual companionship, 
but also shows us that Alice is incapable of achieving anything with- 
out proper guidance. Powerless as she 
is on her own, a bad cause or 
a bad guide will wreck her. 
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Alice's sole inspiration for marrying George comes from the 
possibility of sharing his political success: 
''Dear George, let me have the honour and glory 
of marrying a man who has gained a seat in the 
Parliament of Great Britain! Of all positions 
which a man may attain, that, to me, is the 
grandest. '' (X)OCLI ) 
Alice knows that George purchased his seat; the knowledge tarnishes 
more than a little the honour and glory of the achievement. Her argu- 
ment is defeatist, and closely parallels that used by Glencora when 
she considers eloping with Fitzgerald: 'What if she were ruined! 
There was always the other chance. She might save him from ruin and 
help him to honour and fortune. ' (XXXIV) This last sentence introduces 
a theme which runs through all of the Palliser novels, for the notion 
of saving young men from destruction is evident in the relations bet- 
ween Glencora and Burgo, Violet and Chiltern, and Madame Max and 
Phineas. 
Winning approval from the loved one is closely linked with saving 
the other from destruction. When Vavasor returns to Alice after he 
has won his seat, he attempts to win her approval and love. Alice's 
revulsion and his consequent violence exemplify his frustration with 
her rejection. Because Trollope makes George dangerous, we aren't 
allowed to discover whether or not Trollope took for granted 
that 
women ought to be saviours to young men. By implication 
Alice's deci- 
sion to encourage him demonstrates her poor judgment resulting 
from 
widely dissociated thoughts and feelings. But the evidence 
in the 
later novels weighs against the assumption, for every woman character 
speaks out against being a saviour to men. 
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Alice wants recognition as an individual. 'W'ren John Grey pro- 
poses to her in Switzerland her reluctance, mixed with. guilt and 
pride, is a struggle to maintain a sense of self: 
' ... it may be that there was still left within 
her bosom some remnant of that feeling of rebel- 
lion which his masterful spirit had ever pro- 
duced in her. He was so imperious in his 
tranquillity, he argued his question of love 
with such a manifest preponderance of right on 
his side, that she had always felt that to yield 
to him would be to confess the omnipotence of 
his power. She knew now that she must yield to 
him, --that his power over her was omnipotent. 
She was pressed by him as in some countries the 
prisoner is pressed by the judge, --so pressed 
that she acknowledged to herself silently that 
any further antagonism to him was impossible. ' 
(LXXIv) 
He presses her with his suit, with his arm around her waist, finally 
with his lips over her oven, to silence her protest. He has literally 
cornered her. The stonework of the embrasure will not give way, nor 
will he; she cannot escape him. Even as she whispers her assent she 
shrinks from him: ' 'You win everything, --always. '' Alice's reluctance 
is not so much prudishness as real fear. Trollope does not make Alice 
simply repent and return to her former lover. She fights him every 
inch of the way. In the final surrender, which convention would dic- 
tate to be a highly romantic moment, Alice relinc fishes responsibility 
for herself. Trollope believes the prisoner's sentencing is just for 
the crime committed: 
'She had taken her fling at having her own will, 
and she and all her friends had seen what had 
come of it. She had assumed the command of the 
ship, and had thrown it upon the rocks, and she 
felt that she never ought to take the captain's 
place again. ' (LXXV) 
The Alice who had contemplated rescuing George is now rescued by John. 
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Despite Trollope's intention to convince the reader that Alice 
is better off in John Grey's care, it is often difficult to recon- 
cile what is stated in direct narrative with the way his characters 
act. He would like us to believe that Alice's submission to Grey 
ought to have been the easiest thing in the world, but he demonstrates 
with great sensitivity how really difficult it was for her. Were 
Trollope to gloss the previous passage he might probably argue that 
Grey's action was an assertive demonstration of a manly man. Where 
Trollope sees Grey as manly, he seems to us a bully; where kind, to 
us avuncular and patronising; and where sympathetic, we see him 
suggesting to Alice that she is insane. We are not, therefore, 
unclear about Trollope's assumptions, but we may not see it his way. 
Robin Gilmour's point about Trollope's treatment of Alice's dilemma 
is well taken: 
'Trollope's psychological insights in this novel 
often seem at odds with his narrative attitudes, 
so that he can resolve Alice's dilemma only by 
blackening George, showing him going to the dogs, 
and not by dramatising any convincing change in 
her relationship with John Grey. '8 
Trollope makes a concession to Alice's desire for political involve- 
ment by showing that Grey will go into politics for her sake: 
'The husband had very fully discussed with his wife 
that matter of his parliamentary ambition, and 
found in her a very ready listener. Having made 
up his mind to do this thing, he was resolved to 
do it thoroughly, and was becoming almost as much 
devoted to sugar, as i,: r. Palliser himself. He at 
any rate could not complain that his wife would 
not interest herself in his pursuits. ' 
(LXXX) 
We never get a straight admission from the narrator that 
Grey's inter- 
est and involvement are due entirely to Alice's 
initial interest and 
her friendship with the politically powerful Palliser. But it is the 
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first of a series of examples of the interrelation between the poli- 
tical and social spheres. Robert Polhemis's comment on Trollope's 
view of relations between the sexes clarifies the anti-feminist 
position Trollope's narrator espouses: 
'It is true that he does not imagine women lead- 
ing successful independent lives or having 
identities that do not relate closely to men's 
... 
[But] 
... He cannot imagine men leading 
lives of value that are not closely related to, 
and dependent upon, women's. '9 
The paradox of women living in an era which worshipped independ- 
ence while they are themselves forced into dependence, is evident in 
Trollope's Palliser novels. Trollope's great strength is his ability 
to encompass both aspects of the paradox. Trollope the narrator takes 
an anti-feminist position which corresponds with his own public views 
on feminism, yet Trollope the creator of character gives us an array 
of independent-minded women who defy the anti-feminist ideal of woman 
as the guardian of moral purity. Trollope does not endow his women 
with superior judgmental capacity as anti-feminists such as Riskin 
would, but he does allow them to think and act for themselves and to 
take responsibility for the consequences of their actions. 
Alice's suffering is not, I think, over-drawn, for she uses a 
vast amount of persistent energy to maintain her resistance and to be 
taken seriously. Men refuse Alice the right to know herself; another 
woman mast s} o-. her the way to self-knowledge. Learning to love 
Glencora and being loved by her prepares her to accept herself and to 
accept John Grey's love. As she watches Glencora and 
Palliser she 
realizes that marriage is a matter of making concessions. 
Because 
Trollope establishes that Grey and Alice do love each other from tre 
start l Glencora, on the other 
hand, must learn to love Palliser) the 
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process of making concessions moves rather more smoothly than with 
the Pallisers. In fact, John and Alice are, in the end, so accommo- 
dating that we hear little of them in the later novels. 
In the comic sub-plot, Trollope allows the widow Greenow much 
more freedom to choose between the boringly snug Mr. Cheeseacre of 
Oileymead and the Wickham-like rascal Captain Bellfield. Because she 
has more than enough of the 'bread-and-cheese' (she inherited a large 
estate from her deceased husband), she may allow herself a little 
romance, a little of 'the rocks and valleys'. (Chapter LXIV) In the 
sub-plot Trollope has defused the tension implied by choosing between 
the wild man and the reasonable man. Cheeseacre is a gross caricature 
of Grey and Palliser; Bellfield is a mild version of Fitzgerald and 
George Vavasor. Because Aunt Greenow will never move in the same 
social circles as Glencora, the consequences of her decision are not 
far-reaching. Such decisions are possible, according to Trollope, 
only for a certain kind of woman. 
I would argue that in Can You Forgive Her? Alice's inconsistent 
characterization overall is a weakness rather than a strength. Alice's 
suffering is too easily assuaged by Grey's political accommodation. We 
lose interest in Alice v.,., ile s} e dithers about Grey. We feel that 
Trollope is much more interested in Glencora. Of her we shall have 
more to say later. But now we move to our second case. 
2 
Lady Laura Kennedy, the tragic heroine of the F:. i: eas novels, 
suffers from an unrecognized, uncontrollable passion. 
Like Alice, 
e anycr_e love must come to know herself before she can know a-. 14 
10i 
else; unlike Alice, Laura is passionate and, through her relatives, 
politically powerful. Her habit of independent thought an; 1 actin 
brings her to rely too much on intellectual judgment and not enough 
on feelings. Trollope carefully establishes the reasons for her 
finding herself married to a wealthy man she can't love. She sadly 
metamorphoses in seven years from an energetic, inspirir, generous 
young woman to a pitiable, guilt-ridden, reclusive widow. That she 
sees herself as Phineas Finn's political mentor is one of the two 
reasons why her story is continued through the two novels; that she 
falls in love with him is the other. 
Lady Laura's great interest in life is politics, but she will 
not relinquish the 'privileges of feminine inaction' : 
'That women should even wish to have votes at 
parliamentary elections was to her abominable, 
and the cause of the Rights of Women generally 
was odious to her; but, nevertheless, for her- 
self', she delighted in hoping that she too 
might be useful, --in thinking that she too was 
perhaps, in some degree, politically powerful 
... 
' (FF: X) 
Laura's ambition is noble as befits her birth and bearing. But her 
generous sacrifice of fortune to pay her brother's debts leads to a 
tragic chair, of events. Had Laura kept her fortune she would have 
been free to marry Phineas. By paying for her brother she denies her- 
self any freedom of choice in marriage. Consequently she accepts the 
proposal of th_e wealthy Robert Kennedy. Lady Laura's plight confuses 
her judgment, and what begins as a simple mariage de converance ends 
disastrously With husband and wife driving each. other insane. Laura's 
reasoning betrays the degree to which she has alloc; ec: herself to be 
swayed by prudence. To Phineas she says: 
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''You will make your way; --you will make it 
surely; but how at present could you marry 
any woman unless she had money of her own? 
For me, --like so many other girls, it was 
necessary that I should stay at home or marry 
someone rich enough to dispense with fortune 
in a wife. The man whom in all the world I 
think the best has asked me to share every- 
thing with him; --and I have thought it wise 
to accept his offer. " (PF: XV) 
Notice that Laura says nothing of being in love with Kennedy : she 
thinks him 'best' and thinks it would be 'wise' to marry him, but she 
doesn't allow that love comes into it at all. By bringing this dis- 
crepancy out, Trollope highlights an area where social breakdowns often 
occur. 
Soon after her marriage Laura discovers how far she had deceived 
herself into thinking passion unimportant. Worst of all she now con- 
ceives of a passion for a man she would have married had she recognized 
her own passion at the time. The reasons she had used to dissuade 
herself from marryiri Phineas now hold no water: 
'She had married a rich man in order that she 
might be able to do something in the world; -- 
and now that she was this rich man's wife she 
found that she could do nothing. The rich man 
tho i ht it to be quite enough for her tc sit 
at home and look after his welfare. ' (FF : XXXII) 
The narrator expects that Laura ought to make the best of her situa- 
tion: 'Lady Laura nnist bear it, as it was borne by many another married 
woman. ' (Fr : XXXVI) I said earlier that Trollope clearly highlights the 
problem, but he makes no attempt to resolve the paradox. Laura's duty 
consists of learning to love her husband and taking up his interests 
as her own. But Kennedy is singularly unlovable; dull, unbending, 
demanding, he views his wife as another addition to his property. 
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Laura cannot be blamed for refusing to take up his interest. Indeed 
we understand why she refuses to drop her own political interest even 
after he advises her to stop, for they remind her of the power she 
craves and at one time wielded. 
Laura is punished for the marital choice she makes, but Trollope 
shows us that marrying Phineas would not have been the answer. Nor 
is there any indication that Laura would have ever recovered the 
£, 10,000 used to pay off her brother's debts if she hadn't married, for 
Lord Brentford and Lord Chiltern raise the money between them only 
when Mr. Kennedy demands it. Nevertheless Laura vastly underestimates 
the strength of her unacknowledged passionate love for Phineas. It 
will be that rock upon which her barque will founder and sink. As if 
Lady Laura's position were not tragic enough, Trollope compounds it by 
having Finn judge severely against her for 'choosing' to make a prudent, 
if loveless match: 
'Lady Laura might venture to throw in his teeth the 
fickleness of his heart, but he could not in reply 
tell her that to change a love was better than to 
marry without love, --that to be capable of such a 
change showed no such inferiority of nature as did 
the capacity for such a marriage. ' (PF: XXXIX) 
The passage implies a double standard in relations between men and 
women. Again, while Trollope' s narrative highlights the paradox, he 
does not appear to question it explicitly. 
If a woman changes her affections, she is a jilt and a fallen 
creature (as we saw with Alice Vavasor). If a man changes his affec- 
tions., he may be accused of fickleness, but as far as Trollope is con- 
cerned he is just using good sense. If a man marries prudently (as 
Palliser has done) he will not necessarily suffer from the conseYuences 
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since he controls the relationship. But if a woman marries prudently, 
she may be false, just as Lady Glencora had declared to Alice in the 
Priory Ruins. There is none of the give and take in the Kennedys' 
relationship which saves the Pallisers from early destruction. ºWe 
also notice that Lady Laura does not have any children, a fact which 
makes a significant difference in the lives of Lady Glencora and 
Lady Chiltern. 
Lady Laura's situation is only exacerbated by the fact that she 
refuses to adapt to marriage, unlike Alice, Glencora, Violet, and 
Marie. Kennedy attacks her for neglecting her duties. Although his 
tone is admittedly harsh, there is something in what he says: 
" It's always the way with women who have nothing 
to do, and who cannot be made to understand that 
they should have duties. They cannot live with- 
out some kind of idolatry. '' (PF: LXIV 
Lady Laura would rather die than submit. Her will to resist is as 
tragic for her as it is impressive to us. The paucity of choices for 
her compounds the problem; there are no available outlets for her 
energy except that of promoting the interests of her husband. 
; -ll comments 
that the general situation of wives wasn't J. S. 1,: 4 
as dire as their legal situation would suggest, but his comment goes 
far toward measuring ti-, e severity of Lady Laura's case: 
'If married life were all that it might be expected 
to be,, looking to the laws alone, society would be 
a hell upon earth. Happily there are bot-- feelings 
and interests which in many men exclude, and in 
most, greatly temper, the impulses and propensities 
which lead to tyranny. '10 
Lady Laura confesses her despair tc Violet; trrou¬h this dialogue 
Trollope concedes the possibility of hell in marriage: 
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'This is terrible', said Violet 'this makes me 
feel that I never will be married. ' 
'And yet what can a woman become if she remain 
single? The curse is to be a woman at all. ' 
'I have always felt so proud of the privileges 
of my sex, said Violet. 
'I never have found them; ' said the other 
'never. I have tried to make the best of its 
weaknesses, and this is what I have come to. '' 
(PF: LI) 
To Lady Laura's powerful, power-seeking nature, the concept of dutiful 
obedience is anathema. To her brother she exclaims: ''... there is 
no tyranny to a woman like telling her of her duty. Talk of beating 
a woman! Beating might often be a mercy. '' (PF: LV) And to Ph. ineas 
she explains: "A woman has a fine game to play; but then she is so 
easily bowled out, and the term allowed to her is so short. '' (PF: LXXV) 
Again to Phineas she exclaims: ''A man makes himself really useful, 
but a woman can never do that. '' (PR: XII) Trollope the narrator refu- 
ses here to admit the falsity of Laura's statement. 
Lady Laura becomes increasingly more frustrated, despairing, and 
bitter about the life which she has made for herself and the consequen- 
ces from which she never escapes. Mr. Kennedy's demands for her sub- 
mission are replaced over time by her own self-hate. She eve: Atually 
takes all the blame upon herself for the wreck of their marriage and 
her husband's subsequent death. The narrator would like us to believe 
that the blame does lie with her, but we mast keep in mind everything 
that has gone before: 
'He only did that which she should have expected 
when she married him; --but she had done none of 
that which he was entitled to expect from her. 
The real fault, the deceit, the fraud, --the sin 
had been with her, --and she knew it. her life 
had been destroyed, --but not by him. His life 
had also been destroyed, and she had done it. 
(PR: XXX) 
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Lady Laura has stopped believing in herself. We know that Kennedy 
was an unjust man, and that his relations with Phineas show him to 
be cruel, savage and unyielding. Nevertheless Trollope places the 
responsibility for the marriage's failure on her shoulders. Because 
Lady Laura refuses to lie down in the bed she had made her herself, 
she is damned. "No one was ever more severely punished'' she cries 
out : although Trollope's portrait is sympathetic, he is ambivalent 
in that he pities and punishes her. 
Ramona Denton suggests a possible reason for our diminishing 
sympathy for Laura's plight : 
'Trollope does not suggest that she should return 
to Kennedy; he does suggest, however, that Laura 
has failed in her development of what he might 
call a 'moral consciousness'. He seems less con- 
cerned with the sinfulness of her earlier ambi- 
tion than he does with her inability to imagine 
herself as anything other than the heroine of an 
unhappy romance. '11 
She hopes against hope that somehow Phineas will come back to love her 
as he had once done on the braes of Loughlinter. But she realizes with 
grim resignation that she has lost the battle she had set out to fight, 
to 'use the world as men use it'. Although Mr. Kennedy's death gives 
her 'freedom' and wealth, she is ever more imprisoned by what she 
believes other people think of her, and what she thinks of herself: 
"I cannot cease to remember my age, my ambition, 
and I will say, my love. I suppose that every- 
thing is over for me, --as though i were an old 
woman, going down into the grave, but at my time 
of life I find it hard to believe that it must 
be so. '' (PR: LXXVII 
Lady Laura is a victim of a passion unacknovrled¬ed until too late, 
and of a refusal to submit to her husband's will. Her end is tragic 
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because she exacerbates the fall. At every step of the way we see that 
her nature would not allow her to have made any other choice. The dif- 
ference between Laura and Glencora is that in marriage Glencora makes 
concessions and learns to love her husband, whilst Laura refuses to 
accommodate herself to an equally rigid personality. This defiance 
dogs her to the end. Alice has the chance to see the benefits of 
accommodation; were Laura to have had the same chance Trollope makes 
clear to us that she would not have learned from the example. Alice, 
Glencora, Violet and Marie do obey the rules of the social order, but 
because Laura does not she suffers and is sacrificed. Laura is the 
unhappy example of a woman who cannot change her heart; unlike Alice 
we could never accuse Laura of dithering. She is trapped in a Victorian 
dilemma which requires her to be constant in love, yet demands that she 
makes the best of a loveless marriage. The inconsistency in Trollope's 
presentation is not within Lady Laura's character (which does not change); 
but, rather he presents her sufferings in a manner which suggests sym- 
pathy with her position as a woman, while at the same time subjecting 
her to a relentless anti-feminist character examination. Here I would 
argue that the inconsistency allows us to see clearly the problem facing 
women, even though Trollope refuses to face it. 
3 
Violet Effingham, more than her fellow heroines, is in a position 
to choose freely what to do with her life. Trollope submits her to no 
real danger, and no difficult choices. Unlike Laura and Glencora, 
Violet marries the man she has loved since childhood, and under her 
influence he turns out not to be the wild man everyone thought he was. 
Violet knows herself well and reads others accurately. Less hasty and 
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less passionate than Laura or Glencora, she nevertheless recognizes 
the importance of loving and being loved, for it is her love which 
transforms Chiltern. Violet's substantial fortune oils the wheels 
and enables him to pursue his favourite pastime and most obvious 
talent; it gives Chiltern the independence he desires. 
Like Glencora, an orphan and an heiress with a 'terrible' guar- 
dian, Violet manages to maintain a firm grip on the realistic con- 
straints of her position. She understands that as a member of a great 
family she must behave in accordance with their wish that her wealth 
be bestowed on the scion of a noble house. Violet declares her rebel- 
lious intentions in a teasing manner, confusing her dragon protector 
and defusing the gravity of her threats. 
Trollope could not have chosen a better defender of his faith in 
the happy housewife. Because Violet, who is so obviously clever, per- 
ceptive, and witty, ultimately settles down with Lord Chiltern and 
sweetly surrenders to motherhood, Trollope strengthens his case for 
his conception of woman's role. Trollope is here at his most consis- 
tent. If Violet can be happy with such an arrangement, we ought to 
admire her and the judgment she makes. Her marriage bears no resem- 
blance to the misery of the Kennedys nor the misunderstandings of the 
Pallisers. Violet's philosophy of husband-hunting is humorous as well 
as pragmatically unromantic; a pragmatism she shares with Lady Laura: 
'After all, a husband is very much like a house 
or a horse. You don't take your house because 
it's the best house in the world, but because 
just then you want a house. You go and see a 
house, and if it's very nasty you don't take it. 
But if you think it will suit pretty well, and 
if you are tired of looking about for houses, you 
do take it. That's the way one buys one's horses; 
--and one's husbands. '' 
(PF: X) 
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Violet's relatively shallow passions prevent her from sinking into 
the abyss into which Laura falls when she allows pragmatism to rule 
her heart. Violet has no illusions about the marriage market; her 
wealth practically assures that she will 'pay' for any husband. That 
she chooses Chiltern testifies to her need to be loved for herself (he 
has loved her since childhood, even though her fortune is attractive). 
In fact, Chiltern's relative disinterestedness is demonstrated by the 
discussion he has with his father about settlements: 
''Now I do not want to interfere, Oswald, and of 
course the less so, because Violet's money will 
to a great degree restore the inroads which have 
been made upon the property. ' 
'It will more than restore them altogether. ' 
'Not if her estate be settled on a second son, 
Oswald, and I hear from Lady Baldock that that 
is the wish of her relations. ' 
'She shall have her own way, --as she ought. What 
that way is I do not know. I have not even asked 
about it. She asked me, and I told her to speak 
to you., 
'Of course I should wish it to go with the family 
property. Of course that would be best. ' 
'She shall have her own way, --as far as I am 
concerned. '' (PF: LV) 
Lord Chiltern's refusal to dictate to Violet what she should do with 
her money goes far toward redeeming him for having gambles away his 
sister's fortune and indepeLidence. 
Violet has a streak of the daredevil about her, but her fantasies 
are corralled by a strong sense of the proper. She loves the feeling 
of danger, but as a woman she may not allow herself to seek it: 
' 'If I were a man myself I should go in for every- 
thing I ought to leave alone. I know I should. 
But you see, --I'm not a man, and I must take care 
of myself. The wrong side of a post for a woman 
is so very much the wrong side. I like a fast man, 
but I know that I must not dare to marry the sort 
of man that I like. '' (PF: X) 
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Violet goes about her business in a remarkably independent way. She 
comments archly about her independence : 
I 'We unprotected females in 
these days are so self-reliant that our natural protectors fall off 
from us, finding themselves to be no loner wanted. '' (PF: XLVI) 
Madame Max echoes the theme of independence in her praise of Violet: 
"She seems to me to be the most independent girl 
I ever knew in my life. I do believe that noth- 
ing would make her marry a man unless she loved 
him and honoured hire, and I think it is so very 
seldom that you can say that of a girl. '' (PF: XL) 
Of course Violet's money reinforces her natural tendency to wilfulness. 
But although independent she is not fearless. Lord Chiltern's family 
want Violet to marry him, but she doubts her ability to take on the 
responsibility of moral guardian: 11 ... I am afraid to be his wife. 
The risk would be so great. Suppose that I did not save hi: -. I, but that 
he brought me to shipwreck instead? '' (PF: X) Violet voices the same 
fear we have heard from Alice about George, Glencora about Burgo, and, 
to a lesser degree, Laura about Phineas. Violet states firmly what 
she demands out of a relationship, a demand which Trollope clearly 
admires. Unlike the others Violet doesn't let passion cloud her 
judgment, although she won't ignore it: 
"I do not believe in girls beirr saviours to men. 
It is t: e man who should be the saviour to the 
girl. If I marry at all, I have the right to 
expect that protection shall be given to me -- 
not that I shall have to give it. '' (FF : XIX5 
While Violet views the seriousness of Lady Laura's predicament she 
tries to laugh at her own, and makes a wry threat to give up the whole 
game. Trollope, of course, does not wise: us to take her seriously, 
yet there is a strong element of trath in her mock protest that she 
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''shall knock under to Mr. Mill, and go in for women's rights, and 
look forward to stand for some female borough''. (FF: LI) Another 
protest, she realizes, will not hold water: 
'It was all very well to talk of disregarding the 
world and setting up a house for herself; but 
she was quite aware that that project could not 
be used further than for the purpose of scaring 
her amiable aunt. ' (PF: LI) 
Violet brings up a very important point when she says to the soon- 
to-be-married Adelaide Palliser: "What man thinks of changing himself 
so as to suit his wife? And yet men expect that women shall put on 
altogether new characters when they are married, and girls think that 
they can do so. " (FR: III) We may think that Violet betrays herself 
with such a conviction, (or perhaps here Trollope himself undermines 
his own conservative position) but the underlying truth of Violet's 
relation to Chiltern overrules any other consideration: ''A woman can- 
not transfer her hert'' Violet tells Lady Laura when her engagement 
looks doubtful. This same 'truth' (a truth of nineteenth century 
society) explains Laura's downfall as well as the tension ever present 
in the Palliser marriage. 
However, when Violet is happily married to Chiltern, she lectures 
her sister on the dangers of acknowledging a constancy of love, a 
complete denial of the sentiments declared above : Lady Laura is guilty 
of refusing to transfer her affections from Phineas to her husband. 
Violet concedes that her own decision was never clouded by enormous 
passion as in Laura's case, or, for that matter, 
Glencora's: 
It You talk of the heart as though we could control 
it I 
'The heart will follow the thoughts, and they may 
be controlled. I am not passionate, perhaps, as 
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you are, and I think I can control my heart. 
But rrw fortune has been kind to me, and I have 
never been tempted. '' (PR: LI 
James Kincaid applauds the union between Violet and Chiltern as 
a vindication of positive energy rather than as a conventional example 
of feminine submission. 'Violet's obvious relish of her role as free, 
witty, and powerful wife and Lord Chiltern's teeth-gnashing delight 
in being Master of the Hounds suggest a union of public and private 
roles that no one else ever comes close to attaining. ' 
12 We see how 
well the relationship works in the context of Trollope's world. 
According to the laws Trollope lays down for his heroines, Violet 
behaves admirably. Her barque will not be shipwrecked by Chiltern. 
Violet has disproved her own theory about saving young men, for she 
has saved him by giving him someone to protect. Lady Chiltern accepts 
her life as Mistress of the Hunt without regrets. She makes the best 
of her lot in life (undeniably a good one) as Trollope expects all 
women ought to do. Lady Chiltern is the embodiment of his theory of 
womanhood. As we have seen Violet's success is helped by the fact 
that the accommodations she makes are neither painful nor impossible. 
Her marriage is ideal in Trollope's view; it gives us a model by which 
we may measure the success of other partnerships in his novels. 
4 
Trollope presents Madame Max Goesler with an altoget! -ýer different 
challenge. One of Trollope's most unusual heroines 
(she is a foreigner 
from Vienna and the widow of a Jewish banker) in her quietly ambitious 
way she conquers London high-h, societ. and rescues the hero from certain 
doom. Having mastered the art of accommodation in her first marriage 
and with the old Luke of Omnium, s}_e falls in love, for the first 
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time, with Phineas Finn. She must try to reconcile Phineas to a 
seemingly impossible accommodation : accepting her money and her love. 
Madame Max wrestles with social taboos and bravely upholds her notion 
of moral conduct. Her success is due in no small part to her experi- 
ence in the world. She knows her limitations well and accurately 
understands the self in others. 
Trollope introduces Madame Max at a political dinner given by 
Lady Glencora in London. Her eyes are described in a manner which 
distinguishes her from any other heroine: 
'She seemed to intend that you should know that 
she employed them to conquer you, looking as a 
knight may have looked in olden days who entered 
a chamber with his sword drawn from the scabbard 
in his hand. ' (PR-. XL) 
The image of the knight with drawn sword neatly foreshadows her rescue 
of Phineas from prison, and continues the theme of' women as saviours 
to men. 
Madame Max poses a threat to the other women over marriage : she 
rivals Lady Laura and Violet for Phineas, and Lady Glencora for the 
old Duke. Because Madame Max has money and beauty she wields power. 
Of this power Robert Polhera s makes the observation that: 'Society, 
for Trollope, is the politics of women, and social prestige for them 
is like political power to men. '13 Trollope doesn't appear to disap- 
prove of this use of power, unlike J. S. Mill; in fact he admires 
women who use it. For example, Madame Max' s discussion with Phineas 
at dinner reveals the radical tendency in her political theory but her 
relative complacency in practice: 
i' 
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''Yr. Finn' she said, 'what would I not give to 
be a member of the British Parliament at such 
a moment as this l ... now there is a real fight in the lists. The one great drawback to the 
life of women is that they cannot act in poli- 
tics. I think however that I should be ter Dted 
to feel a dastard security in the conviction 
that I might advocate my views without any 
danger of seeing them carried out. " (PF : XL) 
Nevertheless, she denies any sympathy for the cause of women's rights. 
The inconsistency betrays Trollope's equivocal attitude towards femin- 
ists as opposed to independent-minded, witty, eloquent political 
hostesses. He found it necessary to clarify his alleged point of 
view whenever his ladies appear too interested in politics: 
'You are in the fight. A poor woman, shut up 
in a cage, feels there more acutely than anywhere 
else how insignificant a position she fills in 
the world. ' 
'You don't advocate the rights of women, Madame 
Goesler? ' 
'Oh, no. Knowing our inferiority I submit with- 
out a grumble; but I am not sure that I care to 
go and listen to the squabbles of my masters. '' 
(PR: XXXII) 
It seems odd to hear Madame Max talk of her inferiority and to imagine 
her submitting without a grumble, when we see how superior she is to 
most of the characters in the novel. When Trollope gives her anti- 
feminist dialogue it does not undermine the credibility of the charac- 
ter, because we know that to say the right thing at the right time is 
often the way to power: ''A man should work' she said, '--and you do 
work. A woman can only look on, and admire and long. '' (PF: LVI) 
According to the narrative Madame Max knows her place, and is 
saved from appearing too ambitious by having a compassionate, feminine 
heart: 
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'With all her ambition, there was a something of 
genuine humility about her; and with all the 
hardness she had learned there was a touch of 
womanly softness which would sometimes obtrude 
itself upon her heart ... And though she prized 
wealth, and knew that her money was her only 
rock of strength, she could be lavish with it, 
as though it were dirt. ' (PF: LVII) 
Money is Madame Max' s source of power. Because she refuses to place 
much importance upon her money, Trollope forgives her for using it. 
She tries repeatedly to give away her money, for by disposing of it 
she relinquishes her source of power. She offers her money three 
times to Phineas before he asks her to marry him. It is important to 
notice that they marry only when Phineas does the asking. Only Madame 
Max has the courage or the necessary perception to challenge the 
Victorian attitude towards women and money. Just before Phineas 
leaves Matching, she makes her first offer. The double standard, that 
women may accept, men only may give, is emphasized in his response: 
'Money she knew was wanted, even for householders. 
Would he not understand her, and come to her, and 
learn from her how faithful a woman could be? 
He still was holding her by the hand, and he now 
raised it to his lips and kisser it. 'The offer 
from you', he said 'is as high-minded, as gener- 
ous, and as honourable as its acceptance by me 
would be mean-spirited, vile, a_-. d ignoble. '' 
(PF: XLIX) 
It is clear that Phineas finds it degrading to accept money from 
a woman; it would be an obvious indication of her power. LLad. aae Max 
challenges the standard that implies that a woman's money is untouch- 
able because it is somehow connected with her sexuality. Phineas 
would think himself a gigolo if he took her money, and this is sugges- 
ted to her when she makes her offer for the last time: 
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'Money is neither god nor devil, that it should 
make one noble and another vile. It is an acci- 
dent, and, if honestly possessed, may pass from 
you to me, or from me to you, without a stain. 
You may take my dinner from me if I give it you, 
my flowers, my friendship, my, --my, --my every- thing, but my money! Explain to me the cause 
of the phenomenon. If I give to you a thousand 
pounds, now this moment, and you take it, you 
are base; but if I leave it you in my will, -- 
and die, --you take it, and are not base. Explain 
to me the cause of that. ' ... 
'It is because you are a woman, and young, and 
beautiful, that no man may take wealth from your 
hands ... '' 
(PF: LXXI I 
In her endeavour to help Phineas, Madame Max takes the only step 
that could legitimize her offer to Phineas : she asks him to marry her. 
But for Phineas, this is the final usurpation of power. He must refuse. 
Trollope blurs the issue by having Phineas engaged already to Mary 
Flood Jones. But as much as Finn would like to accept her offer, 
Trollope will not allow her the upper hand. Madame Max demonstrates 
tremendous courage in the scene in which she puts herself on the line, 
at the risk of destroying a reputation which has been many years in 
the making. Juliet McMaster writes perceptively about her proposal: 
'In Marie's bold offer of her hand and her fortune 
to Phineas she is ready to sacrifice her indepen- 
dence that he might gain his. Their marriage 
would involve the lose of her freedom, but her 
money would end Phineas's dependence on office 
under the government. '14 
Madame Max is not allowed to make that sacrifice. She feels 
pressed by the desire to do something extraordinary with her life, yet 
she is virtually imprisoned by strict social conventions: 
''But you are free as air. ' 
'The most cabined, cribbed, and confined creature 
in the world! I have been fighting my way up for 
the last four years, and have not allowed myself 
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the liberty of one flirtation; --not often even 
the recreation of a natural laugh. " (PF: LXXII) 
She refuses the Duke's offer of marriage because she feels her- 
self to be unfit, by birth, for the position. Her pride extends to 
the resolution that she will have no man blush for her. Robert 
Polherrus calls Madame Max's choice a moral decision which elevates 
her to a realm beyond mere social and political success: 
'She renounces the Duke's offer of marriage, as 
Phineas gives up office and turns down her 
offer, to prove that she can still make personal, 
moral choices, and that independent principle 
and self-esteem can still mean more than pres- 
tige. But Trollope, always insisting on the 
dubiety of his age and of human nature, imagines 
that no matter how morally right their decisions 
are, they both know that they will often regret 
choosing conscience over ambition and public 
esteem. ' 15 
It is this regret, as Polhemus rightfully points out, which punctuates 
her existence. 
Madame Max's conscience leads her to care for the Duke in his 
old age, to sacrifice her time and attention to an old man because he 
loves her. She admits she is happy to be able to do some good in the 
world, yet she still feels she hasn't accomplished all that she might: 
' ... there was ever present a gnawing desire to do something more and 
something better than she had as yet achieved. ' (PR: XIV) She will 
have her opportunity to do something fine when she saves Phineas's 
life by going to Prague in search of evidence to give against the real 
murderer. In the meantime she continues to prove herself worthy of 
love by staying with the old Duke until he dies, and by refusing to 
take his legacy because she won't take a reward for her labour of 
love: 
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'Nobody ever repudiates legacies. The Queen 
would take the jewels if they were left to her. ' 
'I am not the Queen. I have to be more careful 
what I do than any queen. I will take nothing 
under the Luke's will. '' (PR: XXVI) 
Madame Max will be expected to work harder and sacrifice more than 
anyone else for the esteem she desires. Her 'heroinism' risks all 
possible future consequences, even cross-examination by the Queen's 
bench. She will use all her power and go to any lengths to save 
Phineas. Nevertheless she will not ask him again to marry her. He 
must take the initiative now. She has done everything for him without 
being sure of his love. But when he finally comes around to her she 
jumps at the chance. She has been waiting for him to confess his 
love. Phineas still protests that because he is poor he isn't good 
enough, underlining an assumption Trollope never questions : that only 
the wealthy are 'good enough'. But Madame Max silences Phineas with 
her offer. She relinquishes control over the money which had made him 
feel inadequate: 
''It must be an even partnership. There must be 
ever so much about money, and you'll have to go 
into dreadful details, and make journeys to Vienna 
to see that the houses don't tumble drown, --but 
there must be no question between you and me of 
whence it came. '' (PIS: LXXIX) 
Why is Madame Max so willing to give up her self-sufficiency and 
self-determination? First, because she loves Phineas and needs to be 
loved by him in order to be happy in life. Second, because she wisr: es 
to experience a political career vicariously through him : she will 
give him the intellectual and financial support necessary to the 
improvement of his career. She cannot continue to maintain her impor- 
tance and influence in society without marrying. Feminists may not 
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like the denouement, but Madame Max's choice has Trollope's approval 
with her longevity. 
With Violet and Madame Max, Trollope seems to have found some 
sort of resolution for the paradox implicit in his handling of Alice, 
Glencora and Laura. That Violet and Madame Max are slightly less 
idealistic about love, slightly more willing to rechannel their energy 
and intelligence into their husbands' careers and fully enjoy their 
role, may explain why the paradox is more easily resolved. They don't 
fight the system; they work within it in the same way that Eleanor 
counsels Marianne to do in Sense and Sensibility. 
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Chapter V 
Glencora Palliser : Independence and the 
Transformation of Self 
Lady Glencora Palliser is not only one of Trollope's greatest 
achievements but one of the most comprehensive studies of any woman 
character in the nineteenth century novel. Through Trollope's 
Palliser novels, which present a vast array of characters over a span 
of nearly twenty years, we come to know an engaging dramatic presence 
which refuses to be pinned down; we watch as Trollope transforms a 
rich, childishly impulsive young woman into a devoted wife, mother, 
and political manipulator. Characteristic of the Englishman's refusal 
to see anything as fixed or simply defined is Trollope's delight in 
surprising the reader with the unexpected. Trollope gives us a compel- 
ling long-term portrait of a marriage from stormy beginning to bitter- 
sweet end. Glencora is no passive angel of the household. She spars 
with her husband and attempts to use the world as men do. Trollope 
persuades us to think about growth with his characterization of 
Glencora. The very lack of rigour, which we found frustrating in his 
earlier characterization of Alice, allows us to see Glencora at differ- 
ent times in different places; it suggests the relaxed 'wait and see' 
attitude of the conservative writer. 
R. H. Hutton discusses Trollope's propensity to delineate charac- 
ters in this manner as against his ideal, George Eliot's method, which 
focusses on 'universal passions': 
'Photograph a man in fifty circumstances of his life, 
and though you won't get the real man even from that 
number of copies of him, you will at least reach 
some defined impression as to the essence of Lis 
"I 
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character; and so in his longer tales dir. 
Trollope has managed to convey to us indirectly, 
never directly, some knowledge of the stuff of 
which his men and women are really made. 'l 
In another review Hutton makes obvious his belief that Trollope's 
method isn't sufficient to the task: 
'A thousand skilful outlines of character based 
on mere individualities of taste and talent 
and temper, are not near as moving to us as 
one vivid picture of a massive nature, stirred 
to the very depths of its commonplace instinct 
and commonplace faith. '2 
As we have already seen in the four previous cases, Trollope's distinc- 
tion as a novelist is that the paradoxes of the era come out in his 
work with clarity and force. Trollope doesn't analyse as George Eliot 
does; he doesn't resolve to explore systematically the issues raised 
by the paradoxes. Neither is he a passive, stupid reflector. He 
recognizes the existence of the difficulties but in true British 
fashion he would rather not rock the boat. 
In Can You Forgive Her? Trollope analyses the moral dilemma posed 
by Glencora's having to marry a man she does not love, against her will, 
in order to preserve her massive inheritance from fortune hunters. 
Opposition to such a mariaFe de convenance arose, as Patricia Thomson 
explains, with the emergence of feminism: 'As more demands were made 
of, and for, women, and their self-respect increased, they became less 
inclined to condone the practice of having a mercenary value set upon 
them. '3 Trollope elicits sympathy for Glencora and the awkward posi- 
tion in which her fortune has placed her. Although Glencora is held 
to be adult enough to marry, Trollope appears to excuse her for 
rebelling: 
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'Poor, wretched, overburthened child, to whom 
the commonest lessons of life had not yet been 
taught, and who had now fallen into the hands 
of one who was so ill-fitted to teach them! ' 
(CYFH: XLIII) 
Trollope's toleration for change begins with this child and encompasses 
a transformation into the woman who learns the lessons of life far 
better than her husband. 
But Henry James, looking at the first novel, criticizes Trollope 
for failing to maintain a consistent characterization of Glencora. He 
wrote in 1888 that: 
'There is a touch of poetry in the figure of Lady 
Glencora, but I think there is a weak spot in 
her history. The actual woman would have made 
a fool of herself to the end with Burgo 
Fitzgerald. She would not have discovered the 
merits of Plantagenet Palliser--or if she had, 
she would not have cared about him. '4- 
James's concept of Glencora differs markedly from Trollope's creation. 
We watch as Glencora recovers from her fascination with Fitzgerald and 
discovers chivalry, honesty, and devotion in her husband. Trollope 
leaves himself open to the charge of inconsistency precisely because 
he leaves Glencora's character open to possibility. His narrative is 
often laced with comments which upset any simple, easily classifiable 
response we may have toward Glencora. 'I do not know that she was at 
all points a lady' says the coy narrator, 'but had Fate so willed it 
she would have been a thorough gentleman. ' (XLIX) In his Autobiography, 
Trollope repeats his claim about Glencora, with a slight twist: 'She 
is by no means a perfect lady; --but if she be not all over a woman, 
then I am not able to describe a woman. '5 But the charge need not be 
refuted, for here Trollope's inconsistent portrait of Glencora is a 
strength, not a weakness : it brings out the complexities of the womalr_ 
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which may not have been obvious in the child Palliser married. 
Trollope admits that there are no easy solutions, and does not attempt 
to hide the contradictions from us. Nor does he smother his heroine 
with a conventional fate. 
Trollope's back-handed compliment leads us to ask how he would 
have us respond to Glencora. Would we consider her impulses childish 
if she were a man? While it would be easy to list the scenes in which 
Burgo Fitzgerald, Lord Chiltern, Phineas Finn, and even the young 
Plantagenet Palliser display wilfulness or unpredictability, none is 
ever accused of childishness. That Glencora has the audacity to chal- 
lenge those who command her to perform a role which doesn't appeal to 
her has consequences more serious than those which arise from, for 
example, Phineas Finn's duel with Lord Chiltern, or Palliser's flirta- 
tion with Lady Dumbello. Trollope would have us believe that Glencora 
is simply understood when he tells us that: 
'Love with her had in it a gleam of poetry, a 
spice of fun, a touch of self-devotion, some- 
thing even of hero worship; but with it all 
there was a dash of devilry, and an aptitude 
almost for wickedness. ' (CYFý: : LXIX) 
In middle age Glencora will deny this romantic streak. But we also see 
the uncomfortable struggle she makes to act as other political wives 
do: ''I do so try to be proper, --and it is such trouble. Talking of 
people earning their bread, Alice, --I'm sure I earn mine. '' ý I) 
Glencora's tremendous energies aren't easily fulfilled in marriage. 
Again the narrator tells us that Glencora: 
' ... believed herself to be unfit for him, and 
would have submitted to be divorced, --or 
smothered out of the way, for the matter of 
that, --if the laws of the land would have 
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permitted it. But she had never for a moment 
given to herself the taste of thinking what 
conduct on her part might be the best for his 
welfare. ' (CYFH: LXIX) 
The last sentence sounds harsh and disapproving until we read it in 
the context of the narrator's comment that Glencora is a perfect gentle- 
man. To borrow Lionel Trilling's phrase (which he used to describe 
Emma Woodhouse), she has a moral life as a man has a moral life; 
6 
she 
thinks of herself first, as men do, and not of others, as women do. 
Because no one takes seriously Glencora's childish behaviour, no 
one takes seriously the substance of her complaint, which is the motive 
behind her rebellion. George Levine makes a strong case for seeing 
Glencora' s bravado as a cover for a powerless, struggling self beneath: 
'But though Glencora, too, is wilful, and though 
she too would like to reject authority, she is 
shown to have a becoming weakness--a capacity to 
be governed which we may see if Trollope does 
not, as an aspect of the fragility of women 
within the arbitrarily ruled society Trollope 
imagines. '7 
But not only women suffer under arbitrary rules, for we see both i inn 
and Palliser buffeted at times in their careers : for example, Finn 
when in prison and Palliser when Prime Minister. But struggles are 
more 'acceptable' in men than in women. 
Robert Polhemus explains that her struggles are the logical out- 
come of the suppression of self: 
'Glencora's difficulties in loving her husband, 
her impulsiveness and her querulousness, are 
various reactions against the stifling of her 
individual liberty. When you limit freedom, 
you also limit the capacity to love. '8 
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Polhemus' s insight goes a long way toward explaining why Glencora 
persists in clinging to the idea of being in love with Burgo Fitzgerald; 
because she has been ordered to forget him and turn to her 'dry, silent, 
uncongenial and uncomfortable god' of a husband. (PIY : LVI) Trollope, 
through Glencora, concedes an argument frequently used by feminists 
such as Frances Power Cobbe: 
"... why have I been brought to such a pass as 
this? And, as for female purity! Ah! What was 
their idea of purity when they forced me, like 
ogres, to marry a man for whom they knew I never 
cared? Had I gone with him, --had I now eloped 
with that man who ought to have been my husband 
--whom would a just God have punished worst--me, 
or those two old women and my uncle, who tor- 
tured me into this marriage? '' (CYFH: LXVII 
Cobbe had written a two-part essay which appeared in Fraser's Magazine 
in 1862, condemning forced marriages. (Can You Forgive Her? was seria- 
lized two years later. ) Glencora's wealth prevents her, ironically, 
from making a free choice because the responsibility accruing to her 
with wealth is usurped by her guardians (the ogres referred to above). 
Cobbe wrote: 
'When we have made it less woman's interest to 
marry, we shall indeed have less and fewer inter- 
ested marriages, with all their train of miseries 
and evils. But we shall also have more loving 
ones, more marriages founded on free choice and 
free affection. '9 
Glencora, who has an enormous income, chooses between husbands, not 
between celibacy or governessing. Trollope has funked this issue, 
although he is sympathetic to the question of 'interested' marriages, 
which is what Palliser, Fine, Chiltern, and Tregear obtain. 
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Juliet McMaster makes an important point about the assumptions 
underlying the presumably male critical attitude toward Trollope's 
women: 
' ... in discussing a novel, in which the question 
of women's rights is to the fore, one may well 
point out that critics who are disposed to admire 
all kinds of intractable male characters as cre- 
ations still tend to demand of female characters 
that they be charming people before they will 
grant them applause, as though they were one's 
hostess or one's dinner companion rather than 
an imaginative creation. '10 
McMaster rightly claims that Can You Forgive Her?: 'is such a document 
as might well make feminists gnash their teeth'. But she concedes that 
Trollope, in discussing the 'woman question' at such an 'explicit 
level', 'was already showing himself partly sympathetic to the cause 
he is attacking'. She explains that Trollope's attitude was complicated 
because 'he seems to have had a rare sympathy with women who were 
stifled in their domestic roles, while being hostile to the movements'. 
11 
Trollope's hostility is obvious when he confronts the 'woman question' 
directly in a lecture he delivered a year before Mill's essay 'On the 
Subjection of Women' was published. The lecture bears closer examina- 
tion: 
I tis we cannot turn a man into a woman, or endue him 
with that quicker appreciation and more sparkling 
intelligence which is the woman's privilege, so 
neither can we give to her the gift of persistent 
energy by which he does perform. and has been 
intended to perform, the work of the world. Where 
is no doubt a very strong movement now on foot in 
favour of such assimilation, arising chiefly, as I 
think, from a certain noble jealousy and highminded 
ambition on the part of a certain class of ladies 
who grudge the other sex the superior privileges of 
manhood. Why should not a woman, if she be capable, 
earn those rich rewards of fame, of position, and of 
wealth which men are on all sides obtainin` for 
themselves? When I hear, as 1 often do hear, a 
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woman urgent in this matter, anxious to press 
forward with her whole heart into the arena of 
the world's work, and this to shake off a 
dependence which she feels, --but I think 
wrongly feels, --to be more abject than that 
of men, I am inclined to admire her while I 
oppose her. But I must always oppose her, 
I do know, --I think I know that she is kick- 
ing against the pricks. ' 12 
Trollope's attack on the feminists here appears to peter out in logic 
and syntax in the last two sentences. He is inclined to admire while 
he opposes her because he is perhaps threatened by the invasion of a 
heretofore stable male province. He grants to woman a 'quicker appre- 
ciation' and a 'more sparkling intelligence' as a privilege but claims 
that she is incapable of supplying or managing the 'persistent energy' 
he believes to be required to 'do the work of the world'. He claims 
that women who chafe against 'dependence' are wrong in their belief 
that they are obliged to be more abject than men, asserting that 
marriage is not a case of dependency. Clearly Trollope felt that 
women only harmed themselves by fighting the system. And he never pre- 
sents his women with any alternative career to marriage. Convinced 
that women waste time and talent attempting to alter lives which 
Trollope regards as more than satisfactory, he nonetheless manages to 
describe with such sensitivity the fear women have of giving themselves 
up completely to husbands. 
Glencora's fear of losing herself is a combination of several 
fears perhaps not thoroughly understood by herself but made clear to 
the reader by the narrative. No doubt feminists gnash their teeth at 
the idea that so much of Glencora's self-respect depends upon 
Palliser's approval. She isn't afraid of Palliser so much as she is 
afraid of failing him. Despite her perpetual teasir, she admires 
;, 
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his noble manner. His anger at her behaviour during Lady Monk's 
party results not from her having danced with Burgo (wYdch he appears 
to treat with nonchalance) so mach as her having accused him of spy- 
ing, of failing to trust her judgment. In a remarkable scene of 
reconciliation Glencora bravely bares her soul and unwittingly forces 
an honest profession of love from Palliser, a revelation to both of 
them: 
"What matters it whether I drown myself, or 
throw myself away by going with such a one as 
him, so that you might marry again, and have a 
child? I'd die : --I'd die willingly. How I 
wish I could diel Plantagenet, I would kill 
myself if I dared ... What is there left for 
me that I should wish to live? ' 
Softly, slowly, very gradually, as though he 
were afraid of what he was doing, he put his arm 
round her waist. 'You are wrong in one thing' 
he said, 'I do love you. ' 
She shook her head, touching his breast with her 
hair as she did so. 
'I do love you' he repeated. 'If you mean that 
I am not apt at telling you so, it is true, I 
know. I1y mind is running on other things' ... 
'I would rather have you for my wife, childless, 
--if you will try to love me, --than any other 
woman, though another might give me an heir. 
Will you try to love me? ' 
She was silent. At this moment, after the con- 
fession that she had made, she could not brim 
herself to say that she would eves , try. 
Had she 
said so, sire would have seemed to have accepted 
his forgiveness too easily. ' (CYE'hh: LVIII) 
Palliser's confession of love changes Glencora's life from one of des- 
pair, anger and frustration to one of confident, if at times aggrava- 
ting, cheerfulness. And Glencora's willingness to sacrifice herself 
for his sake awakens in Palliser the realization that not only was her 
confession an enormous concession to make to him (he , mii_ht otherwise 
have turned her out on her ear) but also the words of an adult and no 
simple child. 
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Trollope shows us in Can You Forgive Her? a frustrated Glencora 
responding to Palliser's sacrifice co the long-coveted job as 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. Palliser 'pays' for previously ignorirlt 
his wife when he goes with her to Europe at the crucial moment of pro- 
motion. He also 'pays' Burgo to leave Glencora alone; whilst Glencora 
'pays' with her pregnancy. 
13 
At Baden we see an entirely new relation 
between the couple who found it so difficult to communicate the morning 
after Lady Monk's party. Seeing Burgo, Glencora begs her husband to 
help him: 
'Do something for him; --do, do. Unless I know 
that something is done, I shall die. You needn't 
be afraid. ' 
'I'm not afraid' said Mr. Palliser. 
Lady Glencora, as she went on quickly, got hold of 
her husband's hand, and caressed it. 'You are so 
good' said she. 'Don't let him out of your sight. 
There; he is going. I will go home with Mr. Grey. 
I will be ever so good; I will, indeed. You know 
what he'll want, and for my sake you'll let him 
have it. But don't let him gamble. If you could 
only get him home to England, and then do something. 
You owe him something, Plantagenet; do you not? ' 
'If money can do anything, he shall have it. ' 
'God bless you, dearest! I shall never see him 
again; but if you could save him! There; --he is 
going now. Go; --go. ' She pushed him forward, and 
then retreating, put her arm within Mr. Grey' s, 
still keeping her eye upon her husband. 
(C YF 1I : LXXV ) 
Two important concessions are made in this scene : Glencora promises 
to forget Burgo and behave herself if her husband will help him; and 
Palliser takes on the role of hero, which he has for so long avoided. 
Thus Palliser quietly masters Glencora's rebelliousness with his 
unselfish charity, just as she masters his natural shyness with her 
insistent affection. 
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The growth of the relationship between Glencora and Palliser is 
less a result of the taming of Glencora than it is a result of the 
concessions and accommodations they make to each other. But such s. 
manner of growth strikes a note of implausibility with George 
Levine: 
'Strong enough to show us the incompleteness of 
the relation between his protagonists, he 
requires that we take as beautiful and satis- 
fying the impossible accommodations they try 
to make to each other. '14 
Levine accuses Trollope here of failing to bridge an imaginative gap 
between the sensitive character portrayal of his women and the conven- 
tional fate he decrees for each. But, if we refer back to Trollope's 
suspicion of final answers and his toleration of possible change in 
characters, the 'impossible accommodation' is not evidence of incon- 
sistency but evidence of the strength of his comprehensive vision. 
The conservative Trollope would have us wait until the whole story is 
played out before evaluating Glencora. In The Golden Bowl we shall 
see how Henry James asks us to withold our judgment of the characters 
until the end. It is not the acts themselves which have significance 
or can be placed in categories of 'good' or 'evil'; it is tt. e signi- 
ficance which the characters' intentions bring to a whole train of 
actions. 
Gl encora' s struggle to discover and maintain a sense of self will 
help us to understand something about the elusive, changing concept of 
self. To the very end Glencora demands individual recognition, and 
wriggles with dissatisfaction in the role for which she is chosen. 
Robert Polhemis's excellent discussion of the Palliser novels he 
applauds Trollope's capable and consistent rendition of Glencora's 
dilemma of self : 
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'She continually has to fight for her independ- 
ence, insisting that her personal feelings be 
considered and that she be treated as herself, 
Glencora, a unique individual, and not as some 
conventional woman or wife. She has to keep 
baulking the idea that she ought to curb her 
personality, that she ought to be genteel 
rather than honest and make herself conform 
to an abstract pattern of ideal feminine 
behavior. '15 
In the last sentence of Phineas Redux the narrator tells us that 
'Nothing will ever change the Duchess', but we have seen that this 
statement is misleading. The self which Glencora displays before the 
public never really changes, but the self she shares with Alice Vavasor, 
Marie Goesler and most importantly with her husband does change over 
time. 
For example, Glencora learns the important political survival 
technique of adaptability; which in the later novels is much appreci- 
ated by her husband's uncle, the old Duke of Omnium: ''Ah, she is very 
clever ... she adapts herself. If she were to go from any one place to 
any other, she would be at home in both. '' (PF : LVII) And Glencora 
fully realizes the importance of this skill: ''Every man likes a 
clever woman the best ... if the clever woman only knows how to use 
her cleverness. '' (FF: LVII) 'rthat has happened to the Glencora who 
spent long hours wandering about the Priory ruins at I, Latching? J. S. 
Mill's discussion of the effects of subordination in marriage provides 
a clue: 'An active and energetic mind, if denied liberty, will seek 
for power; refuseä the command of itself, it will assert its perso:: - 
ality by attempting to control others ... 116 The description is 
strikingly apt. She gives up rebellion in return for wifely content- 
ment, or so Trollope would have us believe when 'r-, e tells us her 
thoughts: 
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'She had wished to be imprudent when she was young; 
but her friends had been too strong for her. She 
had been reduced, and kept in order, and made to 
run in a groove, --and was now, when she sat look- 
ing at her little boy with his bold face, almost 
inclined to think that the world was right, and that grooves were best. ' (PF: LXII) 
It would be easier for the reader to accept this reflection were 
it not for the fact that Glencora's children play no role in the story 
until after her death, in The Duke's Children. Moreover Glencora never 
ceases to rebel. She finds other means of expressing herself which 
prove dangerous for her husband's career. She may not speak as elo- 
quently as her friend Marie Goesler, but she sees the essence of poli- 
tics as the relation between a pleasant supper party one evening and 
the passage of important legislation the next. Nevertheless her poli- 
tical views are too radical even for the maverick Mr. Monk: 
''I believe ... that you and I are the only two in 
the whole party who really know what we would be 
at. ' 
'If I must be divided from so many of my friends' 
said Mr. Monk, 'I am happy to go astray in the com- 
pany of Lady Glencora Palliser. ' 
'And might I ask' said Mr. Gresham, with a peculiar 
smile for which he was famous, 'what it is that you 
and Mr. Monk are really at? ' 
', vlaking men and women all equal' said Lady Glencora, 
'That I take to be the gist of our political 
theory. ' 
'Lady Glencora, I mast cry off' said Mr. Monk. 
'Yes; --no doubt. If I were in the cabinet myself 
I should not admit so much. '' (PF: XIV) 
Mr. Monk will not be led astray by Glencora's closet feminism. But 
Glencora will be led by her enthusiasm. And because she insists upon 
supporting select yourlL men who will act for her (e. g., Lopez) she 
embarrasses her husband and his ministry. J. S. Mill's comment here 
is particularly appropriate to Glencora's 'feminine cunning' : 
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'By entirely sinking her own existence in her 
husband; by having no will (or persuading him 
that she has no will) but his, in anything which 
regards their joint relation, and by making it 
the business of her life to work upon his senti- 
ments, a wife may gratify herself by influencing, 
and very probably perverting, his conduct, in 
those of his external relations which she has 
never qualified herself to judge of, or in which 
she is herself wholly influenced, by some per- 
sonal or other partiality or prejudice. ' 17 
Mill here refers to the harmful influence a wife may inflict upon a 
husband, but in Glencora's case she acts independently for her own 
special gratification. 
Nevertheless, the young Duchess's drawing-room influence is so 
powerful that it is declared that 'no old ministry could be turned out 
and no new ministry formed without the assistance of the your 
Duchess'. (PR: XXXI) But the Duchess is less interested in personal 
glorification than she is in promoting other individuals. Despite 
Phineas Finn's anger at her interference she lobbies her husband for 
his inclusion in the newly-formed government. She has learned to man- 
age her husband since the days in Baden when she promised to behave if 
he granted her a favour. Now she threatens to misbehave if he doesn't: 
I 'if you can't manage this for me, Plantagenet, I shall take it very 
ill. It's a little thing, and I'm sure you could have it done. I 
don't very of ten trouble you by asking for anything. '' (PR: XVII 
Although Glencora never admits to herself that her political manoeuv- 
rings may have indirectly led to the circumstances of Finn's imprison- 
ment for the murder of Bonteen, she nevertheless works with redoubled 
energy (like a mafioso godmother) to buy influence in the court. Car- 
ing more for the person than for the principle involved she condones 
any means to have him acquitted: ''I know that this man is innocent, 
and I'd do anything to save him. A woman, I know, can't do rauch; --but 
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she has this privilege, that she can speak out what men only think. '' 
(PR: LIV) Glencora's ability to convince others of her ideas is 
strengthened by her tremendous persistence. Her spirited defence of 
Finn underlines a political theme of people versus principle: 
"Surely you can avoid speaking of it. ' 
'No more than you can avoid your decimals. Out 
of the full heart the mouth speaks, and my heart 
is very full. What harm do I do? ' 
'You set people talking of you. ' 
'They have been doing that ever since we were 
married; --but I do not know that they have made 
out much against me. We must go after our 
nature, Plantagenet. Your nature is decimals. 
I run after units. '' (PR: LVIII) 
The passage above demonstrates that although Trollope espouses a 
conservative anti-feminist outlook, he has a gift of sympathy with 
honest, passionate, eloquent women. He does not go as far as Thackeray 
in Vanity Fair to attribute 'pretty treachery' to women: 
'The best of women (I have heard my grandmother 
say) are hypocrites. We don't know how much they 
hide from us; how watchful they are when they 
seem most artless and confidential; how often 
those frank smiles, which they wear so easily, 
are traps to cajole or elude or disarm--I don't 
mean in your mere coquettes, but your domestic 
models, and paragons of female virtue. Who has 
not seen a woman hide the dullness of a stupid 
husband, or coax the fury of a savage one? We 
accept this amiable slavishness, and praise a 
woman for it; we call this pretty treachery 
trutl1. '18 
Perhaps Trollope found it dull or difficult to write about docile 
women; certainly Mary Flood Jones, that paragon of submissiveness, 
doesn't live to see her husband's return to Parliamentary politics. 
The women that appear to interest Trollope are those who hold their 
own in a man's world. It 'r`Lilst being critical of the propriety of 
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'womanly' interference, Trollope clearly admires the success of the 
great political hostess. Trollope does not write about the taming of 
Glencora so much as he uses her rise to social eminence as an effec- 
tive parallel to her husband's rise to political eminence. But we 
see that the rise jades her; she thoroughly dismisses all the roman- 
tic notions of her youth: ''Romance and poetry are for the most part 
lies ... and are very apt to bring people into difficulty. I have 
seen something of them in my time, and much prefer downright honest 
figures. '' (PR: LXXVI) Glencora' s words are a tribute to her husband, 
who is honest to a fault. 
In The Prime Minister Glencora reaches the pinnacle of her power 
and fame. As she tests the extent of her influence she runs up against 
barriers which convince her of failure. But Trollope makes clear that 
Glencora has succeeded in creating an independent place in the sun for 
herself: 'She had a celebrity of her own, quite independent of his 
position, and which could not be enhanced by any glory or any power 
added to him. ' (Pi.:: VI) In fact the Duke becomes jealous of his wife' s 
influence in politics. He begins to think that 'she with her dinner 
parties and receptions, with her crowded saloons, her music, her pic- 
nics, and social ten:. p tatior_, was Prirne 1. irSster at: _'r 
than he him- 
self. ' (P, _: XVIII) It irritates him that the Duchess has invaded his 
sphere. He is not completely unaware of the spirit behind her efforts, 
although he misunderstands her ambition. She wants personal recogni- 
tion to complement his success: 
''You are doing the best you can to further what you 
think to be my interests. ' 
'I am' said the Duchess. 
'I love you the better for it, day by day. ' Thi s 
so surprised i. er, that as she took him by the arm, 
ýý 
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her eyes were fulled with tears. 'I know that 
you are working for me quite as hard as I work 
myself, and that you are doing so with the pure 
ambition of seeing your husband a great man. 
'kid myself a great man's wife. ' 
'It is the same thing. But I would not have you 
overdo your work. '' (Pbi: XVII I 
There is a difference between 'seeing your husband a great man' and 
being 'a great man's wife' - the difference is one of a self subsumed 
in another and a self in partnership with the other. The idea of 
partnership is repeated in the relation between Marie and Phineas. 
Glencora has become tenaciously obstinate about the separateness 
of her opinions, just as Plantagenet has learned to express his wrath. 
She stands up stoutly to his anger over the Silverbridge election: 
"What business is this of yours? ' 
'I suppose I may have my political sympathies 
as well as another. Really you are becoming so 
autocratic that I shall have to go in for woman's 
rights. ' 
'You mean me to understand then that you intend 
to put yourself in opposition to me. ' 
'What a fuss you make about it all'. ' she said. 
'Nothing that one can do is right ! You make me 
wish that I was a milkmaid or a farmer's wife. '' 
(FILM : XXXII 
Glencora contin"aes to throw herself into the fray. But the harder she 
works, the more she realizes how little she values her success. Everý-- 
thing has begun to seem a waste of time: 
''I'm almost sick of schemes. Oh, dear, I wish 
I knew something that was really pleasant to do. 
I have never really enjoyed anything since I was 
in love, and I only liked that because it was 
wicked. '' (PM: LXXII 
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Both Glencora and Palliser reach the pinnacle and discover that 
the end is hollow and disappointing. When Palliser, who has always 
lacked Glencora's skill of diplomacy, is forced to give up office, 
Glencora attacks hire for unrealistically expecting to begin a 
and Joan' existence. She knows that he is more comfortable with sta- 
tistics than with people: 
''I am thinking of you rather than myself. I 
can make myself generally disagreeable and get 
excitement in that way. But what will you do? 
It's all very well to talk of me and the chil- 
dren, but you can't bring in a bill for refor- 
ming us. You can't make us go by decimals. You 
can't increase our consumption by lowering our 
taxation. I wish you had gone back to some 
Board. '' (PY: LXVIII 
Glencora underlines a shortcoming in Palliser which explains why the 
coalition goverment failed. Palliser is unwilling to accomrodate i er- 
sonality with principle; it is a consistent strength or failing which 
tortures him throughout his life. 
Glencora's last words mark a resignation, an acceptance of defeat, 
and the passing of an age: ''I shall never again think that I can help 
to rule England by coaxing unpleasant men. It is done and gone, and 
can never come back again. ' (Pi\:: LXXX) According to Trollope, Glencora 
ought to have stuck to leading society and not the government. But ever. 
leading the government can be an unsatisfying experience as her husband 
discovers. She has the strength to 'brazen out a job', as she tells 
Mrs. Finn: ' 'They should have made me Prime Minister, and have let 
him be Chancellor of the Exchequer. I begin to see the ways of gover- 
ment now. I could have done all the dirty work. '' 
(P1, i: LVI) Her thick 
skin will never be tested because her husband refuses to take her 
political savvy seriously. The anti-feminists would have disagreed 
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strongly here with Trollope; to Ruskin, a woman in Glencora's posi- 
tion should have persuaded Palliser to stick to his principles and 
should have rebuked him for any willingness on his part to turn away 
from them. Trollope's Glencora is too clear-sighted about the ways 
of the world to suggest an idealistic path to her husband. 
Trollope shows us a Glencora who grows to understand why she is 
necessary to her husband's life and happiness. At the same time she 
learns to love him because he needs her. Only when she dies does he 
suddenly admit to himself the full force of her ability to link him 
to the world: 
'Hitherto he had never specially acknowledged to 
himself that his wife was necessary to him as a 
component part of his life. Though he had loved 
her dearly, and had in all things consulted her 
welfare and happiness, he had at times been 
inclined to think that in the exuberance of her 
spirits she had been a trouble rather than a 
support to him. But now it was as though all out- 
side appliances were taken away from him. There 
was no one of whom he could ask a question. ' 
(DC: I) 
That Palliser will admit (albeit in private) his immense need of people 
shows how far he has come since the days when nothing was of greater 
importance than his work. We have been told in Can You Forgive Eer? 
that: 'To lose his influence with his party would be worse to him than 
to lose his wife. ' (XXIV) Trollope no doubt intended the comparison, 
although perhaps hoping, against hope that readers' memories stretch 
across five novels: 
' ... had the 'ueen persistently declined to comply 
with the constitutional advice of her ministers, 
had a majority in the House of Commons lost its 
influence in the country, --the utter prostration 
of the bereft husband could not have been more 
complete. ' (DC: I) 
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Trollope tells us about a very different Glencora in The Duke's 
Children, and the reader must somehovi reconcile the manipulative 
politician with the perfect mother. She has unmistakably influenced 
her children to value independence and true love, and because she res- 
ponds warmly to their high spirits, they trust and confide in her 
rather than their father. The passage reflects Trollope's desire tc 
keep up the idea of Glencora as a child: 
'In all their joys and in all their troubles, in 
all their desires and all their disappointments 
they had ever gone to their mother. She had been 
conversant with everything about them, from the 
boys' bills and the girl's gloves to the inner- 
most turn in the heart and the disposition of 
each. She had known with the utmost accuracy 
the nature of the scrapes into which Lord 
Silverbridge had precipitated himself, and had 
known also how probable it was that Lord Gerald 
would do the same. The results of such scrapes 
she, of course, deplored; and therefore she 
would give good counsel, pointing out how impera- 
tive it was that such evildoings should be avoided; 
but with the spirit that produced the scrapes she 
fully sympathised. ' (DC: I) 
Glencora's support gives the children the courage to face the Duke with 
their own plans which lie in opposition to his own. The manipulative 
Glencora emerges from the last novel as the Duke realizes that even 
after death Glencora has more lastin`, influence on the children than he 
ever will. 
The Duke's reaction to his children's independent ways is violent 
because he projects his ovm feelings of guilt. When, for example, he 
learns of Lady Mary's engagement and his wife's prior knowledge of it, 
his anger and grief are uncontrollable: 
'He did know, though now at this moment he was most 
loath to own to himself that it was so, --that his 
dear wife had been the most imprudent of women. 
And he recognised in her encouragement of this most 
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pernicious courtship, --if she had encouraged 
it, --a repetition of that romantic folly by which 
she had so nearly brought herself to shipwreck in 
her own early life. ' (DC: V) 
Presumably Trollope would claim that Palliser has, and Glencora has 
not, learned this lesson. It is typical of the Duke that he never con- 
siders the romantic folly he committed with Lady Dumbello, which nearly 
cost him his inheritance, to be of anything like the same magnitude. 
(See The Small House at Allington) 
Trollope sensitively portrays a man who is so tightly wound about 
with his 'principles' that he cannot see the connection between his 
family's disobedience and his own unconinunicativeness. It is easy to 
see why Glencora kept silent about the engagement; she knew her hus- 
band would be difficult to approach on any subject, let alone his 
daughter's marriage, and she recognized the difficulty Tregear would 
pose, given the Duke's private prejudices, which are completely at 
odds with his political principles. Glencora's significant omission 
embarrasses the Duke because he mist admit what she knew all along : 
his painful incapacity for dealing with human relations. 
Principles alone will rarely convince by themselves; people mast 
be coaxed, cajoled, loved, or despised. The Duke's crildrer. force him 
to confront the prejudices which subvert his own principles and 
brim 
him to understand the importance of connecting with people, an impor- 
tance which surpasses anything else in his life. Thus we see that 
Trollope has, eventually, given Glencora's political pragmatism the 
ascendant. The children teach the father a 
lesson which he would never 
take from his wife. The obstinate unemotional young man who visits 
Hartlebury is transformed by Glencora's love, a love which he only 
fully understands when she is gone. 
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Glencora's enormous extension of self partly explains the dra- 
matic presence she has for the other characters and for the reader. 
For the self in these novels is partly defined by relations with 
others; the self extends through love to encompass the changes 
wrought by love. Glencora comes to know herself through her relations 
with others, and she accepts herself because she knows she is loved. 
Palliser begins to know himself when he learns to relinquish his prin- 
ciples for love. And it is Glencora's lasting influence which is res- 
ponsible for this transformation. 
Accommodation is the key to survival in Trollope's world. And, 
as we have seen with his portrait of Glencora, it is also evidence of 
the strength of his comprehensive vision. Moral growth, which is for 
Trollope a manifestation of intellectual independence, consists of 
recognising the self in others through an extension of self, and of 
making accommodations which are painful but rewarding. 
Trollope's novels suggest that these accommodations aren't impos- 
sible. It requires a certain amount of pragmatism, and a willingness 
to give here and take there. One can make a self, Trollope's novels 
imply, which usefully and excitingly inhabits a society - as we saw in 
Jane Austen's novels. 
For all the social complications which have arisen in Trollope's 
world since Austen's time, he persists in the belief that there 
is a 
society in which one can live without sacrificing one's self 
to it. In 
this belief he and Austen are alike. But the third of the novelists, 
Henry James, is a great deal more diffident on the subject. A 'great 
divide' marked roughly in time by the year 1870 separates 
him from the 
other two. In James's novels neither the self nor 
the medium in which 
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it lives, moves and has being are taken for granted. Consequently 
ontological questions swim to the surface almost immediately. And, 
as we shall see, the categories of independence derived from our 
initial definition become much less clear in an environment lacking 
the earlier guideposts of a true self in a true society. 
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Chapter VI 
The lesson of compassion or the self-service of obligation 
in 'The Portrait of a Lady' : the self in inward struggle 
We have seen how in Jane Au sten' s novels women and independence 
implies not only a concept of self which is in agreement with society's 
expectations but also a self which is solid, stable, and discoverable. 
In Anthony Trollope's novels women and independence suggests a self 
which, under the influence of social and political pressures, may 
change beyond recognition or become buried under unnatural roles and 
must be fathomed and rediscovered. We now move to Henry James, in whose 
novels the concept of women and independence implies a self more tenuous, 
less outwardly visible, requiring a struggle within the subjective con- 
sciousness for an idea of being. In The Portrait of a Lady James brings 
into relief the argument between the aesthetic sensibility, which guides 
conduct through the touchstone of taste (exempiified in the appreciation 
of fine objects) and the moral sense, which precipitates an inward 
struggle unfettered by material existence. The argument, as seen by 
Mme. Merle and Isabel Archer, will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Of Isabel Ralph Touchett makes the following observation earl, ' in 
his acquaintance: 
'She was intelligent and generous; it was a fine 
free nature; but what was she going to do with 
herself? This question was irregular, for with 
most women one had no occasion to ask it. Most 
women did with themselves nothing at all; they 
waited, in attitudes more or less gracefully pas- 
sive, for a man to come that way and furnish them 
with a destiny. Isabel's originality was that she 
gave one an impression of havinE intentions of her 
own. ' (VII)I 
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That Isabel has 'intentions of her own' constitutes, for Ralph, her 
'originality' and our reason for being interested in her. James 
further sharpens the interest by placing the 'centre of tr. e subject in 
the young woman's ow consciousness' as the 'scale of her relation to 
herself'. With the distinguishing narrative perspective (a perspective 
distinct from Isabel's subjective consciousness) we are enabled to see 
just how well Isabel knows herself and understands her intentions. At 
the same time James deliberately limits Isabel's sense of self in 
others: 'Make her only interested enough, at the same time, in the 
things that are not herself, and this relation needn't fear to be too 
limited. ' In addition he doles out only sparingly the consciousness 
of Isabel's 'satellites', as an 'interest contributive only to the 
greater one'. 
2 
Ralph contributes to our interest in Isabel as he 
questions the force which enables Isabel to act with intention. In 
the first chapter he defines the terms of his interest in what his 
mother's cryptic telegram refers to as Isabel's independence: 
''... is it used in a moral or in a financial sense? 
Does it mean tf: at they 've been left well off, or 
that they wish to be under no obligations? Or does 
it simply mean that they're fond of their oven way? '' 
(I) 
Isabel's independence isn't financial (at least to begin with), for she 
has been left a very s all portion by her extravagant father. Never- 
theless she refuses to be 'beholden' to anyone, implying an intellectual 
independence winch mist be translated into action: 
"I'm not in my first youth--I can do what I 
choose--I belong quite to the independe_. t class 
I try to judge things for myself; to judge 
wrong, I thii , is more honourable than not to 
judge at all. I don't wish to be a mere sheep 
in the flock; I wish to choose my fate and know 
some thing of human affairs beyond what other 
people think it compatible with prop riet; , to 
tell me. " (XVI) 
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Intellectual independence is for Isabel a question of deciding her 
own fate. The Touchett bequest, which Ralph warmly encourages his 
father to make, provides Isabel with additional financial independence. 
Yvor winters suggests that James fudges the issue of free unhampered 
choice by making it too easy for his heroines, although be believes 
that James chose the better of two possible alternative limitations: 
'There is possibly greater educative value--there 
are wider ethical implications--in suffering the 
consequences of an ill-judged but unhampered 
choice than in any other department of experience; 
on the other hand, the person whose choice is 
normally unhampered may often appear to have an 
abominably facile existence in the eyes of him 
whose life is an unbroken and unavailing endurance 
of necessity, whose primary virtue must of neces- 
sity be fortitude. 
'James sought in so far as possible, it would seem, 
to create the illusion of unhampered choice, he 
sought to study the ethical judgement of his time 
and nation in the purest essence to which he could 
distill it. This I believe to have been a limita- 
tion, but of the two alternative limitations, if 
one is to choose one or the other extreme, dis- 
tinctly the lesser evil. '3 
The Touchett bequest raises two problems, the first of which- will 
Isabel's fortune imprison her in the clutches of fortune hunter? - is 
suggested by Mr. Touchett: 
''It seems to me immoral. ' 
'Immoral, dear daddy? ' 
'Well, I don't know that it's right to make every- 
thing so easy for a person ... Isabel's a sweet 
young thing; but do you think she's so good as 
that? '' (XVII I) 
Wealth may attract the wrong sort of people, and Mr. Touchett doesn't 
believe Isabel will be able to distinguish genuine honest appreciation 
from flattering deceptive greed. 
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The second problem is peculiar to Isabela romantic imagination. 
Her practical friend Henrietta doesn't think Isabel can deal realis- 
tically with the consequences of the inheritance. Isabel admits that 
perhaps it will prove a 'curse in disguise'. Henrietta's reply acutely 
characterises the problem of Isabel's vulnerable idealism - vulnerable 
precisely because the money will enable her to act out her fantasies: 
''I hope it won't ruin you; but it will certainly 
confirm your dangerous tendencies ... I mean your 
exposure on the moral aide ... The peril for you is that you live too much in the world of your 
own dreams. You're not enough in contact with 
reality--with the toiling, striving, suffering, 
I may even say sinning, world that surrounds you. 
You're too fastidious. You've too many graceful 
illusions. Your newly-acquired thousands will 
shut you up more and more to the society of a 
few selfish and heartless people who will be 
interested in keeping them up. " (XX) 
Henrietta proves to be absolutely right about Isabel's fortune. 
Isabel reacts by worrying about making an aesthetically fine decision. 
She fears public failure, she hates to make mistakes. To Ralph she 
says: 
"A large fortune means freedom, and I'm afraid 
of that. It's such a fine thing, and one should 
make such a good use of it. If one shouldn't 
one would be ashamed. And one must keep thinking; 
it's a constant effort. I'm not sure it's not a 
greater happiness to be powerless. '' (XXI) 
Nevertheless, Isabel refuses to see the limits of the power her inheri- 
tance gives her. She does not recognize that it is her wealth, and not 
just her mind (her moral independence) which makes her so attractive to 
Osmond and Yme. Merle. 
As Henrietta suggests above, Isabel is a 'bovaryste' dreamer. 
Although she may flaunt her irresponsible imaginative visions as if 
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to ridicule them, in more serious moments her imagination takes her 
to realms as fantastic and unreal as the carriage image with which she 
teases her friend. Henrietta seriously asks her if she knows where 
she's drifting: 
"No. I haven't the least idea, and I find it very 
pleasant not to know. A swift carriage, on a dark 
night, rattling with four horses over roads that 
one can't see--that's my idea of happiness. " 
(XVII) 
It is no surprise to us that Isabel says such things : her sensitivity 
to people, opinions and situations has been nurtured in the lap of 
literature. She hugs herself to herself in libraries or darkened cham- 
bers and philosophically contemplates existence. James's irony touches 
on her characteristic similarity to Emma Bovary: 
'The girl had a certain nobleness of imagination 
which rendered her a good many services and 
played her a great many tricks. She spent half 
her time in thinking of beauty and bravery and 
magnanimity. ' (VI) 
On the other hand, when we first meet Isabel in Albany, she is reading 
a dry, heavy tome on the history of German thought. No gothic romances 
here! Isabel may have spent long hours dreaming in the library, but she 
prefers to her books an active means of deriving images and experiences 
in the stimulating European environment. Isabel doesn't believe in the 
possibility of failure, nor does she accept suffering as a part of every- 
day life: ''It's not absolutely necessary to suffer; we were not made 
for that. '' (VI), the confident and naive Isabel tells Ralph. She dis- 
tinguishes between faith and perception, but her ideal tends to obscure 
the boundaries of definition: 
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'... she often reminded herself that there were 
essential reasons why one's ideal could never 
become concrete. It was a thing to believe in, 
not to see--a matter of faith, not of experience. ' 
(XIX) 
Isabel persists in her visions even when they collide with real experi- 
ence. She reinterprets reality to accord with her imaginative view. 
Her 'love' for Osmond is such a reinterpretation of'reality': 
She was wrong, but she believed. She was deluded 
but she was dismally consistent. It was wonder- 
fully characteristic of her that, having invented 
a fine theory about Gilbert Osmond, she loved him 
not for what he really possessed, but for his very 
poverties dressed out as honours. ' (XXXIV) 
Isabel is wrong, deluded, yet stubborn. She creates large visions out 
of nothingness; she loves a man who doesn't exist. Ralph's description 
of Osmond - ''He has a great dread of vulgarity; that's his special 
line; he hasn't any other that I know of '' (XXIII) - isn't flattering 
in the least, yet Isabel chooses to interpret her new acquaintance's 
exclusionary taste as a virtue in line with her beliefs. She is sus- 
ceptible to such beliefs because her romantic imagination develops an 
aesthetic sensibility which not only separates the exquisite from the 
ordinary but also, and more importantly, directs her moral judgments. 
Isabel rejects two proposals of marriage because neither suitor 
offers an 'ideal' life. Caspar Goodwood's raw honesty irritates her 
severely; but Lord Warburton's generous ease is too comfortable: 
'[His offer] ... failed to support any enlightened 
prejudice in favour of the free exploration of 
life that she had hitherto entertained or was now 
capable of entertaining. ' (XII) 
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Isabel wants to preserve her 'freedom' - at least this is the excuse 
she makes for not marrying Warburton. Her admission of pride is rather 
closer to the mark. One is tempted to observe that she believes her- 
self to be too good for Warburton. But Isabel really doesn't know yet 
what she wants, except that he doesn't offer her any challenge: 
'What view of life, what design upon fate, what 
conception of happiness had she that pretended 
to be larger than these large, these fabulous 
occasions? If she wouldn't do such a thing as 
that then she must do great things, she must do 
something greater. Poor Isabel found ground to 
remind herself from time to time that she must 
not be too proud, and nothing could be more sin- 
cere than her prayer to be delivered from such 
a danger : the isolation and loneliness of pride 
had for her mind the horror of a desert place. ' 
(XII ) 
The danger lies in the possibility that Isabel will fail to do 'some- 
thing greater'. The inheritance gives her the wherewithal to act, and 
even the very sum kindles her imagination: 
'She lost herself in a maze of visions; the fine 
things to be done by a rich, independent, gener- 
ous girl who took a large human view of occasions 
and obligations were sublime in the mass. Her 
fortune therefore became to her mind a part of 
her better self; it gave her importance, a 
certain ideal beauty. ' (XXI) 
The passage is fascinating because it explains why Isabel wouldn't 
marry Goodwood or Warburton. Both liked her for herself - especially 
for her ideas. Neither cared that she had no 'portion'. It didn't 
matter to them - her personal value was enough. But Isabel saw their 
offers (although different in many ways) to be equally patronising. 
Mrs. Caspar Goodwood, the wife of an American industrialist; Lady 
Warburton, wife of the famous liberal peer - neither appeared to her 
to give due credit to Isabel Archer the independent young woman. 
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Consequently she relishes the independent social stature wealth gives 
her - she has become important. James's dissociative irony alerts us 
to the trap into which she will fall : 'to her mind' the fortune 
becomes a 'part of her better self'; to 'her own imagination' it 
gives her 'a certain ideal beauty'. Isabel has a new reason to treat 
herself to 'occasions of homage'. 
Marriage to Osmond appeals to her imagination because she wants to 
do something finely appreciable with her money, and because she wishes 
to acquire 'the finest--in the sense of being the subtlest--manly 
organism she had ever known'. (XIII) As she is quick to reassure her- 
self, she marries him because: 
'a certain ardour took possession of her--a sense 
of the earnestness of his affection and a delight 
in his personal qualities. He was better than 
anyone else. This supreme conviction had filled 
her life for months, and enough of it still 
remained to prove to her that she could not have 
done otherwise. ' (XLII) 
Isabel's pride expresses itself here again - her supreme conviction 
reinforces the notion that she is to have only the best. 
Ralph's des- 
cription of Osmond ought to have put Isabel off; in 
fact it enthralls 
her: 
"He's a vague, unexplained American who has been 
living these thirty years, or less, in Italy ... 
For all I do know he may be a prince in disguise; 
he rather looks like one, by the way--like a 
prince who has abdicated in a fit of fastidious- 
ness and has been in a state of disgust ever 
since. ' (XXIII) 
In Osmond Isabel has come face to face with what she believes to 
be a 
sublime, supreme observer of life. 
Osmond's quiet manner asks her to 
make no emotional sacrifice. 
She regards the distance he gives her in 
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the light of the highest good manners. She tells him she believes 
'' one ought to choose something very deliberately, and be faithful to 
that. '' (XXIV) - the narrative irony is implicit. Her belief accords 
with her idea of independence - to be able to choose her fate. 
But there is another dimension to Isabel's choice. She is happy: 
'that she should be able to be of use to him. She could surrender to 
him with a kind of humility, she could marry him with a kind of pride; 
she was not only taking, she was giving. ' (XXXV) Isabel's fortune will 
help Osmond, and she can congratulate herself on finding such a worthy 
receptable - 'At bottom her money had been a burden, had been on her 
mind, which was filled with the desire to transfer the weight of it to 
some other conscience, to some more prepared receptable. ' (XLII) - just 
as her generous 'imagination supplied the human element [in him] which 
she was sure had not been wanting'. (XXIV) 
Nina Baym comments that the real consequences of financial inde- 
pendence are wasted on Isabel partly because of her inexperience and 
partly because she refuses to relinquish her romantic ideal of existence: 
'... modern as it seems, the desire for independ- 
ence in a young woman may well represent an old- 
fashioned feminine ignorance of the real world. 
Consequently, Ralph's gift is no boon to Isabel, 
and the covert bequest deprives her of one option 
she has hitherto successfully employed in threat- 
ening situations : the choice of turning it down. 
The fortune imposes on her a necessity to act for 
which she is hopelessly unprepared ... James's 
point is not that the desire to be independent is 
dangerous in itself, but that such a desire when 
its substance is all romantic is no different from 
any other romantic dream, and will meet the same 
defeat in real life. 'k 
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Because Isabel hasn't been prepared to manage her own affairs the 
fortune takes on too much importance - she must rid herself of it 
somehow, in an honourable fashion. 
Henrietta Stackpole, Madame Merle, Mrs. Touchett and the Countess 
Gemini provide important contrasts to Isabel's character. They draw 
her out in different ways without distracting attention from the hero- 
ine. James states his idea for these characters in the preface: 
'They were like the group of attendants and enter- 
tainers who come down by train when people in the 
country give a party; they represented the con- 
tract for carrying the party on. ' 
Henrietta, the 'literary lady', is brave and strong, and talkative. She 
bowls people over. Isabel admires Henrietta's self-made independence 
and moral stance, but her coarse manners and inadequate perceptiveness 
embarrass Isabel. Her comments make the Gardencourt set squirm. Some 
things, they feel, are better left unsaid: 
''There's something the matter with you all; you're 
as dismal as if you had got a bad cable. ' 
'You do see through us, bliss Stackpole' said Ralph 
in a low tone, giving her a little intelligent nod 
as he led the party out of the gallery. 'There's 
something the matter with us all. '' (XIV) 
Henrietta tries to protect Isabel's American individualism by encourag- 
ing her to marry the suitor from Boston (Goodwood). But Isabel thinks 
Henrietta too pushy - she wishes to decide for herself and her friend's 
'American conscience' only irritates her. James appears to have dis- 
liked Henrietta's type, for his descriptions are reductively dismissive. 
Her eyes are mere machine-like 'black buttons'. Like a newspaper she 
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had 'probably no misprint'. She hates door knockers and walks right 
in. Yet she cares deeply about Isabel and is hurt by her criticism: 
''My poor Henrietta' she said, 'you've no sense 
of privacy. ' 
Henrietta coloured deeply, and for a moment her 
brilliant eyes were suffused, while Isabel found 
her more than every inconsequent. ' (X) 
Isabel has no tenderness for Henrietta; she has no real need for the 
affection of others. She admires her friends but she doesn't love them. 
In fact admiration is the unemotional substitute for love. She doesn't 
appear to be capable of love because of her pride. 
Isabel's pride attracts her to another proud woman, Serena Merle, 
a woman whom Isabel would like to emulate. In the Preface, James marks 
their first meeting as a turning point in Isabel's life, and one of the 
two most important events in the novel: 
... Isabel, coming into the drawing room at 
Gardencourt, coming in from a wet walk or what- 
ever, that rainy afternoon, finds Madame Merle 
in possession of the place, Madame Merle seated, 
all absorbed but all serene, at the piano, and 
deeply recognises, in the striking of such an 
hour, in the presence there, among the gathering 
shades, of this personage, of whom a moment 
before she had never so much as heard, a turning- 
point in her life. '5 
Mme. Merle impresses Isabel with her social graces, her intellect, and 
her apparent ability to feel: 
'She knew how to think--an accomplishment rare 
in women; and she thought to very good purpose. 
Of course, too, she knew how to feel; Isabel 
couldn't have spent a week with her without 
being sure of that. ' (XIX) 
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As she does with Osmond, Isabel attributes to Madame Merle great 
depths - she trusts her own judgment fully, although the narrator's 
dissociative irony undercuts the effect - that after one week she must 
be able to tell about someone's emotional capabilities. The irony 
comes close to criticizing Isabel for too rapid assessments of people 
(Ralph, Warburton, Henrietta, Osmond), so that when unpredictable 
traits appear Isabel refuses either to understand or believe them; as 
she refuses to believe Mme. Merle's suggestion that she will be forced 
to crawl: 
''We're mere parasites, crawling over the surface; 
we haven't our feet in the soil. At least one can 
know it and not have illusions. A woman perhaps 
can get on; a woman, it seems to me, has no natu- 
ral place anywhere; wherever she finds herself 
she has to remain on the surface and, more or less, 
to crawl. '' (XIX) 
Mme. Merle represents what Isabel might become as Osmond's wife; her 
words are a warning which Isabel refuses to countenance. 
Through Mme. Merle James raises an idea crucial to Isabel's notion 
of independence. When discussing Osmond, Mme. Merle voices her belief 
in things as the outward expression of one's self: 
'When you've lived as long as I you'll see that 
every human being has his shell and that you must 
take the shell into account. By the shell I mean 
the whole envelope of circumstances. There's no 
such thing as an isolated man or woman; we're 
each of us made up of some cluster of appurten- 
ances. Mhat shall we call our 'self'? Where 
does it begin? Where does it end? It overflows 
into everything that belongs to us--and then it 
flows back again. I know a large part of my self 
is in the clothes I choose to wear. I've a great 
respect for thins. One's self--for other people 
--is one's expression of one's self; and one's 
house, one's furniture, one's garments, the books 
one reads, the company one keeps--these things are 
all expressive. ' 
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Isabel disagrees with Mme. Merle's metaphysical analysis of self; she 
will not be judged herself by outward things, and refuses somewhat 
naively to judge anyone else by material possessions: 
''I don't know whether I succeed in expressing 
myself but I know that nothing else expresses 
me. Nothing that belongs to me is any measure 
of me; everything's on the contrary a limit, 
a barrier, and a perfectly arbitrary one. Cer- 
tainly the clothes which, as you say, I choose 
to wear, don't express me; and heaven forbid 
they should. '' (XIX) 
The 'barrier' image reverberates to chapter XLII, when Isabel finds her 
life to be 'a dark, narrow alley with a dead wall at the end' . Osmond is 
limited by his possessions, as is Mme. Merle with her cracked tea cup. 
Isabel's refusal to see that others see themselves in relation to their 
possessions, her projection upon them of her definition of self, cre- 
ates immense difficulties, as she realizes later on: 'She had a much 
more wondrous vision of him, fed through charmed senses and oh such a 
stirred fancy: --she had not read him right. ' 
(XLII) We have seen this 
idea of reading characters before with Austen's and Trollope's heroines. 
In fact, the reading 'aright' of characters constitutes the heroines 
ultimate success or failure. 
6 
Tory Tanner comments on James's concept of self in the novel: 
'James knew that things and surroundings (the shell) 
were important : there was a way of being among 
things which manifested the quality of self, which 
enabled it to realise itself. But of course there 
was also a way of being among things 
[the spiritua- 
lising of things] which menaced and could destroy 
the self. '? 
Mme. Merle, as a woman of the world, has learned how to 'get on'; 
her experience has taught her to use anything and anyone. 
''I don't 
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pretend to know what people are meant for' said Mme. Merle. 'I only 
know what I can do with them. " (XXII) In an odd way Mme. Merle's 
declaration rings true for Isabel. Isabel's friends exist, after all, 
only to admire her, although James intended this, as we have seen in 
the Preface. Mme. Merle recognizes Isabel's self-absorption and 
imagines a very special use for her. She will make a match between 
her and another self-absorbed type, her ex-lover and the father of her 
child. Although Mme. Merle has given up the idea of personal success, 
she fights fiercely for the possible 'successful' marriage of Pansy. 
Eventually Isabel discovers the 'truth' about Mme. Merle from 
Osmond's sister the Countess Gemini, and actually revenges herself upon 
the really helpless individual, helpless in spite of her polished sur- 
face: 
'That Madame Merle had lost her pluck and saw before 
her the phantom of exposure--this in itself was a 
revenge, this in itself was almost the promise of 
a brighter day. And for a moment during which she 
stood apparently looking out of the window, with 
her back half-turned, Isabel enjoyed that knowledge. ' 
(LI I) 
Isabel takes action much less subtle than does Maggie when she allows 
Charlotte (in The Golden Bowl) to choose to return to America. Isabel 
banishes Mme. Merle directly: 
"I think I should like never to see you again. ' 
Madame Merle raised her eyes. 'I shall go to 
America' she quietly remarked while Isabel passed 
out. ' (LII) 
Mme. Merle has no acquaintances in America, no money, no influence, and 
no prospects. Isabel shows no mercy. As she reflects to herself, she 
always had a great dread of wasting her compassion, 'a precious article, 
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worth more to the giver than to anyone else'. (XXXIV) In Mrs. Touchett 
we have an example of what Isabel may become if she persists in refus- 
ing to feel for anyone. At Ralph's death she notices this very flaw 
in his mother, but she doesn't apparently apply the lesson to herself - 
for she still believes herself to be flawless, if deceivable: 
'... her old pity for the poor woman's inexpressive- 
ness, her want of regret, of disappointment, came 
back to her. Unmistakably she would have found it 
a blessing today to be able to feel a defeat, a mis- 
take, even a shame or two. She wondered if she were 
not even missing those enrichments of consciousness 
and privately trying--reaching out for some after- 
taste of life, dregs of the banquet; the testimony 
of pain or the cold recreation of remorse. On the 
other hand perhaps she was afraid; if she should 
begin to know remorse at all it might take her too 
far. Isabel could perceive, however, how it had 
come over her dimly that she had failed of something, 
that she saw herself in the future as an old woman 
without memories. Her little sharp face looked 
tragical. ' (LIV) 
It is significant that this passage comes to the reader through Isabel's 
consciousness. By this means James associates Mrs. Touchett's emotional 
desolation with Isabel's analysis - an analysis perhaps guilty on an 
unconscious level. That Isabel is able to identify or imagine what 
Mss. Touchett might be feeling may be because Isabel could fear the 
same consequences, unconsciously, for herself. The analysis of 
Isabel's consciousness of Yrs. Touchett suggests an analysis of 
Isabel's self-consciousness. 
Franz Stanzel defines the rendering of consciousness in the figu- 
ral novel, in which the reader identifies with one particular figure's 
impressions of all the other characters, as follows: 
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'the [narrated monologue] is characterized by the 
withdrawal of the narrator and by the reader's 
illusion that he is receiving a direct glimpse 
into the consciousness of a figure. ' 
'In narrated monologue, as in indirect discourse 
and in the report, the bearer of consciousness 
or speaker is named in third person. Despite 
this third person reference, however, in narrated 
monologue the individual traits in the speech or 
thought of a figure are not fully effaced, as is 
generally the case in the indirect presentation 
of speech. '8 
Stanzel's framework, which resembles Graham Hough's analysis of narra- 
tive distance in Emma, 
9 
is useful, in determining whether James's, and 
our, attitudes toward Isabel are or should be censorious, sympathetic 
or indulgent. The next section takes a closer look at an example of 
narration in The Portrait which provides us with a fair sampling of 
both Isabel's ideas and James's evaluation of those ideas. 
In chapter XLII of The Portrait James gives us a picture of Isabel's 
consciousness, distinguishing her own thoughts from his narrative com- 
ments. J. M. Newton's essay on 'Isabel Archer's Spiritual Disease' 
presents the argument that James, in failing 'to give an honest account 
of the matter, did not wish us to see Isabel's blind egotism'. 
10 
Newton's argument isolates the interpretative and critical significance 
of a proper description of the narrative point of view. By using narra- 
tive irony at Isabel's expense James cuts through what might otherwise 
be seen as unlimited indulgence of Isabel's foibles. 
Newton believes James did indulge his heroine. But a distinction 
must be made between narrative opinion 
(rendered in the third person) 
and narrated monologue. Stanzel points out that in the latter, the 
opinions of the person whose consciousness is being rendered 'are not 
fully effaced'. Consequently the reader must distinguish between 
162 
authorial comment and character comment in a narrated monologue. The 
critical controversy emerges from a confusion of authorial and figural 
third-person references. The distinction is important to our under- 
standing of James's attitude toward his heroine. In his preface to 
the New York edition James writes of chapter XLII: 
'It is a representation of her motionlessly seeing, 
and an attempt withal to make the mere still 
lucidity of her act as 'interesting' as the sur- 
prise of a caravan or the identification of a 
pirate. ' 11 
James refers to the same image Maggie conjures up as she ponders her 
husband's adultery. Both Isabel and Maggie pass through a motionless 
phase in which they do nothing but attempt to see. In Maggie's case 
the caravan symbolizes all of the feelings, 'the rights of resentment, 
the rages of jealousy, the protests of passion', which she can never 
allow herself to feel or to express without making 'everything that was 
unaccustomed in her cry out with pain'. Instead she sees her horror as 
'a wild eastern caravan, looming into view with crude colours in the 
sun, fierce pipes in the air, high spears against the sky, all a thrill, 
a natural joy to mingle with, but turning off short before it reached 
her and plunging into other defiles'. (GB: XXXVI) Whilst Maggie suppres- 
ses her reaction in order to prevent either Charlotte or her father from 
knowing that she knows anything is wrong, Isabel determines to prevent 
Osmond from knowing that she is unhappy. 
Throughout the novel James emphasizes, by means of narrative irony, 
his heroine's imperfections. Very early in the novel he offers the 
following admission, strikingly similar to that offered by Jane Austen 
on behalf of Emma Woodhouse: 
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'It may be affirmed without delay that Isabel was 
probably very liable to the sin of self-esteem. 
She often surveyed with complacency the field of 
her own nature; she was in the habit of taking 
for granted, on scanty evidence, that she was 
right; she treated herself to occasions of hom- 
age. Meanwhile her errors and delusions were 
frequently such as a biographer interested in 
preserving the dignity of his subject must 
shrink from specifying. ' (VI) 
While James coyly skirts the issue of Isabel's 'errors and delusions', 
he alerts us to their existence by invoking the tradition of Victorian 
biographers who refused to 'compromise' their subjects with 'indeli- 
cate' references. Another passage ironically emphasizes the fineness 
of Isabel' s stupidity, for she: 
'... with all her love of knowledge had a natural 
shrinking from raising curtains and looking into 
unlighted corners. The love of knowledge coexis- 
ted in her mind with the finest capacity for 
ignorance. ' (XIX) 
Newton attacks Isabel for her 'perverse and even monstrous egotism', 
(XLII) and for James's attempt to 'hide' this from the reader: 
''It was not her fault'--if any of the marriage's 
failure were to turn out to be Isabel's fault, 
wouldn't these thoughts of hers about it and the 
whole chapter long meditation from which they 
come have an all too recognisable and unpleasant 
ring? She interrupts her ruthless self-justifi- 
cation, self-ennoblement and self-pity only when 
she considers blaming herself for the fact that 
Osmond too had been left with some illusions by 
their courtship : she had been so completely 
given up to her passionate admiration for him at 
that time, and had therefore not been having so 
much to say for herself as usual, and had there- 
fore failed to show him how splendidly large and 
free her mind was: 112 
Newton believes then that James doesn't want us to see Isabel's faults, 
but fails to hide them. But if we read carefully the relevant passage 
164 
we discover a number of illogical sequences 'placed' by the author, 
sequences which betray Isabel's thoughts as distinct from James's 
authorial comments. In the course of a paragraph Isabel doubles back 
on herself: 
'Was the fault in himself or only in the deep 
mistrust she had conceived for him? ... It was 
not her fault--she had practised no deception; 
she had only admired and believed ... It was her deep distrust of her husband--this was what 
darkened the world. ' (XLII) 
The authorial presence in the very next line undercuts her self justi- 
fication: 
'That is a sentiment easily indicated, but not so 
easily explained, and so composite in its charac- 
ter that much time and still more suffering had 
been needed to bring it to its actual perfection. 
Suffering, with Isabel, was an active condition; 
it was not a chill, a stupor, a despair; it was 
a passion of thought, of speculation, of response 
to every pressure. She flattered herself that 
she had kept her failing faith to herself, how- 
ever--that no one suspected it but Osmond. ' 
(XLII) 
'She flattered herself' is authorial and ironic - she may deceive her- 
self, and even her friends (e. g. Ralph, Henrietta, Caspar), but James 
intends that she won't deceive us. Another contradiction relating to 
the source of her misery in the same passage follows: 
'These shadows were not an emanation from her own 
mind : she was very sure of that; she had done 
her best to be just and temperate, to see only 
the truth. They were a part, they were a kind of 
creation and consequence, of her husband's very 
presence. ' (XLII) 
James has already explained to us that Isabel's suffering consists in 
a 'passion of thought, of speculation, of response to every pressure' - 
she suffers from an easily excitable and overly sensitive imagination. 
165 
While in one breath Isabel claims to be 'just and temperate' in the 
next she deduces that 'these shadows' emanate from her husband's pres- 
ence. These emanations are the imagined consequence of Isabel's dis- 
trust - and she has already admitted that her distrust has 'darkened 
the world'. Isabel's self-justification leans on the truism that she 
is, after all, herself: 'She couldn't help that; and now there was no 
use pretending, wearing a mask or a dress--' Nevertheless she admits 
her deception of him: '... if she had not deceived him in intention 
she understood how completely she must have done so in fact. She had 
made herself small, pretending there was less of her than there really 
Was. ' And she even concedes her unfairness: 
'She had known she had too many ideas; she had more 
even than he had supposed, many more than she had 
expressed to him when he had asked her to marry him. 
Yes, she had been hypocritical; she had liked him 
so much. ' 
So Isabel was guilty of deceiving him about herself. One of the stron- 
gest ironies (again at Isabel's expense) in the monologue is indicated 
by the use of an exclamation point: 
'She had a certain way of looking at life which he 
took as a personal offence. Heaven knew that now 
at least it was a very humble, accommodating way! 
The strange thing was that she should not have 
suspected from the first that his own had been so 
different. ' 
Isabel appears to have been humble and accommodating only once : during 
her courtship with Osmond. (XXXV) We know she has often treated herself 
to 'occasions of homage'. And even in the previous chapter (XLI) she 
does not appear to accommodate herself to her husband's wish that Pansy 
marry Lord Warburton. Mme. Merle warns Rosier not to multiply the 
already numerous points of difference between r. r. and Yrs. Osmond by 
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pressing his suit for Pansy, surely not an indication - at least on 
the outside - of 'humble accommodation'. Isabel is attempting to 
'cheer herself up' in chapter XLII. She wilfully misinterprets even 
her own admissions in order to make herself out to be better than she 
is. And James ironically underscores her attempt; he certainly 
doesn't praise it. 
This notion of cheering oneself up with a monologue originates 
with T. S. Eliot's discussion of Othello's last speech: 
'Humility is the most difficult of all virtues to 
achieve; nothing dies harder than the desire to 
think well of oneself. Othello succeeds in turn- 
ing himself into a pathetic figure, by adopting 
an aesthetic rather than a moral attitude, drama- 
tizing himself against his environment. He takes 
in the spectator, but the human motive is pri- 
marily to take in himself. I do not believe that 
any writer has ever exposed this bovarysme, the 
human will to see things as they are not, more 
clearly than Shakespeare. 113 
Eliot introduces the term bovarysme to describe Othello's wishful think- 
ing. James was also concerned with the conflict between Emma Bovary's 
fantasy world and harsh reality. In his introduction to an English 
translation of Madame Bovary he refers to Emma as 'a victim of the 
imaginative habit', that 'she remains absorbed in the romantic vision 
while fairly rolling in the dust' . 
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Isabel's 'romantic vision' lifts 
her out of self-pitying misery by placing the blame on conjured bodi- 
less emanations from an evil source - her own distrust of her husband. 
The irony of her never having suspected that Osmond's attitude had 
been so different from her own lies in the fact that hers really isn't 
very different at all. His attitude: 
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'... implied a sovereign contempt for everyone 
but some three or four very exalted people whom 
he envied, and for everything in the world but 
half a dozen ideas of his own. That was very 
well; she would have gone with him even there 
a long distance; for he pointed out to her so 
much of the baseness and shabbiness of life, 
opened her eyes so wide to the stupidity, the 
depravity, the ignorance of mankind, that she 
had been properly impressed with the infinite 
vulgarity of things and the virtue of keeping 
one's self unspotted by it. ' (XLII) 
'Never to be vulgar' seems to be a distinct perversion of Isabel's 
'superior' morality. This perversion may be the 'fatal susceptibility' 
Richard Chase perceptively comments on: 
'... although James has much admiration and ten- 
derness of feeling for his heroine, he gives her 
an element of perverse Yankee idealism of the 
sort that he was shortly to portray in the more 
exacerbated form of positively perverted idealism 
in Olive Chancellor in The Bostonians. So that 
for all her dark-haired, gray-eyed beauty, her 
delightful young enthusiasm, and her zest for 
life, there is in Isabel a fatal susceptibility 
to a form of imprisonment worse than that she 
has escaped. '15 
And David Gervais believes that James baulks the real question of Isabel's 
independence: 
'It might be suggested that in having Isabel marry 
an egotist, James robbed her nature of its chance 
to express itself, just as Flaubert perhaps robbed 
Emma of that chance when he had her marry a 
Charles Bovary. Marriage to Warburton or Goodwood 
(though implausible) might have forced him to con- 
sider more deeply what he had implied about his 
heroine's soul. ' 16 
Isabel's entrapment, aggravated by Osmond's mocking view of her and 
Mme. Merle's sly yet persistent interference with Pansy's life, galvan- 
izes her into a kind of action defiant in intent rather than in effect 
she will not let her husband see her go down in defeat: 
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'She could never rid herself of the sense that 
unhappiness was a state of disease--of suffering 
as opposed to doing. To 'do'--it hardly mattered 
what--would therefore be an escape, perhaps in 
some degree a remedy. Besides, she wished to 
convince herself that she had done everything 
possible to content her husband. She was deter- 
mined not to be haunted by visions of his wife's 
limpness under appeal. ' (XLI) 
Stuart Hutchinson connects the discovery of self in nineteenth century 
English novels with marriage as a 'public confirmation of the identi- 
ties discovered'. Children, he argues, represent the characters' 'con- 
fidence in their ability to make an acceptable mark on the course of 
life'. By contrast, he argues, 'nineteenth century American novels 
provide no sure public confirmation of identities': '... characters 
are sustained to the end by little more than their own self-questioning. 
They have no confidence that the self will find accommodation in the 
world. '17 Isabel's own child dies (XXXVI), but she chooses to fight 
for Osmond's child Pansy in order to sustain her self. Here I disagree 
with Hutchinson. Isabel's final determination to return to Rome is 
formed by her intention to do what she can for Pansy. Isabel has a 
house (even if it is the wrong house, as Tony Tanner suggests18) and 
her intention is to help Pansy find the right accommodation. 
Isabel's pride is resolute, although she admits to herself that 
'there was more in the bond than she had meant to put her name to'. 
(XLII) Isabel refuses to let her friends see her unhappiness; she 
doesn't want to hear them say 'I told you so'. Henrietta, who knows 
her friend well, confronts Isabel with the truth: 
''You won't confess that you've made a mistake. 
You're too proud. ' 
'I don't know whether I'm too proud. But I can't 
publish my mistake. I don't think that's decent. 
I'd much rather die. ' 
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'You won't think so always' said Henrietta. 
'I don't know what great unhappiness might 
bring me to; but it seems to me I shall always 
be ashamed. One must accept one's deeds. I 
married him before all the world. I was per- 
fectly free; it was impossible to do anything 
more deliberate. " (XLVII) 
Isabel, who has always prided herself on her judgment, has blundered. 
But, as we shall see, she has the opportunity to learn from her mis- 
take. 
The second half of Isabel's history deals with the discovery of 
love and the recognition of duty. Isabel has a tendency to mistake 
aesthetic appreciation for love, and the idea of giving herself to 
someone scares her. The narrator claims she is capable of such an 
offering, but his tone, while omniscient, is still coy. He alerts us 
to the existence of the formidable images which lurk deep in her soul, 
but he declines to specify them, in the manner of the Victorian biog- 
rapher, as if afraid that the reader won't like such things in a 
heroine: 
'Deep in her soul--it was the deepest thing there 
--lay a belief that if a certain light should 
dawn she could give herself completely; but 
this image, on the whole, was too formidable to 
be attractive. ' (VI) 
'Deep in her soul--deeper than any appetite for 
renunciation--was the sense that life would be 
her business for a long time to come ... It 
couldn't be she was to live only to suffer; 
she was still young, after all, and a great 
many things might happen to her yet. ' (LIII) 
Isabel still believes she isn't made to suffer, but she also knows that 
she won't escape the consequences of her actions. Mixed together in the 
above passage are both a bovaryste notion that life for her has to 
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improve, and a practical notion (anti-bovaryste) that one cannot 
solve problems by ceasing to live. Wishful thinking suggests that 
she bribe Osmond to go away. She forgets that she originally wanted 
him as 'a worthy receptacle' for her money: 
'She found herself confronted ... with the convic- tion that the man in the world whom she had sup- 
posed to be the least sordid had married her, like 
a vulgar adventurer, for her money ... She won- dered whether, since he had wanted her money, her 
money would now satisfy him. Would he take her 
money and let her go? ' (XLIX) 
Yet when Henrietta suggests this very idea, Isabel bristles with indig- 
nation: ''I'm extremely struck with the offhand way in which you speak 
of a woman's leaving her husband. It's easy to see you've never had 
one. ' ' (XLVIII) Duty gives Isabel something to cling to in a world of 
her own making which is fast dissolving before her eyes. The reason 
for her not wanting to leave Osmond lies in her unwillingness to admit 
that she has failed miserably, that her intellectual independence 
didn't prepare her for such an outcome: 
'To break with Osmond once would be to break for 
ever; any open acknowledgement of irreconcilable 
needs would be an admission that their whole 
attempt had proved a failure. For them there 
could be no condonement, no compromise, no easy 
forgetfulness, no formal readjustment. They had 
attempted only one thing, but that one thing was 
to have been exquisite. Once they missed it 
nothing else would do; there was no conceivable 
substitute for that success. ' (XLV) 
Isabel's dilemma is more complex: than her aversion to failure and her 
fear of a public avowal of that failure. Osmond, for all his cruelty, 
believes fervently in the sacred bond - '' ... I think we should accept 
the consequences of our actions, and what I value most in life is the 
honour of a thing'' (LI) - and Isabel recognizes that a divorce would 
shake him severely: 
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'What he thought of her she knew, what he was 
capable of saying to her she had felt; yet they 
were married, for all that, and marriage meant 
that a woman should cleave to the man with whom, 
uttering tremendous vows, she had stood at the 
altar. ' (LI) 
'Certain obligations were involved in the very 
fact of marriage, and were quite independent 
of the quantity of enjoyment extracted from it. ' 
(LV) 
This adherence to duty could be viewed as yet another wishful 
attempt to prove to herself that she is better than she really is. 
Although Isabel realizes above that her attempt at harmonious marriage 
has failed, she will show the world her determination to sta; - on in 
spite of the unpleasantness. If Osmond dislikes her as much as she 
believes he does, then her continued presence (though required by him 
for appearance's sake) will also torture him. 
Pansy Osmond could be a claim on Isabel's compassion or yet 
another duty for Mrs. Osmond. Isabel has long recognised Pansy's help- 
lessness: 
'... she could be felt as an easy victim of fate. 
She would have no will, no power to resist, no 
sense of her own importance : she would easily 
be mystified, easily crushed : her force would 
be all in knowing when and where to cling. ' 
(m) 
Pansy clings to Isabel as forcefully as she can when she appeals to 
Isabel's mercy. But Isabel has difficulty being merciful (compassion 
with her is precious) when she sees nothing about Pansy's weakness to 
admire: 
'(Pansy) had no vocation for struggling with 
combinations; in the solemnity of sequestration 
there was something that overwhelmed her. She 
bowed her pretty head to authority and only 
asked of authority to be merciful. ' (LII) 
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Isabel's offer to Pansy to leave the convent reminds us of the same 
offer Sir Claude makes to Maisie to give up Mrs. Wix and come away to 
Paris: 
"Don't leave me here' Pansy went on gently. 
Isabel said nothing for a minute; her heart 
beat fast. 'Will you come away with me now? ' 
she asked. 
Pansy looked at her pleadingly. 'Did papa tell 
you to bring me? ' 
'No; it's my own proposal. ' 
'I think I had better wait then. '' (LII) 
Isabel Is offer would enable her to revenge herself on Osmond by steal- 
ing his daughter away, but Pansy refuses to reject : he father whom she 
knows loves her deeply. Isabel pities Pansy's inability to combat her 
father's will, and recognizes dutifully her need to cling to Isabel for 
protection: 
''What are you afraid of? ' 
'Of papa--a little. And of Madame Merle. She 
has just been to see me. ' 
'You must not say that' Isabel observed. 
'0h, I'll do everything they want. Only, if 
you're here I shall do it more easily. ' 
Isabel considered. 'I won't desert you' she 
said at last. 'Goodbye, my child' ... 
'You'll come back? ' she called out in a voice 
that Isabel remembered afterwards. 
'Yes--I'll come back. " (LII) 
Isabel's notion of duty is converted to one of compassion, for by agree- 
ing to come back she realises that in remedying her own problems she 
shouldn't compound Pansy's agony. 
In the novel's final confrontation between Caspar Goodwood and 
Isabel it appears that Isabel, in failing to respond to Goodwood's 
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overtures chooses duty and obligation and represses compassion. 
Goodwood's physical attractive power disturbs and repulses Isabel's 
aesthetic sensibility: 
'Caspar Goodwood had never corresponded to her 
idea of a delightful person and she supposed 
that this is why he left her so harshly 
critical. ' (XIII) 
Goodwood's hard, crude, unsubtle, unrelenting yet overwhelmingly honest 
pursuit affects her profoundly; she trembles with the effort it takes 
her to recover from his visits. She won't allow herself to submit to 
a man who doesn't appeal to her imagination. His powerful sexuality 
frightens her, so she is determined not to let him take 'positive 
possession' of her. James makes it quite clear that Isabel doesn't 
want anyone to control her. By the same token Isabel isn't good at 
hiding her unhappiness. She doesn't suffer secretly. Caspar's honesty 
hurts her pride: 
I You can't deceive me anymore; for God's sake be 
honest with a man who's so honest with you. You're 
the most unhappy of women, and your husband's the 
deadliest of fiends. '' (LV) 
She reacts as though he had slapped her across the face. But Isabel 
rejects Goodwood's attempt to rescue her from the marriage; his words 
don't succeed in budging her from the self respecting post of duty: 
"I swear, as I stand here, that a woman deliber- 
ately made to suffer is justified in anything in 
life--in going down into the streets if that will 
help her :I know how you suffer, and that's why 
I'm here. We can do absolutely as we please; to 
whom under the sun do we owe anything : What is it 
that holds us, what is it that has the smallest 
right to interfere in such a question as this? 
Such a question is between ourselves--and to say 
that is to settle it! Were we born to rot in our 
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misery--were we born to be afraid? I never knew 
you afraid! If you'll only trust me, how little 
you will be disappointed! The world's all before 
us--and the world's very big. I know something 
about that. ' (LV) 
Isabel's anguish is intense; she knows she is unhappy, she knows she 
wasn't 'made to suffer', but she also knows she must face the cause of 
her suffering. What she tells Ralph before he dies betrays indecision 
and despair: 
"Is it all over then between you? ' 
'Oh no; I don't think anything's over. ' 
'Are you going back to him? ' Ralph gasped. 
'I don't know--I can't tell. I shall stay here 
as long as I may. I don't want to think--I 
needn't think. I don't care for anything but 
you, and that's enough for the present. '' (LIV) 
Caspar Goodwood's proposal tempts her enormously. She had wanted to die 
with Ralph - she had envied his rest, but now, with Caspar, she believes 
that 'to let him take her in his arms would be the next best thing to 
her dying' . But her words belie her feelings as she tries to banish him: 
''Do me the greatest kindness of all' she panted. 
'I beseech you to go away! ' 
'Ah, don't say that. Don't kill me! ' he cried. 
She clasped her hands; her eyes were streaming 
with tears. 'As you love me, as you pity me, 
leave me alone! '' (LV) 
Caspar unmistakably stirs her, confusing her reasoning; she doesn't 
want to lose control. His famous 'white lightning' kiss catapults her 
into decisive action. She flees him, having rediscovered her freedom 
and a 'very straight path'. William Veeder reminds us that Isabel runs 
away from a fear of sexuality to face a dreadful marriage: 
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'Recognizing with Caspar's kiss her potential for 
passionate sexuality, Isabel controls that dan- 
gerous impulse by returning to a marriage forever 
dead to passion. Her reaffirmation of marriage 
cannot, then, be seen simply as the triumph of 
duty over the powers of sexuality; doing what 
society advocates allows Isabel to repress what 
she (and society) fear. The very convenience of 
this act, its inevitable self-service, is what 
assures. Isabel's permanent ambivalence. '19 
The ambiguity arising from Isabel's failure to confront Caspar's sexu- 
ality is complemented by her strict adherence to social duty. Caspar 
appeals to a side of her rarely engaged. We have seen how emotionally 
cool she remains, even with poor Pansy. What would people say of her 
if she ran away from her husband? What other people think does matter 
to her because she thrives on admiration. Even though her husband hates 
her she will be admired for putting up with him. Were she to leave 
Osmond it is possible that he might retain the rights to her estate. 
But if she stays she will have the power to decide whether or not to 
provide a dowry for Pansy -a dowry Osmond very much wants for her. 
Finally, Isabel has shown a certain amount of compassion toward Pansy 
by promising to return to her. Through Ralph's example (even though she 
realised too late), Isabel has learned the importance of helping other 
powerless creatures. She may do for Pansy what Ralph did for her. Were 
Isabel to escape with Caspar she would epitomize the helpless female, 
which she is not. Laurence Bedwell Holland emphasizes this aspect of her 
refusal to submit to his advances: 
'If her return to life and to her marriage makes the 
bond more demanding as a form of obligation, it also 
makes of the woman's role something more dignified 
than mere formalistic, deferential, and passive 
assent ... In her combination of resolute 
independ- 
ence of act with her insistence on the strictness 
of the bond, in her determination to play a role 
as parent, and in the prospect, unlikely though 
il 
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it is to be achieved of Ned and Pansy's union, 
the Portrait prefigures some of the conspicu- 
ous features of marriage in Modern America. '20 
When Isabel decides to return to Rome to face life's harsh realities, 
she renounces bovarysme. But all is not lost. Her inheritance, which 
she mistakenly thought would enlarge her own experience, will enable 
her to provide for Pansy. Her intellectual independence will enable 
her to stand up to Osmond on Pansy's behalf. And Pansy's helplessness 
encourages in Isabel the development of compassion awakened by Ralph's 
death. 
Isabel's inward struggle with self ends in a repression of passion; 
she, like Milly Theale, Maggie Verver, and Mrs. Dalloway, will not let 
out the beast in the 'leaf-encumbered forest of the soul', the darker 
side of self. In the next chapter we shall see how Milly Theale, who 
lives in terror of exposing this secret self to the light of day, folds 
her wings about her for protection. 
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Chapter VII 
billy Theale and the Terrified Secret Self 
The Wings of the Dove (1902) is a portrait of a young woman with 
financial and intellectual independence. Like Isabel Archer, Milly 
wants not only to live all she can but wants also not to make any mis- 
takes. Unlike Isabel, Milly recognizes that death will shortly ter- 
minate her existence. Dramatic tension in the novel is established 
between two ways of seeing existence. There is Kate Croy's vision, 
which involves an aesthetic appreciation of beauty: ''I verily 
believe I shall hate you if you spoil for me the beauty of what I see! '' 
(XVIII), and a fatal attraction for 'material things', for 'she had a 
dire accessibility to pleasure from such sources'. (II) Kate is 
obsessed with appearances and surfaces : we first meet her staring at 
her reflection in a glass. Milly's way of seeing involves protecting 
a secret, terrified inner self from discovery. That she will go to 
great lengths to protect this self's integrity, by 'putting on' the 
protective colouration of a dove and subsuming her idea of self in 
their idea of her, indicates the importance of the inward struggle is 
to her and to James. James is concerned not with the obvious, super- 
ficial dilemma of having or not having money, but with a more funda- 
mental concept of being. 
By far the most impressive thing about billy is her fabulous 
wealth: '... she had to ask nobody for anything, to refer nothing to 
anyone; her freedom, her fortune and her fancy were her law ... ' 
(VIII) James's purpose in making Reilly rich is quite clear; it gives 
her, he writes in the Preface: 
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'a strong and special implication of liberty, 
liberty of action, of choice, of appreciation, 
of contact--proceeding from sources that provide 
better for large independence, I think, than any 
other conditions in the world--and this would be 
in particular what we should feel ourselves 
deeply concerned with. 'l 
It is Milly's liberty with which James wishes us to be concerned. She 
has the means and the inspiration (financial and intellectual indepen- 
dence) to lose herself in London, to hide in the upper chamber of a 
Venetian Palazzo. At the National Gallery she discovers a possible 
sanctuary among the Titians and Turners: 
'It was the air she wanted and the world she would 
now exclusively choose; the quiet chambers, 
nobly overwhelming, rich but slightly veiled, 
opened out round her and made her presently say 
'if I could lose myself here! ... ' The case was 
the case of escape, of living under water, of 
being at once impersonal and firm. There it was 
before one--one had only to stick and stick. ' 
(XVI ) 
'The romance for her, yet once more, would be to 
sit there for ever, through all her time, as in 
a fortress; and the idea became an image of 
never going down, of remaining aloft in the 
divine dustless air, where she would hear but 
the splash of the water against stone ... 'Ah, 2 
not to go down--never, never to go down! ' (XXV) 
Milly's 'rueful fancy' is made possible by her money. She need never 
go down, for Eugenio makes sure that she is well-supplied in her pro- 
visioned citadel. Until the end of the novel, hilly studiously avoids 
unpleasantness (references to her illness, her wealth, her loneliness, 
or the dark side of others). This failure of perception constitutes, 
in one important respect, a deficient morality. To seek to know only 
the good is but half the story. Morality is practiced by those who 
know evil and yet persist in doing good. That '. `illy sees and forgives 
Densher, a forgiveness demonstrated by her act of ¬enerosity, is the 
rectification of a deficient morality and an imperfect perception. 
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The balance of power in the novel, evidenced by the construction 
of elaborate cases for the three main characters, is only the start- 
ing point. Milly's money (what Kate wants) balances out Kate's fierce 
health (what Milly doesn't have). Unlike Isabel Milly believes that 
the others value her not for the self she keeps hidden but for her 
money. But the novel demonstrates that it is not the substance of 
her generosity (the gift of money to Densher) so much as the convic- 
tion leading to the act, which constitutes the shape of Milly's self 
in Densher's and in our minds. Her generosity gives her a greatness 
of presence that is hinted by her appearance in white at her last 
soiree. Densher is greatly affected by Milly's inward struggle. He 
adopts the images of a secret inner self he wishes to protect: 'a 
small emergent rock in the waste of waters. ' (XXXVIII) James does 
make it clear here that he comes down on Milly's side, and that he 
believes, and wants us to believe, in M. illy's greatness : Milly's way 
of seeing should be our way of seeing. 
Knowing that she is 'unmistakably reserved for some complicated 
passage' (V) and that success will depend upon her will power alone, 
dilly puts a brave face upon a brief flight. She explains herself to 
Densher: 
''Oh, I could go far! ' 
He bethought himself. 'Then why don't you? -- 
since you've got here, as I learn, the whole place 
in your pocket. ' 
'Well, it's a kind of economy--I'm saving things 
up. I've enjoyed so what you speak of-- ... I 
want--in the interest of itself what I've had, and 
may still have--not to make any mistakes. The way 
not to make them is to get off again to a distance 
and see the situation from there. '' (XXI) 
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Milly's explanation sheds light on her conflict. She wants to live, 
but she knows that running away in order not to make mistakes is no 
way to live. Now James has a particular reason for setting up his 
case in this manner, and it clearly wasn't because he wanted to record 
a 'collapse'. He was interested rather in how Milly lives with her 
knowledge and how that fatal knowledge affects her friends around her. 
R. P. Blackmur refers to the characters in James's late novels 
who, rather than submit to life's conditions, will 'master what lies 
under the conditions by achieving a conviction of the self--for surely 
a man's convictions may be said to be the very shape of his self'. 
3 
Milly's small, secret self is terrified of discovery: 'She wished to get 
away from him, or indeed, much rather, away from herself so far as she 
was present to him. ' (VII) What is there about herself that she wants 
to hide, or that she wants to run away from? The obvious, but not the 
only, answer is her rapidly approaching doom. Death is a taboo subject, 
and not one of Milly's friends can face her death except in terms of 
how it may benefit each of them. 
4 
In the light of that doom her refu- 
sal to commit the secret self to someone while aching for love holds 
her in thrall. We see how bravely Milly faces death; we must look for 
other possible reasons for her terror. Her friends accuse her of run- 
ning away from people: 
''Do you want to run away from him? ' 
It was oddly enough, an idea Milly seemed half to 
accept. 'I don't know what I want to run away 
from! '' (IX) 
''Shall you run away from him? ' 
She neglected the question, wanting only now to 
get off. 'Then' she went on, 'you'll deal with 
Kate directly. ' 
'Shall you run away from her? ' Mrs. Lowder pro- 
foundly inquired. ... '' 
(XIV) 
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Milly must suspect something is up or she wouldn't want to run away. 
Involvements, complications, abysses terrify and fascinate her. Kate 
inspires terror in Milly: '... she had felt herself alone with a 
creature who paced like a panther. That was a violent image, but it 
made her a little less ashamed of having been scared. ' (XV)5 
The title of the novel appears in two different passages from the 
Book of Psalms, first in Psalm LV: i-7: 
'My heart is torn with anguish 
and the terrors of death come upon me. 
Fear and trembling overwhelm me 
and I shudder from head to foot 
Oh that I had the wings of a dove 
to fly away and be at rest! 
I should escape far away 
and find a refuge in the wilderness ... ' 
and then in Psalm LXVIII: 12-13: 
'The women at home divide the spoil, 
Though they stay among the sheepfolds--the wings 
of a dove covered with silver, its pinions with 
green gold. ' 
In his sketch for : 'illy, James echoes the words of the psalm: 
'She learns that she has but a short time to live, 
and she rebels, she is terrified, she cries out 
in her anguish, her tragic young despair. She is 
in love with life, her dreams of it have been 
immense, and she clings to it with passion, with 
supplication. '6 
Death does terrify ?, silly, as bravely as she attempts to challenge it. 
What also terrifies her is the dreadful possibilities of the self in 
search of power, possibilities which she sees in Kate and which lie 
dormant even in her self. For her acceptance of Kate's name for her is 
the beginning of her deception. It enables her to hide that secret 
self behind fluttering white wings: 
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'It was ... like an inspiration : she found 
herself accepting as the right one, while she 
caught her breath with relief, the name so 
given her. She met it on the instant as she 
would have met the revealed truth; it lighted 
up the strange dusk in which she lately had 
walked. That was what was the matter with her. 
She was a dove. Oh, wasn't she? ... ' 
(XV) 
In Densher's eyes: 
'Hilly was indeed a dove; this was the figure, 
though it most applied to her spirit. But he 
knew in a moment that Kate was just now, for 
reasons hidden from him, exceptionally under 
the impression of that element of wealth in 
her which was a power, which was a great power, 
and which was dovelike only so far as one 
remembered that doves have tender tints and 
soft sounds. It even came to Densher dimly 
that such wings could in a given case--had, in 
fact, in the case in which he was concerned-- 
spread themselves for protection. ' (XXVIII) 
Psalm LVII offers up yet another reference to protection: 
'Be gracious to me, 0 god, be gracious; 
for I have made thee my refuge 
I will take refuge in the shadow of thy wings 
until the storms are past. ' 
James may even allude to this verse when we have the storms of Venice 
(XXX) which sweep Densher into hiding. hilly clings to the new identity 
as a defence against the loss of composure she suffers at Matcham when 
she faces the mirror of the Bronzino portrait: 
'And she was dead, dead, dead. }filly recognized 
her exactly in words that had nothing to do with 
her. 'I shall never be better than this. ' ... 
She was before the picture, but she had turned to 
him, and she didn't care if, for the minute, he 
noticed her tears. It was probably as good a 
moment as she should ever have with him. It was 
perhaps as good a moment as she should have with 
anyone, or have in any connexion whatever. 'I 
mean that everything this afternoon has been too 
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beautiful, and that perhaps everything together 
will never be so right again. I'm very glad 
therefore you've been a part of it. '' (XI) 
At Matcham Milly lets slip confusion and fear of the unknown: ' 'One 
never knows one's self ... " 
Milly faces the awful truth? of Kate's and Densher's interest in 
her late in the novel; she divines that she can never compete with 
Kate in the flesh, and that her money is the most substantial thing she 
has. She is of more use to them dead than alive: 
... wouldn't her value, for the man who should 
marry her, be precisely in the ravage of her 
disease? She mightn't last, but her money would. 
For a man in whom the vision of her money should 
be intense, in whom it should be most of the 
ground for 'making up' to her, any prospect of 
failure on her part to be long for this world 
might easily count as a positive attraction. ' 
cXXV> 
There isn't any doubt but that Milly is referring to Densher's making 
up to her. She has no illusions about his love for her ease, all of 
which gives her final gesture to him even more poignant - unless we see 
it as a final bid for power. The move is a curious mixture of devotion 
and enchantment. Here I agree with John Goode, who credits Lilly accu- 
rately with more perception than the other characters have, limiting 
their view of her to that of a dove: 
'Living is reduced to a metaphor based on money, 
because Milly has endless resources of money and 
no resources of life. Of course, her plucky 
little self-irony is at work again here, but 
what she actually does is to use her money as a 
counter-move to fate--both in the sense that she 
lives in a palace where all appears beautiful, 
and in the sense that, by creating an image of 
herself that overwhelms Densher, she can avoid 
the fate of being used to provide a means by 
which Kate's strength may express itself. '8 
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For some critics Kate Croy figures prominently in the novel at 
the expense of the dying heroine. As in The Golden Bowl, James uses 
a medal image to describe the form given to his two cases, stressing 
the choice available to the reader: '... could I but make my medal 
hang free, its obverse and its reverse, its face and its back, would 
beautifully become optional for the spectator. '9 It would at first 
appear from such an explanation that James presents us here with a 
case of ethical neutrality, as defined by Eliseo Vivas: 
''Ethical' in art consists solely in submission to 
the inner thrust of the dramatic incident which 
has been selected for treatment in humility before 
the object's inward dialectic, as against the arro- 
gant and pre-intended dominance with which the par- 
tisan violates, for his own subjective ends, the 
autonomy of his material. '10 
However we discover that James presents us instead with a case of ethi- 
cal complexity. Because he persistently sticks to an 'indirect presen- 
tation of his main image', 
11 
James makes it infinitely more difficult 
for the reader to discern a moral direction to the proceedings. 
Because of her father's unnamed, horrible deeds, Kate can never 
think of her self as anything but dishonoured.. Her self-esteem is 
curiously low: ''I'm not so precious a capture ... no one has ever 
wanted to keep me before. '' (I) The nature of the relationship between 
Kate and Densher is one of perception. At the start, 'Densher's per- 
ception went out to meet the young woman's and quite kept pace with her 
own recognition'. And James notes carefully in the narrative that: 
'Any deep harmony that might eventually govern 
them would not be the result of their having much 
in common--having anything, in fact, but their 
affection; and would really find its explanation 
in some sense, on the part of each, being poor 
where the other was rich. ' (III) 
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But the problem in their relationship is that neither has monetary 
wealth, and Densher fully recognises this: 
'Thus was kept before him the question of whether 
it were more ignoble to ask a woman to take her 
chance with you, or to accept it from one's con- 
science that her chance could be at the best but 
one of the degrees of privation; whether, too, 
otherwise, marrying for money mightn't after all 
be a smaller cause of shame than the mere dread 
of marrying without. ' (III) 
Similarly, Kate is faced with the danger, the dread of marrying without 
money. 'She saw as she had never seen before how material things spoke 
to her. ' (II) She is 'marked from far back', 
12 
and especially vulner- 
able because 'of her having to recognise that, should she behave, as 
she called it, decently--that is still to do something for others--she 
would be herself wholly without supplies'. And furthermore, 'it was 
perfectly present to Kate that she might be devoured, and she likened 
herself to a trembling kid, kept apart a day or two till her turn should 
come, but sure sooner or later to be introduced into the cage of the 
lioness'. (II) Kate doesn't recognize the amorality of her motives in 
fulfilling her vision. Densher sees her as 'violent and unfeminine', 
Milly denies that she is 'brutally brutal'. For the sake of the Croy 
family name she must do everything possible: ' 'It makes me ask myself 
if I've any right to personal happiness, any right to anythinE but to 
be as rich and overflowing, as smart and shining, as I can be made. 
'' 
(III) 
Kate indeed dazzles ?, `illy, although billy senses that there are 
'other', 'not wholly calculable' elements in Kate that she cannot know. 
?. "illy uses Kate and her friends to fill up her scene; she trusts 
indiscriminately, expecting that Susan will supply the people, any 
people, for their entourage. Kate's assumptions about those with money 
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involve the notion of 'noblesse oblige' - that those who have ought 
to patronize those who haven't. She sees the elements of a fair 
exchange in their transactions. If Milly needs people, Kate needs 
money; but Milly doesn't ask enough of Kate in return. 
Kate Croy's conviction of self is overwhelming in its single- 
minded determination. V, ith her independence of vision and instinct for 
survival (the panther in the jungle) she masters life's conditions. 
She'll make the declarations which Densher won't risk: 
''She'll let me off. I shan't have to lie to her. ' 
'It will be left all to me? ' asked Kate. 
'All to you! ' he tenderly laughed. ' (IV) 
That Kate must act for both of them at the start, and that her actions 
are deliberate and yet difficult, marks her out for many critics as the 
anti-heroine who isn't at the same time a villainess, and deserves 
special sympathy. James leads the way in such judgments when he makes 
the following admission with perhaps deliberate ambiguity: 
'It may be declared for Kate, at all events, that 
her sincerity about her friend ... was deep, her 
compassionate imagination strong, and that these 
things gave her a virtue, a good conscience, a 
credibility for herself, so to speak, that were 
later to be precious to her. ' (XXIV) 
Ahat James says here is that Kate always operates under the assumption 
that she is doing what is best and kindest for `illy, an assumption she 
sticks to when she later declares that she always played fair with 
Milly. James's lead is followed up by many critics, and is especially 
well-stated by Kenneth Graham: 
'Kate's burden of self-knowledge--and to the very 
end of the book she knows herself, her powers, 
her ambitiousness, her danger of coldness, better 
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than any of the other characters know them- 
selves, including Milly--is added to by a 
more or less active conscience. '13 
In the Preface James makes clear what role Kate and Densher play: 
'They are far from a common couple, Merton 
Densher and Kate Croy, as befits the remark- 
able fashion in which fortune was to waylay 
and opportunity was to distinguish them--the 
whole strange truth of their response to which 
opening involves also, in its order, no vulgar 
art of exhibition; but what they have most to 
tell us is that, all unconsciously and with the 
best faith in the world, all by mere force of 
the terms of their superior passion combined 
with their superior diplomacy, they are laying 
a trap for the great innocence to come. '14 
But before they lay the trap Densher must recognize his danger: 
'The play of one's mind let one in, at the best, 
dreadfully, in action, in the need of action, 
where simplicity was all; but when one couldn't 
prevent it the thing was to make it complete. 
There would never be mistakes but for the orig- 
inal fun of mistakes. What he must use his fatal 
intelligence for was to resist. ' (IV) 
Stephen Spender uses this passage to illustrate an important point about 
characters in James's late novels: 
'The fatal intelligence which is the enemy to 
action is cast over the three great novels, The 
airings of the Dove, The Ambassadors, and The 
Golden Bowl. The result of it is that the heroes 
and heroines of these novels are all passive; 
they do not act at all. Their morality is to 
suffer generously. It also follows that what 
they have to suffer from is being more intelli- 
gent than the other characters. Also, there 
are no villains. It is important to emphasize 
this because in these really savage novels the 
behaviour of some of the characters is exposed 
in its most brutal form. But the wickedness of 
the characters lies primarily in their situation. 
Once the situation is provided the actors cannot 
behave otherwise. Their only compensation is 
that by the use of their intelligence, by their 
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ability to understand, to love, and to suffer, 
they may to some extent atone for the evil 
which is simply the evil of their modern world. 
It is these considerations that make his later 15 books parables of modern Western civilization. 
Spender's ideas resemble R. P. Blackmur's on the novel, and his theory 
is an attractive one. Densher has a 'case of conscience'. It is here 
that James's case of ethical complexity takes place. Densher's elabor- 
ate justification for his taking action confirms the complexity: 
'Wouldn't it be as indelicate, in a way, to chal- 
lenge her as to leave her deluded? --and this 
quite apart from the exposure, so to speak, of 
Kate, as to whom it would constitute a kind of 
betrayal. Kate's design was something so extra- 
ordinarily special to Kate that he felt himself 
shrink from the complications involved in judg- 
ing it. Not to give away the woman one loved, 
but to back her up in her mistakes--once they 
had gone a certain length--that was perhaps 
chief among the inevitabilities of the abjec- 
tion of love. ' (XXI) 
Densher moves from passive acceptance of Kate's design to active parti- 
cipation; he must convince Milly that she is the reason he is staying 
on in Venice. Only by convincing her can he hope to fulfil his part of 
Kate's plan to stay for Milly in Venice, thus laying the trap for her 
innocence with the best faith in the world, a faith reinforced by their 
'superior passion': 
'Her surrender was her response, her response her 
surrender; and, though scarce hearing what she 
said, he so profited by these things that it 
could for the time be solid to him that he was 
keeping her. The long embrace in which they 
held each other was the rout of evasion, and he 
took from it the certitude that what she had 
from him was real. It was stronger than an 
uttered vow, and the name he was to give it in 
afterthought was that she had been sublimely 
sincere. That was all he asked--sincerity mak- 
ing a basis that would bear almost anything. ' 
(XVII)16 
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Densher realizes that Kate convinces him by the power of her words and 
passion alone. Their sexual connection is the strongest and only con- 
nection they have together, and it has tremendous consequences for 
both of them : Kate gives all she has - her body - to him. And he 
cherishes that gift until it is supplanted by Milly's gift. 
Densher's guilt is greater than he wishes to believe. He denies 
responsibility and exults in his innocence of committing any act when 
he discovers the Palazzo Leporelli closed to him: 
'His business, he had settled, as we know, was to 
keep thoroughly still; and he asked himself why 
it should prevent this that he could feel, in 
connexion with the crisis, so remarkably blame- 
less. He gave the appearances before him all 
the benefit of being critical, so that if blame 
were to accrue he shouldn't feel he had dodged 
it. But it wasn't a bit he who, that day, had 
touched her, and if she was upset it wasn't a 
bit his act. The ability so to think about it 
amounted for Densher, during several hours, to 
a kind of exhilaration. ' (XXX) 
Not only does Densher accuse Lord Mark of wanting Nilly for the same 
reason he himself does (XXXI), he also condemns Kate for the amoral 
ease with which she sees her way: 
'Of course, it was to be remembered, she had always 
simplified, and it brought back his sense of the 
degree in which to her energy as compared with his 
own, many things were easy; the very sense that 
so often before had moved him to admiration. ' 
(XXXIII) 
Kate of course sees this judgment in Densher's eyes: ''Oh, you would 
have broken with me to make your denial a truth? You would have 
'chucked' me' - she embraced it perfectly - 
'to save your conscience" 
(XXXIII) What has happened to Densher that his relation to Kate chan- 
ges so drastically that they can 
be no more than 'so damned civil'? 
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He has had the time to consider and accept . 1l`illy's willingness to 
give everything for nothing in return. (In much the same way Charlotte 
Stant will be willing to give herself away, for nothing, in The Golden 
Bowl. ) James uses a special image to describe the difference made in 
Densher's rooms by the two women's sacrifices. After Kate has come to 
his rooms in Venice to consummate their secret engagement, his mind 
reels for days afterward with the shock and pleasure of the encounter: 
'It played for him--certainly in this prime after- 
glow--the part of a treasure kept, at home, in 
safety and sanctity, something he was sure of 
finding in its place when, with each return, he 
worked his heavy old key in the lock. The door 
had but to open for him to be with it again and 
for it to be all there; so intensely there that, 
as we say, no other act was possible to him than 
the renewed act, almost the halucination, of 
intimacy. ' (XXIX) 
When Kate burns filly's letter containing the sacred knowledge of her 
gift, attempting to burn away the sin of their deed, Densher preserves 
the thought of what Milly might have done, as a 'priceless pearl cast 
before his eyes ... into the fathomless sea' on which sounded, 
'for the 
spiritual ear ... as a 
faint, far wail'. (XXXVII) The sound, like the 
sensation of Kate's presence in his rooms in Venice, haunts him: 
'This was the sound that he cherished, when alone, 
in the stillness of his rooms. He sought and 
guarded the stillness, so that it might prevail 
there till the inevitable sounds of life, once 
more, comparatively coarse and harsh, should 
smother and deaden it--doubtless by the same 
process with which they would officiously heal 
the ache, in his soul, that was somehow one with 
it. It deepened moreover the sacred hush that 
he couldn't complain. He had given poor Kate 
her freedom. ' (XXXVIII) 
Densher's conscience has been deeply affected by the girl's death. James 
uses an interesting inversion to illustrate the effect : 
the stillness of 
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death being smothered and deadened by the sounds of life, another 
suggestion that James's attitude towards death, as reflected by Densher, 
is difficult for us to understand. The letter which Kate burns in a 
symbolic purging rite is, ironically, seen by him as a burnt offering 
to her memory. Milly's powerful will to live coupled with her pure 
generosity creates an admirable image for him so strong that it dis- 
rupts his love for Kate. He has a vision of evil darkness, of which 
he is a part. He offers himself up to Kate once more in the park in 
order to set himself right: 
"&y dear man, what has happened to you? ' 
'bell, that I can bear it no longer. That's 
simply what has happened. Something has snapped, 
has broken in me, and here I am. It's as I am 
that you must have me ." 
(XXXN ) 
Densher wistfully hopes that by his offer he may somehow erase his 
guilty complicity. But because Kate will only meet him with a surety 
from him that her plan has succeeded, his horror, rage and awakening is 
such that even her passionate impulse doesn't save them (see XXIV): 
'... it was as if his act, so deeply associated 
with her and never to be recalled nor recovered, 
was abroad on the winds of the world. His honesty 
as he viewed it, with Kate, was the very element 
of that menace : to the degree that he saw at 
moments, as to their final impulse or their final 
remedy, the need to bury in the dark blindness of 
each other's arms the knowledge of each other that 
they couldn't undo. ' (XXXVIII) 
Once more we are faced with the ethical complexity of James's vision. 
R. P. Blackmur wrote at length about the presentation of good and evil 
in James's novels; the difficulty, thought Blackmur, was to create 
meaningful, believable oppositions: 
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'As the experience in art must be somehow of the 
actual and as the record must be somehow of the imaginative, then the artist is free to create 
evil as well as good without risk of police interference. It is not that his vision of evil 
may overcome his vision of good, but that, if he 
is to be an artist of any scope, he must create both, and if the emphasis is on the one in a 
given work it must have the other as its under 
or supporting side ... ' 
'But 
... to have validity whether moral or 
aesthetic, whatever the artist creates ... must 
show its source in the actual; for is other- 
wise either immoral or vapid, and likely both. 117 
There are two ideas which appear to lie beneath Blackmur's explanation 
here. Either the moral isn't creatable from the actual, or, morality 
has come to have less and less bearing upon the significant consequences 
of organized human behaviour (e. g., war or genocide), and therefore it 
has become increasingly difficult to distinguish the good from the 
evil. 
It may appear at first that Blackmur was bothered by a morality 
which was created by James's imagination rather than of the actual 
world in which James lived. But I suspect that for Blackmur the diffi- 
culty with James occurred when he perceived how accurately James pre- 
dicted a trend in twentieth century understanding of human behaviour. 
James's predictions seem to take the form of the paradox of the divided 
self described by his brother William in The Varieties of Religious 
Experience, the Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion, given in Edinburgh 
in the year before The Zings of the Dove was published: 
'If we admit that evil is an essential part of 
our being and the key to the interpretation of 
our life, we load ourselves down with a diffi- 
culty that has always proved burdensome in 
philosophies of religion ... on the monistic 
or pantheistic view, evil, like everything else, 
must have its foundation in God; and the 
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difficulty is to see how this can possibly be 
the case if God be absolutely good. This diffi- 
culty faces us in every form of philosophy in 
which the world appears as one flawless unit of 
fact. Such a unit is an Individual, and in it 
the worst parts must be as essential as the best, 
must be as necessary to make the individual what 
he is; since if any part whatever in an indivi- 
dual were to vanish or alter it would no longer 
be that individual at all. '18 
William James tentatively concludes later in the lectures that although 
there are some 'forms of evil so extreme as to enter into no good sys- 
tem whatsoever, and that, in respect of such evil, dumb submission or 
neglect to notice is the only practical resource ... ', nevertheless he 
argues that any system must account for evil coherently: 
'But ... since the evil facts are as genuine parts 
of nature as the good ones, the philosophic pre- 
sumption should be that they have some rational 
significance, and that systematic healthy minded- 
ness, failing as it does to accord to sorrow, 
pain, and death any positive and active attention 
whatever, is formally less complete than systems 
that try at least to include these elements in 
their scope. '19 
What William James is arguing for is a system which recognizes good and 
evil within a coherent framework. Henry James writes in his novels 
about individual units, characters, which embody good and evil, even if 
the mixes are unrecognized by those individuals. But in an atmosphere 
of tremendous uncertainty and upheaval (i. e., the time in which Blackmur 
and many other critics write20) it often becomes difficult to accept 
such a mixture. We readers wish to cling to absolutes we can trust; 
Lionel Trilling argues this case for the popularity among his students 
of Jane Austen's novels. 
21 
Henry James recognized that ideals and sub- 
conscious motives could easily become confused in art : when one accepts 
evil into the universal framework, it becomes nearly impossible to 
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attribute an absolute moral stance to any side in a pitched battle. 
Blackmur recognized this impulse in James to illustrate the whole 
framework and, perhaps overwhelmed by the spectacle of mass destruc- 
tion in the name of morality (two world wars), his attitude towards 
James's vision becomes increasingly pessimistic, reverting almost to 
the melancholic religious experience, 
22 
the side that dwells on evil. 
But James didn't dwell solely on evil, nor did he ignore it. 
Blackmur's critical about-face occurred perhaps because he wanted to 
see James's characters either disposing with evil triumphantly or sub- 
mitting dumbly, inevitably. In 1948 he wrote that the force which 
gave Milly and Maggie their triumph was 'the positive strength of 
character and perceptive ability which their experience of treachery 
only brings out', empowered by decency which is either 'a transformation 
of the force of sex' or 'a new kind of vocation in morals'. 
23 
By 1951, 
R. P. Blackmur's positive impression of the power of James's late hero- 
ines had become a negative impression: 
'... somehow Kate is the destructive persistent 
element of practical philosophy which criticizes, 
and places, and makes intelligible, and disposes 
of the overweening image of moral beauty which is 
Milly Theale, princess in her own American right 
and heiress of the ages. Kate is criticism which 
does not destroy but modulates : under her impact 
we see the nominal heroine of the novel, t, 'illy 
Theale, for what she is, an aspiration impossible 
of realization; she is the temptation seen on the 
high places which is the worst temptation, once 
seen the most corrupting, appealing with the best 
impossible appeal to the worst in our natures. 
That is not what a man wants to do with his image 
of moral beauty, but it is what the imaginative 
man, when he sees his image in terms of the actual24 
conditions of life, sometimes must in honesty do. ' 
Blackmur's changed insights are representative of the conflict obvious 
in James's critics. Blackmur switches sides, from admirint :. 'illy to 
i7/ 
admiring Kate for showing Milly up. I would suggest that one of the 
reasons for the change in Blackmur's attitude, and perhaps a reason 
for the split in criticism of James's late novels, lies with critics' 
individual attitudes toward human behaviour in the world they live in, 
than to the way James observed human behaviour as recorded in his 
novels. Because James's novels are of course grounded in reality, and 
have therefore a particular force for us, it is tempting but wrong to 
confuse James's attitude toward the world he sees with our own possibly 
different attitude, and, more to the point, to confuse the world of art 
James creates in his novels with the world as we should like to see it. 
That's not playing fair with James : to judge his artistic creation by 
the way we see our world. Nevertheless it is difficult not to bring 
our own desires in to criticism of his novelistic world. 
YW'here, ultimately, does James leave us in The Wings of the Dove? 
He leaves us to accept or reject his terms : that in spite of or because 
of everything that has occurred in the novel, he gives his blessing to 
Milly, the dying heroine. In that way James is hopeful; for '. illy is, 
in the end, a model of selfless love. She gives for the pleasure of 
giving, not for the hope of receiving. And Kate is a model of selfish 
love, giving in anticipation of receiving all. 'Give, give all you can' 
could be the motto of the novel, a modification of Strether's plea to 
little Bilham to ''live all you can, it's a mistake not to'' (The 
Ambassadors, Book V. Chapter II), and Sir Luke's advice to '-'illy, '' My 
dear young lady ... isn't to 
'live' exactly what I'm trying to persuade 
you to take the trouble to do? '' (XII) Milly gives Densher all she 
possesses; Kate gives her most valuable possession, herself, to him. 
Densher is transformed first by Kate's brave act, then by : filly's, both 
of which are gifts of sacrifice of the body - one willingly, to sexual 
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passion, one unwillingly to death. Both sacrifices become inextric- 
ably mingled in his changed conviction of self. That the two women 
share Densher as their motive for sacrifice, and that the good in 
Yilly and the bad in Kate should be thus confused underscores his and 
our inability to censure or praise either Milly or Kate alone. Kate 
recognizes the change in Densher and her own link with Milly, but she 
cannot cope with his inability to admit the change. He wants things 
to be 'as they were' before the confusion. Kate, as always, sees 
things as they are. Without the bridge between 'were' and 'are', Milly, 
they cannot go on together. Kate had thought that Milly's life preven- 
ted them from marrying. She sees that Milly's death actually, effec- 
tively, bars the union. Kate and Densher, hanging around Milly, wait- 
ing for her death, might have instead been living, just as Richard in 
Bleak House waits for an inheritance which never comes. `: illy discovers 
her life, her conviction of self, in giving. If she waits it is to give 
Densher time to accept her selfless gift. If she doesn't see him for 
days it is because she wants him to see and understand how little she 
is free and how much her life depends on his freely accepting the 
offering she makes. His idea that she is ''the least coercible of 
creatures'' the ' 'freest person probably now in the world'' 
(XXIX) has 
to change. By the end of their last revealed passage Densher pretends 
to be there for i,. 'illy: 
''Isn't it enough, whatever may be one's other 
complications, to stay, after all, for you? " 
(XXIX ) 
Shortly thereafter he does see, understand, and accept the responsibi- 
lity: 
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'When he had turned about, to Milly, at the palace, 
half an hour before, on the question of the impos- 
sibility he had so strongly felt, turned about on 
the spot and under her eyes, he had acted, of a 
sudden, as a consequence of seeing much farther, 
seeing how little, how not at all impossibilities 
mattered. It wasn't a case for pedantry; when 
people were at her pass everything was allowed. 
And her pass was now, as by the sharp click of a 
spring, just completely his own--to the extent, 
as he felt, of her deep dependence on him. Any- 
thing he should do, or he shouldn't, would have 
reference, directly, to her life, which was thus 
absolutely in his hands--and ought never to have 
reference to anything else. It was on the cards 
for him that he might kill her--that was the way 
he read the cards as he sat in his customary 
corner. The fear in this thought made him let 
everything go, kept him there, actually, motion- 
less, for three hours on end. ' (XXX) 
Impossibilities don't matter anymore. It has come down, he thinks, to 
his not acting in order to save her life. And so also paralysis seems 
to grip the culture of the times in which James writes and even now, in 
the times in which we read. To act or not act : in both is death, and 
in one is life. If it was a matter of Densher's being merely straight 
with ! ", illy, he would be straight. But the truth for Densher has gone 
far beyond simple straightness; it is not only infinitely complex but 
also infinitely difficult to capture except in death. dilly's death 
offers a truth for Densher, for Kate, for everyone who surrounds her. 
Her death not only gives her life a conviction, it also gives a cold, 
hard truth to their own lives. She gives them an example by which they 
measure themselves. 
This reading suggests that James meant death to have as positive 
meaning for us as it did for him. In Leon Edel's biography of James he 
quotes him as saying that his sister Alice's ''tragic health was in a 
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manner the only solution for her of the practical problem of life''. 
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There are some evils for which 'dumb submission or neglect to notice 
is the only practical resource' - Yilly's dumb submission was in hope, 
as was James's record of her fight. In that light her submission is 
an extraordinary triumph. 
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Chapter VIII 
The self in inward struggle : the dilemma of aesthetic 
and moral vision in 'The Golden Bowl' 
James's last completed novel deals with the nature of self and the 
assimilation of the moral vision with the aesthetic vision. In the 
novel the rendered consciousness of the characters bears witness to 
these issues. James chooses to show us Maggie's struggle for a know- 
ledge of self which recognizes and accepts responsibility for her actions. 
'Tell me what the artist is, and I will tell you of what he has has been 
conscious. Thereby I shall express to you at once his boundless freedom 
and his 'moral' reference. '' 
1 
Once we have seen of what the novelist 
has been conscious, as evidenced by the narrative, we should be able to 
determine from what 'moral' perspective he writes. James explains fur- 
ther that the degree to which a character is conscious determines what 
he (and the reader) will derive from the experience: 
'... the figures in any picture, the agents in any 
drama, are interesting only in proportion as they 
feel their respective situations; since the con- 
sciousness, on their part, of the complication 
exhibited forms for us their link of connexion 
with it. But there are degrees of feeling--the 
muffled, the faint, the just sufficient, the 
barely intelligent, as we may say; and the acute, 
the intense, the complete, in a word--the power to 
be finely aware and richly responsible. It is 
those moved in this latter fashion who 'get most' 
out of all that happens to them and who in so doing 
enable us, as readers of their record, as participa- 
tors by a fond attention, also to get most. '2 
Consciousness is not, however, to be confused with morality or conscier. ý, e. 
James writes with high humour of the effect his father's attitude towards 
'morality' had on him: 
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'... we had ever the amusement, since I can 
really call it nothing less, of hearing 
morality, or moralism, as it was more invidi- 
ously worded, made hay of in the very interest 
of character and conduct; these things suffer- 
ing much, it seemed, by their association with 
the conscience--that is the conscious conscience-- 
the very home of the literal, the haunt of so 
many pedantries. '3 
James's meaning comes out of the narrative structure of the novel. 
He has divided The Golden Bowl into two volumes -I: The Prince and 
II : The Princess. Volume I is to a large degree preoccupied with sur- 
faces. An important clue is dropped in chapter III when the Prince 
observes to himself that Charlotte's doom is to arrange appearances. 
Reinforcing the concern for appearances is the Prince's acceptance of 
Adam's idea of him as a 'pure and perfect crystal'. (IV) The first 
volume of The Golden Bowl presents the Prince's attempts to maintain 
a perfect appearance, a surface betraying no cracks or flaws. He 
strives to act in accordance with the Verver's wishes. He conceives 
of 'being' in terms of action. 
Volume II is concerned, by contrast, with MI{aggie's inner turmoil. 
Considerable emphasis is laid upon what lies beneath the surface : 
tapping on porcelain panels, breaking through iced puddings, smashinf- 
golden bowls. Much of Volume II is a rendering of `, aC ie's conscious- 
ness of events : thought is weighted more heavily than action. 
James's characterization concentrates less on surfaces (aesthetic 
considerations) than it does on interiors (moral considerations). The 
range of surface discriminations and devices which James employed in 
The Portrait of a Lady (e. g., his mimicry of Henrietta Stackpole) very 
largely disappears in the late novels. It is not how the characters 
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speak (since they all now appear to mimic James himself) but what 
they think : their moral vision or conviction of self. 
James's narrative method, which focusses upon interior discrimin- 
ations rather than surfaces, is morally realistic. Marius Bewley 
defends James's indirect approach to morality in the novels as being 
the closest approach to life: 
'James was a confessed pragmatist to whom moral 
values were acceptable only when they had proved 
and validated themselves in terms of human experi- 
ence. Life proved itself in the living. But as 
social conventions and attitudes are frequently 
dissociated in the actual world from the sources 
of life and refreshment, the social surfaces of 
James's fictions are often screens behind which 
we have to look to discover the values he 
believed in and the judgements he was making. 
They are often different from what they appear 
to be at first. This is not a contrivance in 
James : in some ways it is the level at which 
his art approaches life most closely. '4 
Morality has to be rediscovered and redefined in each novel, just as 
living experiences prove or disprove the rules by which we live in 
society. Like Jane Austen, James links the technical difficulty of 
seeing with problems of great moral urgency. He also makes us aware 
of how immeasurably more complex these problems have become since Ela: a. 
His narrative constraints allow us no more assurance than does life 
itself. James doesn't resolve the perplexities he presents. The 
narrative tugs at us to think in moral terms but offers no shortcuts. 
It witholds authorial authority and the dispensation of narrative 
justice. 
James's prodigious technique has led some critics to think that he 
has refined life out of existence at the expense of 'decent passions'. 
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F. R. Leavis, for example, complains of the morally stifling atmos- 
phere James's novel produces: 
'The trouble with the late style is that it exacts 
so intensely and inveterately analytic an atten- 
tion that no sufficient bodied response builds up 
nothing sufficiently approaching the deferred con- 
crete immediacy that has been earned is attainable. 
Of Henry James himself we feel that the style 
involves for him, registers as prevailing in him, 
a kind of attention that doesn't favour his realiz- 
ing his theme, in the whole or locally, as full- 
bodied life. The relation between deficiency of 
this order (a deficiency--in spite of the tremen- 
dous output of intellectual energy represented by 
each work--in vitality) and the kind of moral un- 
satisfactoriness that we have observed in The 
Golden Bowl should be fairly plain ... We do not feel in the late style a rich and lively sensi- 
bility freely functioning. '5 
Critics such as Leavis don't believe it's worth the bother of trying to 
cut through a veritable jungle of prose in order to discover what Maggie 
is actually doing in the second half of the novel. This is, of course, 
because James is less concerned in Volume II with what Maggie does than 
with what she thinks. Leon Edel, on the other side of the argument, 
writes of James's late style as ceasing to be 'minutely descriptive': 
'The discussion of manners and the behavior of 
Aiiierican girls gradually disappears : the pre- 
occupation with problems of conduct gives way to 
a study of states of feeling and of dilemmas of 
existence. He begins to probe the 'unlived' life 
of his characters and to portray 'poor sensitive 
gentlemen' who discover too late the price they 
have paid for their sensitivity and their insula- 
tion against the shock of experience. '6 
Edel doesn't see James's preoccupation as a problem. Rather, he praises 
James for his portrayal of the existentialist's struggle. 
James's technical ambiguity is as purposive as the characters' 
consciousness of the events. James makes the reader suffer along with 
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the participants, a process for which critics often suffer an intense 
dislike. As Nicola Bradbury succinctly puts it: 'Absolute morality 
is subordinated to the process of perception :a process closely 
linked with that by which we as readers apprehend the novel as a 
whole. '7 It is no surprise that the critical controversy about The 
Golden Bowl centres on consciousness and morality, for it is clear 
that James was concerned most with these concepts. Jean Strouse 
writes that in the James family: 
'Evil, acknowledged in the abstract, had no place 
at the family hearth. That basic contradiction, 
between what their father espoused (man finds God 
only after directly experiencing the evil in his 
own nature) and what he practiced (evil does not 
exist), fostered in each of the children a pre- 
occupation with morality and a tendency to dicho- 
tomize. To be innocent and good meant not to know 
the darker sides of one's own nature. To love and 
be loved, then, required the renunciation of cer- 
tain kinds of knowledge and feeling. '8 
The paradox implied by the elder James's practising philosophy had to 
be worked out by each of his children. Strouse's conclusion has special 
implications for Maggie Verver, Milly Theale, and Isabel Archer. Inno- 
cence is equated with incomplete self-knowledge, implying an imperfect 
consciousness. But all of James's heroines are 'vessels' of conscious- 
ness, and if they become fully conscious they may experience evil in 
their own natures, an experience which destroys innocence. According 
to Strouse, the James offspring had to renounce knowledge of evil and 
the darker side of self in order to love and be loved. Gabriel Pearsor. 
sees such a renunciation as a necessary part of the recovery of Maggie's 
consciousness: 
'The self-negating heroine recovers in conscious- 
ness the raw vitality of social and sexual exis- 
tence that she loses in fact. Consciousness is 
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nonetheless, finally, negation ... James's entire art rests upon a metaphysic of loss-- 
loss of the actual, the sexual, the carnal, the 
power-giving which only gross souls can enjoy, 
in their unconsciousness. '9 
But renunciation isn't the answer in The Golden Bowl. Maggie grows to 
understand the terrifying implications of the darker side of self. 
Instead of renouncing the knowledge she accepts it as a part of the 
whole. Maggie will see, forgive and love in the light of the 'terrible' 
knowledge the Prince imparts to her: ''Everything's terrible, cara--in 
the heart of man. '' (XLI 
In Volume I of The Golden Bowl the Prince is our confused reflec- 
tor. His biggest confusion is how to understand his wife and her 
father. Their 'innocence' and 'romanticism' befuddle his amoral con- 
sciousness. When the Prince says to Maggie at the beginning of the 
novel '' You Americans are almost incredibly romantic'' , we must keep in 
mind what James meant by that adjective. In his preface to The American, 
James states that: 
'The romantic stands ... for the things that, with 
all the facilities in the world, all the wealth 
and all the courage and all the wit and all the 
adventure, we never can directly know; the things 
that can reach us only through the beautiful cir- 
cuit and subterfuge of our thought and our desire. '10 
If Maggie is indeed 'romantic' by James's definition, then what she 
learns in the early part of the novel reacher her not through the medium 
of high intelligence but through the 'subterfuge' of her unspoken con- 
sciousness. Maggie's response to the Prince emphasizes the nature of 
her aesthetic sensibility : she will only see what is beautiful. She 
sees perhaps too much of ''everything that's nice at all. The world, 
the beautiful world--or everything in it that is beautiful. '' (I) 
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James echoes the theme with his portrayal of Charlotte, as seen by 
the Prince: 
'Her own vision acted for every relation--this he 
had seen for himself : she remarked beggars, she 
remembered servants, she recognised cabmen; she 
had often distinguished beauty, when out with 
him, in dirty children; she had admired 'type' 
in faces at hucksters' stalls. ' (VI) 
Charlotte sees beyond Maggie and the Prince to the beauty of the lower 
orders. This is an implied criticism of the Ververs and the Prince : 
the former's vision is biased by enormous wealth, the latter by social 
class. 
The Prince sees a problem inherent in Maggie's vision which fore- 
shadows the difficulty she will have in the second half of the novel, 
although he discounts for the present the possible repercussions of 
such a vision: 
''You see too much--that's what may sometimes make 
you difficulties. When you don't, at least' he 
had amended with a further thought, 'see too little. ' 
But he had quite granted that he knew what she meant, 
and his warning perhaps was needless. He had seen 
the follies of the romantic disposition, but there 
seemed somehow no follies in theirs--nothing one 
was obliged to recognise, but innocent pleasures, 
pleasures without penalties. Their enjoyment was 
a tribute to others without beinp a loss to them- 
selves. ' (I) 
Adam admits the danger of enjoying their innocent pleasures: 
''Yie want each other ... only wanting it, each time, 
for each other. That's what I call the happy spell; 
but it's also, a little, possibly, the immorality. '' 
(xxix 
It is the immorality of possession. In her failure to see anything but 
what is beautiful Maggie blithely explains: '' ... Amerigo doesn't ß nä. 
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He doesn't care, I mean, what we do. It's for us, he considers, to 
see things exactly as we wish. " (X) Again we have the reference to 
seeing, and we know that the 'incredibly' romantic Maggie and Adam 
wish to see and possess only what is beautiful. Not until Maggie sees 
all of her husband - not just the beautiful image with his 'archives, 
annals, infamies', but his ''single self, the unknown, unimportant, 
personal quantity'' (I) - will she be able to love him as she grows 
to understand the nature of love. 
We might perhaps call The Golden Bowl a romantic novel because we 
as readers are forced by James's narrative consciousness to apprehend 
'things that, with all the facilities in the world ... we never can 
know ... ' And for this reason James never tells us anything directly. 
The reader is forced to experience the perceptions of a romantic con- 
sciousness along with the 'more or less bleeding participants'. 
11 
James 
makes his readers grope in the dark with the Prince in the first volume 
for some idea of morality : is it drunk with tea (II) he wonders, is it 
preventing Maggie and her father from knowing evil and being hurt (XIX), 
is it refusing gifts (V) or is it gracefully accepting them when freely 
given (XXII)? The Prince is especially handicapped in his search 
because, as he explains to Fanny, his moral sense is nonexistent: 
''I've of course something that in our poor dear 
backward of Rome sufficiently passes for it. But 
it's no more like yours than the tortuous stone 
staircase--half-ruined into the bargain: --in some 
castle of our quattrocento is like the 'lightning 
elevator' in one of Mr. Verver's fifteen-storey 
buildings. Your moral sense works by steam--it 
sends you up like a rocket. Ours is slow and 
steep and unlighted, with so many of the steps 
missing that--well, that it's as short, in almost 
any case, to turn round and come down again. '' (II) 
The Prince asks Fanny for guidance because he can't see his way through 
'the white fog' of expectations his new foreign relations have for him. 
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Fanny's role in the novel needs explaining : she is a double 
agent. Her first loyalties lie with the Prince because she is in love 
with him. But because Charlotte has no time for Fanny, Fanny's only 
legitimate connection with the Prince is through Maggie. Consequently 
Fanny becomes a general dogsbody. James gives us the Assinghams as a 
pair of imperfect interpreters of the scene. We know their vision is 
inadequate from certain clues in the narrative: 
"And you call me immoral? ' 
She hesitated. 'I'll call you stupid if you 
prefer. But stupidity pushed to a certain point 
is, you know, immorality. Just so what is mor- 
ality but high intelligence? ' This he was unable 
to tell her; which left her more definitely to 
conclude. 'Besides, it's all, at the worst, 
great fun. ' 
'0h, if you simply put it at that--! ' 
His implication was that in this case they had a 
common ground; yet even thus he couldn't catch 
her by it. 'Oh, I don't mean' she said from the 
threshold, 'the fun that you mean. Good night. ' 
In answer to which, as he turned out the electric 
light, he gave an odd, short groan, almost a 
grunt. He had apparently meant some particular 
kind. ' (IV) 
James allows us to see in this passage that Fanny's idea of morality 
isn't sufficient. Fanny and her husband may be aware of the moral 
dilemmas posed by Charlotte's return and Maggie's blissful ignorance, 
but they by no means attempt to resolve the dilemma. When Charlotte 
and the Prince chuck Fanny aside she sticks to Maggie, even while 
defending the Prince's honour without receiving his gratitude. Because 
her loyalty is divided it is untrustworthy. Yet at the same time she 
is aware, as James wishes the reader to be aware, of the complexities 
of the case. James, I think, would have us trust Fanny's reactions, 
which are honest, further than her imaginative resolutions, which like 
those of Emma Woodhouse, are hopelessly inadequate. Fanny is the only 
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one to burst into tears (XXIII) and commits the only actual act of 
violence, the smashing of the antiquario's golden bowl. We daren't 
trust Fanny's final judgment when she makes such confessions as 
these: 
''I don't make mistakes. But I perpetrate--in thought--crimes. ' And she spoke with all inten- 
sity. 'I'm a most dreadful person. There are times when I seem not to mind a bit what I've done, or what I think or imagine or fear or 
accept; when I feel that I'd do it again-- 
feel that I'd do things myself. " (XXIII) 
Maggie's marriage to the Prince, the first action she takes in the 
novel, commits her in name to him and by consequence excludes her 
father. The Prince views his impending marriage to Maggie with the 
trepidation of a convicted prisoner entering into a long confinement. 
The imagery James uses resembles that used by Isabel when she accepts 
Osmond's proposal. Isabel doesn't know whether the proposal will bring 
her greater freedom or less: 
'The tears came into her eyes : this time they 
obeyed the sharpness of the pang that suggested 
to her somehow the slipping of a fine bolt-- 
backward, forward, she couldn't have said which. ' 
(FL: XXIX) 
In the Prince's case, 'The moment had something of the grimness of a 
crunched key in the strongest lock that could be made. ' (I) 
Charlotte Stant's appearance, on -the eve of the Prince's marriage, 
is a daring exercise of freedom. She lacks a fortune, a home, and her 
former lover, but she still loves him and will risk showing her love 
even without a return. James establishes Charlotte's case more sug- 
gestively but less insistently than he does Kate Croy's case.. 
Charlotte, lacking protection and advantages, has to draw the 
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line between survival and morality, and in her the survival instinct 
is strong. Like Kate, she doesn't give in to disastrous circumstan- 
ces. She tries to make much of her independence as a 'single woman 
today' (19010 but her bravado in the face of defeat is transparent: 
"The position of a single woman today is very favourable, you know 
... just to existence--which may contain, after all, in one way and 
another, so much. '' (III) 
Charlotte, the homeless, fortuneless, husbandless, glamorous young 
woman of the novel, by rights ought to occupy more space in this chap- 
ter, insofar as she makes great claims for the 'existence' of single 
women 'today'. She is a spiritual descendant of Jane Fairfax in being 
really accomplished (with her 'strange sense for tongues' (III), play- 
ing the piano 'with a facility that never failed' (XI) and a beauty 
which proved that 'materials to work with had been all she required 
and that there were none too precious for her to understand and use' 
(XIV)). Unlike Emma, who shunned Jane's acquaintance, Maggie had 
adored Charlotte as a young girl at the convent school. Maggie con- 
tinues to admire Charlotte for being great, socially accomplished. As 
the Prince remarks to himself at Charlotte's reappearance, she was 
doomed to 'arrange appearances'. And of course what does a truly 
great socialite do but arrange appearances? . %s I have already sugges- 
ted, James gives us plenty of surface detail in Volume I, that part 
most concerned with the Prince and Charlotte. That we are never given 
a glimpse of any possible inward struggle on Charlotte's part leads 
one to believe that Charlotte doesn't undergo such a struggle. She, 
like the Prince, conceives of the self in terms of actions, of that 
which can be seen and aesthetically judged. 
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It is through Maggie that we are allowed to imagine Charlotte's 
struggle, not through Charlotte herself. In the beginning of the 
novel Maggie tells her father: 
"Can't I give it--generally--for dignity? 
Dignity, I mean, in misfortune. ' 
'You've got to postulate the misfortune first. ' 
'Well' said Maggie, 'I can do that. Isn't it 
always a misfortune to be--when you're so fine-- 
so wasted? And yet' she went on, 'not to wail 
about it, not to look even as if you knew it? ' 
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'She has suffered--she has done that. ' And the 
Princess added, 'She has loved--and she has lost. ' 
Mr. Verver, however, still wondered. 'But how 
many times? ' 
Maggie hesitated, but it cleared up. 'Once is 
enough. Enough that is, for one to be kind to 
her. '' (X) 
Charlotte's self-confessed attitude is rather less deep: ''Ah, for 
things I mayn't want to know, I promise you shall find me stupid. '' 
(XXII) The things Charlotte doesn't wish to know are precisely the 
things Maggie sets out to discover in her inward struggle for a know- 
ledge of self that assimilates good and evil. Charlotte doesn't go 
beneath the surfaces. The Prince recognizes Charlotte's failure to do 
so when he says to Yaggie ''She's stupid''. (XLI) Because James is 
concerned with the inward struggle and because no such struggle is evi- 
dent in his characterization of Charlotte we may assume one of two 
things. Either he suppresses our knowledge of Charlotte (in the same 
way that Jane Austen suppresses our knowledge of Jane Fairfax) or he 
implies that there was no struggle to show. I suspect the latter to 
be the case, and for this reason 1 haven't found much to discuss about 
Charlotte. 
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Charlotte makes it too easy for the Prince to recapture their 
past: '' Giving myself, in other words, away, --and perfectly willing 
to do it for nothing. '' (V) Charlotte's words strike us as patheti- 
cally brave in the light of Fanny's judgment that the Prince doesn't 
really care for Charlotte because: '' ... men don't, when it has all 
been too easy. That's how, in nine cases out of ten, a woman is 
treated who has risked her life. '' (XXIV) Charlotte's attempts fail 
independently of Maggie precisely because of the Prince's attitude. 
He may profit by the relation, and pity her, but he doesn't care for 
her in the same way as he cares for Maggie. That he takes her for his 
mistress has little moral consequence for him: 
'It produced for the man that extraordinary mixture 
of pity and profit in which his relation with her, 
when he was not a mere brute, mainly consisted; 
and gave him in fact his most pertinent ground of 
being always nice to her, nice about her, nice 
for her ... She was the twentieth woman, she was 
possessed by her doom-, but her doom was also to 
arrange appearances, and what now concerned him 
was to learn how she proposed. He would help her, 
would arrange with her--to any point in reason; 
the only thing was to know what appearance could 
best be produced and best preserved. Produced 
and preserved on her part of course; since on his 
own there had been luckily no folly to cover up, 
nothing but a perfect accord between conduct and 
obligation. ' (III) 
The Prince appears to dump the entire guilt of their previous relation 
on her. In effect, he implies that galantuomos are expected to have 
affairs, but for women it is folly. 
The difference between them is emphasized in the Bloomsbury shop 
where the golden bowl is discovered. The Prince is superstitious of 
'cracks' and won't take anything from her. Charlotte wants a remem- 
brance of the affair. She would do anything to enable him to give her 
something. His condition is her marriage. ''Well'' charlotte replies, 
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' 'I would marry, I think, to have something from you in all free- 
dom. '' (VI) Charlotte has nothing to lose and everything to gain. 
She sets about her business - to marry money - with the Prince's 
words in her mind as a reward. Thus James quickly establishes the 
basis for the adultery. 
Part Two of the novel describes Adam's and Maggie's responsibility 
for and attitude toward Charlotte and the Prince. First we see Adam 
preyed upon by female fortune hunters at Fawns. The narrative empha- 
sizes Adam's essential 'innocence' which obliterates the past in which 
he had 'wrought by devious ways'. It also establishes his vocation as 
a collector. He places a valuation upon the Prince as he would a 
costly objet d'art, a valuation which the Prince accepts uneasily: 
''Oh, if I'm a crystal I'm delighted that I'm a 
perfect one, for I believe that they sometimes 
have cracks and flaws--in which case they're to 
be had very cheap! '' (VII) 
The Prince recognizes that the Ververs are incapable of seeing his 
imperfections. They see what they want to see. He wonders if he will 
be able to live up to the price of his purchase. 
James then invites us to look at the Ververs's case. ': a gie and 
her father are helpless in their 'felicity'. They don't need 'Know- 
ledge' and are even 'constitutionally inaccessible to it'. (XX) 
Maggie's wilful ignorance is naive and irresponsible. She can afford 
to be morally righteous because she has never had to confront 'mere 
existence'. Maggie hardly thinks of her husband; she good-humouredly 
believes that: 
'Even should he some day get drunk and beat her, 
the spectacle of him with hated rivals would, 
after no matter what extremity, always, for the 
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sovereign charm of it ... suffice to bring her round. ' (IX) 
Maggie drives the Prince to such lengths just 'to keep her in love 
with him'. 
Adam's attitude to his son-in-law is most curious. He expects 
the Prince to entertain him, to give him something to think about, to 
challenge his native beliefs: 
'If the Prince could only strike something to 
which he hadn't [been brought up]! This wouldn't, 
it seemed to him, ruffle the smoothness, and yet 
might, a little, add to the interest. ' (IX) 
It is here that we find the motive behind Adam's quiet acceptance - it 
is all a part of his interest in the object he has acquired for his 
collection. Then we see how Adam has displaced the Prince in the 
family. Father and daughter are closer than ever after the birth of 
the Principino. Maggie becomes even more concerned, ironically, for 
Adam's welfare, in that she feels guilty for having married and thus 
deserted him. Her beautiful suggestion that Adam marry Charlotte is 
doubly inspired, providing Charlotte with 'means' and Adam with an 
object of 'great' value. It works brilliantly : Charlotte arrives, 
disperses the rabble, charms Adam, and accepts his proposal after 
wrestling with her conscience. The support she receives from the 
Prince for her decision is ominous: ''We must lead our lives as we 
see them; but I am charmed with your courage and almost surprised at 
my own. '' (XVII) 
Part Three is the longest of the first volume : we watch as 
Charlotte acts upon her husband's preferences and see how the Prince 
bows to those of his wife. Fanny recognizes danger and confronts 
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first Charlotte, then the Prince with the possible 'immorality' of 
their actions. But the Prince and Charlotte defend their position 
on the ground that they must preserve their spouses' innocent pleasure. 
Although they do not understand why iLaggie and Adam need to be with 
each other, they realize that they must continue to enable them to do 
so. And Charlotte, of course is fully ready to receive, in all free- 
dom, the Prince's consolation for being thus deserted. It is a high, 
romantic task, allowing them to judge from their feeling, their 
intuition (the sensibility which Jane Austen strove against in her 
novels) and it demands more of them than their spouses ever do: 
''He might vulgarly have put it that one had never 
to plot or to lie for them; he might humourously 
have put it that one had never, as by the higher 
conformity, to lie in wait with the dagger, or 
to prepare, insidiously, the cup. These were the 
services that, by all romantic tradition, were 
consecrated to affection quite as much as to 
hate. ' (XIX) 
(Maggie later envisions these same naked blades, overflowing cups, high 
Wagnerian lovers, in her awakened state. ) The Prince and Charlotte see 
it as their duty to prevent Maggie and Adam from being hurt. A bond 
still exists between them, 'a mystic golden bridge ... strongly sway- 
ing and vertiginous, for that intimacy of which the sovereign law 
would be the vigilance of 'care', would be never rashly to forget and 
never consciously to wound'. (XIX) The bridge of communication is as 
strong between them as it is between Maggie and Adam. Such complete 
understanding comes as a relief to the Prince after his repeated yet 
ineffectual attempts to understand Maggie and her father. 
At the same time we see how Maggie has further usurped Charlotte's 
place in the Verver household : first, by taking Charlotte's carriage 
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to run errands for her father (XVIII); second, by acting as hostess 
at Charlotte's dinners (XIX); third, by staying home with Adam and 
sending Charlotte and the Prince out to do all the socializing for 
them. The Prince becomes increasingly irritated by the situation as 
it puts a tremendous strain on his practically non-existent moral 
sense. It makes a fool of Mrs. Verver in her house and of the Prince 
in his own: 
'Being thrust, systematically, with another woman, 
and a woman one happened, by the same token, 
exceedingly to like, and being so thrust that 
the theory of it seemed to publish one as idiotic 
or incapable--this was a predicament of which the 
dignity depended all on one's own handling ... As if a galantuomo ... could do anything but blush 
to 'go about' at such a rate with such a person 
as Mrs. Verver in a state of childlike innocence, 
the state of our primitive parents before the 
Fall. ' (X. X ) 
Finally, at Matcham (the same house hilly visits with Lord Mark) the 
Prince hears 'a chink of gold' as Charlotte makes clear her plan for 
their expedition to Gloucester: 
'Charlotte had uttered the exact plea that he had 
been keeping ready for the same foreseen neces- 
sity, and had uttered it simply as a consequence 
of their deepening unexpressed need of each 
other and without the passing between them of a 
word. ' (XXI) 
Their mute communication justifies everything - even adultery. 
Charlotte receives from the Prince 'in all freedom' his old love at 
the inn in Gloucester. We see how much she has come to depend upon 
him; the mere sight of him conjures up for her an intense force which 
suggests 'his connection with occult sources of renewal'. (XIV) She 
implicitly trusts him: ''I go by one thing'' she tells him, ''I go 
by you. '' (XXII) 
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He justifies his taking the adulterous step with the marvellous 
reasoning that Maggie and Adam must want him to have his freedom: 
'He hadn't struggled nor snatched; he was taking 
but what had been given him; the pearl dropped 
itself, with its exquisite quality and rarity, 
straight into his hand. Where precisely, it 
was, incarnate; its size and value grew as 
Mrs. Verver appeared, afar off, in one of the 
smaller doorways. ' (XXII) 
The image of the pearl expresses the Prince's objective appreciation 
of Charlotte. He, like Maggie and Adam, has fallen into the habit of 
connoisseurship which dissociates him from real feeling. He and 
Charlotte have learned too well the merit of acquisition from their 
spouses: "These days, yesterday, last night, this morning, I've 
wanted everything'' says Charlotte. The Prince reassures her: "You 
shall have everything. '' (XXII) Only at great cost shall she have 
everything for because she made it all too easy for him she has been 
used and devalued. James echoes Maggie's earlier refusal to know the 
truth about Charlotte (X) when he has Charlotte say to the Prince: 
I 'Ah, for things I mayn't want to know I promise you shall find me 
stupid. " (XXII) Perhaps we should take this to mean that she doesn't 
want to know if the Prince really does love his wife. 
The concept of discovering and accepting evil in self as a neces- 
sary part of the whole is first voiced by Fanny. Fanny's theory, which 
bears examination, suggests that Maggie's confrontation with Evil will 
teach her ''one or two things in the world''. That these things might 
be disagreeable she never denies: 
''They'll have had to be disagreeable--to show 
her a little where she is. They'll have had to 
be disagreeable to make her sit up. They'll 
have had to be disagreeable to matte her decide 
to live. '' (XXIV) 
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Understanding the part that evil plays in Maggie's discovery of self 
helps us to evaluate the major critical difficulty in the novel : how 
can we side with Maggie if she makes others suffer? It is because 
she takes the whole burden upon herself. Fanny gives us evidence 
when she admits to her husband of her own deep complicity: 
"She'll see me somehow through. ' 
'See you--V 
'Yes, me. I'm the worst. For' said Fanny 
Assingham, now with a harder exaltation, 'I 
did it all. I recognise that--I accept it. 
She won't cast it up at me--she won't cast 
up anything. So I throw myself upon her-- 
she'll bear me up. ' She spoke almost volubly 
--she held him with her sudden sharpness, 
'She'll carry the whole weight of us. '' (XXIV) 
Dorothea Krook sees the novel as a fable 'of the redemption of man by 
the transforming power of human love', but believes that Maggie's love 
is 'informed by high intelligence'. Central to her theme of redemption 
is the belief that Maggie 'magnificently spares' Charlotte and the 
Prince, and that Maggie must combine aspects of morality with aesthetic 
sensibility in order to regain her husband: 
'The aesthetic must be superseded by the moral; 
yet the moral must, somehow, incorporate the 
aesthetic. For if the good is not also beauti- 
ful, and if it is not seen as beautiful, it will 
have no power to draw to itself those who are in 
the grip of its infernal principle. But the 
beautiful for the Prince and Charlotte ... is 
inseparable from the intelligent ... Therefore 
the good must have the specific beauty of 
intelligence ... '12 
For Krook both the moral and the aesthetic must be incorporated in 
order for a character to succeed in a Jamesian struggle. John Henry 
Raleigh also links morality directly with aesthetic sensibility. For 
James, he writes: '... human consciousness was beatitude, the only 
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real value in a complex, almost indecipherable universe, and the sole 
argument for immortality. ' For Raleigh the critical problem is to 
define this consciousness. He argues that in James's novels: 
'Each person is his own arbiter and must arrive 
at moral decisions by an appeal to his own experi- 
ence, which, in this case, usually means sense 
impressions, and, finally, morality becomes 
purely aesthetic. The consciousness most sensi- 
tive to impressions is liable to be the most 
moral ... So in James there is an equation bet- 
ween the aesthetic and the moral sense, and the 
individual who most appreciates the beauty of a 
Renaissance painting is also the most moral. '13 
Raleigh's arguments go too far, however, because for James morality is 
not purely aesthetic. Martin Green posits a split between the moral 
and the aesthetic: 
'James teaches one to include moral considera- 
tions in aesthetic judgements, but then makes 
the latter obliquely autonomous ... He makes it 
seem that aesthetic sensibility, suitably en- 
larged, will guide you through every moral and 
intellectual tangle. But neither his novels 
themselves nor the vision of life they embody 
justify us in agreeing with him. '14 
Green accuses James of failing to convince the reader of the superiority 
of the aesthetic sensibility. But this is the very point Green has 
failed to grasp. James's consciousness is at work within the work. His 
artist's intelligence includes both the moral and the aesthetic vision: 
'There is one point at which the moral sense and 
the artistic sense lie very near together; that 
is in the light of the very obvious truth that 
the deepest quality of a work of art will always 
be the quality of the mind of the producer. In 
proportion as that intelligence is fine will the 
novel, the picture, the statue partake of the 
substance of beauty and truth. To be constituted 
of such elements is, to my vision, to have pur- 
pose enough. '15 
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Moral appraisal is not always a necessary condition of aesthetic 
appreciation. 
Sir Claude, for example, in What Maisie Knew, focusses the con- 
flict between the aesthetic and the moral vision when he tells 
Mrs. Wix: 
"I've not killed anything ... on the contrary 
I think I've produced life. I don't know what 
to call it--I haven't even known how decently 
to deal with it, to approach it; but, whatever 
it is, it's the most beautiful thing I've ever 
met--it's exquisite, it's sacred. '' (WMK: XXXI) 
For Sir Claude and Mrs. Wix there is a conflict because they see the 
world in one way only. Sir Claude appreciates Maisie aesthetically but 
will not make himself morally responsible for the child who by now 
loves him. His aesthetic vision doesn't include a moral appraisal. 
Mrs. Wix on the other hand doesn't appreciate Maisie at all and her 
vulnerability to Catholicism has nothing to do with her religious 
beliefs (a moral sense represented by black bonnets and bibles) but 
everything to do with her deficient aesthetic sense (represented by 
sentimental novels). The directing intelligence of the novelist is 
of course where the moral and the aesthetic lie closest together in 
the work. James directs us to Maisie for his proof. ', '. aisle's vision, 
we see, assimilates both the aesthetic and the moral. James refers to 
what prompts her emotional response as emerging from something in her 
far 'deeper' than a 'moral sense'. And in The Spoils of Poynton Fleda 
appreciates the spoils aesthetically but also recognizes the moral 
dilemma they pose. James keeps the categories distinct. Had Fleda 
not been in love with Owen, she would have seen no moral dilemma. 
In his study of dramatic poetry Robert Langbaum reasons that: 
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'Only the detached intelligence is, in fact, evil. 
The complete human being, with a capacity for 
sympathy and therefore for experience and devel- 
opment, cannot be evil. For the remorse he suf- 
fers when he has done harm to others makes his 
lawless act an incident in his moral evolution, 
an incident which cannot be judged until the 
whole story has been told. '1 
But there is a problem with Langbaum's assessment of morality, for the 
act may be lawless (or evil), but the agent can't be reduced to the 
terms of the moral category, 'evil'. By subsuming action into activity 
as a continuous process of development he doesn't allow for the contem- 
plation of a separate evil action. Characters may commit evil actions 
without being themselves evil. The moral content of an action depends 
to some extent on the inner makeup of the agent. One's sense of the 
agent's makeup isn't complete until one follows the process through; 
laws will make a given action illegal, while at the same time a judg- 
ment may be mitigated by a consideration of the intent (i. e., pre- 
meditated or first-degree murder vs. manslaughter or accidental death). 
The point is that James shows us another way of assessing morality in 
The Golden Bowl. Volume I is concerned to a very large extent with the 
Prince's actions and the preservation of appearances. Volume II is 
concerned almost exclusively with Maggie's inward struggle, and with 
her breaking through the surfaces: 'the pretty mould of an iced pud- 
ding, or something of that sort, into which, to help yourself, you 
didn't hesitate to break with the spoon. ' (XXVI) Through Maggie's 
inward struggle we are able to assess the morality of the novel. James 
makes the reader experience her turmoil in the process of reading his 
tortuous prose. 
In the second volume we grope with the Princess for some idea of 
the nature of love. And in the search for love we see how James has 
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so closely linked seeing with loving. Maggie asks herself is love 
knowable (XXV), is it sexual or chaste (XXVII), does it demand sacri- 
fices (XXXVII), and in the end is it worth the cost? (XLII) Maggie 
has for too long allowed others to judge for her; her timidity is 
morally irresponsible: 
'It wasn't that the Princess could be indebted 
to another person, even to so clever a one as 
this friend, for seeing anything in her husband 
that she mightn't see unaided; but she had ever, 
hitherto, been of -a nature to accept with modest 
gratitude any better description of a felt truth 
than her little limits--terribly marked, she 
knew, in the direction of saying the right 
things--enabled her to make. ' (IX) 
In City of God Augustine writes that in the end, on the eighth and eternal 
day in paradise: 'There we shall be still and see; we shall see and 
we shall love; we shall love and we shall praise. ' 
17 
The link between 
seeing and loving is crucial. What Maggie needs to know in order to 
see, and then love, is everything that isn't beautiful. She needs some- 
thing of Charlotte's vision, and she needs to know evil. But these are 
things which can't be known except through 'the beautiful circuit and 
subterfuge' of 'thought' and 'desire'. Maggie has to want this know- 
ledge, and we see how in the seconc volume she searches ever more des- 
perately, knowing only that she risks losing the Prince altogether 
unless she does see. This search, in stark contrast to her earlier 
resolve not to know 'what would have been dreadful' for her (X) is 
important. Seeing and loving implies forgiveness. Yte must bear in 
mind this critical connection throughout our discussion of Maggie's 
search. 
Maggie moves from a state of dependence and irresponsibility to 
one of independence fully charged with responsibility during the seconü 
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volume. And once Maggie's enlightenment catalyses the power of money 
and the morality of marriage, the 'timid tigress' prepares to pounce. 
Part Four is the heart of the novel, and except for the Assingham 
ritornello, it is a concentrated rendering of Maggie's awakening con- 
sciousness. 
Maggie's first forays into the garden, echoing the Prince's allu- 
sion to Eden before the Fall (XX), are so timid that she doesn't even 
want to answer for having approached and metaphorically tapped on one 
of the rare porcelain tiles. Are these the same Damascene tiles which 
Adam purchases with Charlotte at Brighton? If so, we have another 
image to balance the real golden bowl, for the tiles cover the pagoda 
which figures 'the arrangement', just as the bowl represents her 
marriage: 
... it had reared itself there 
like some strange, 
tall tower of ivory, or perhaps rather some won- 
derful, beautiful, but outlandish pagoda, a 
structure plated with hard, bright porcelain, 
coloured and figured and adorned, at the over- 
hanging eaves, with silver bells that tinkled, 
ever so charmingly, when stirred by chance 
airs. ' (XXV) 
The images of danger, of sinister figures lurking in shadows with bare 
blades, begin to pile up in Maggie's imagination. What she doesn't 
know looms large in the foreground. The 'timid tigress' senses that 
her freedom is being limited by the Prince and Charlotte. She sees how 
clearly Charlotte is in control, how the Prince and Charlotte always 
act in concert and how Adam must not find out: 
'Ah: Amerigo and Charlotte were arranged 
together, but she--to confine the matter only 
to herself--was arranged apart. It rushed 
over her, the full sense of all this, with 
quite another rush from that of the breaking 
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wave of ten days before; and as her father 
himself seemed not to meet the vaguely clut- 
ching hand with which, during the first shock 
of complete perception, she tried to steady 
herself, she felt very much alone. ' (XXVI) 
It begins to dawn on Maggie that she, alone, will have to work to 
recover the Prince. She pays for the love she eventually discovers by 
sacrificing her father. She deliberates and reaches a painful solu- 
tion: 'The only way to sacrifice him would be to do so without his 
dreaming what it might be for. ' (XXVIII) Here an examination of one 
of the elder James's ideas may help to explain the critical importance 
of the sacrifice. James the son did consider this idea to be important 
enough to quote at length in his autobiography: 
It... cosmoses are destined to a life of such 
surprising change that you may say their career 
is an incessant disavowal of their birth, or 
that their highest maturation consists in their 
utter renunciation of their natural father and 
mother ... The law is the same with the individ- 
ual as it is with the race : none of us can dodge 
the necessity of regeneration, of disavowing our 
natural ancestry in order to come forth in our 
own divinely given proportions. '18 
Whether Maggie comes into 'divinely given proportions', whether the 
nature of the regeneration justifies the sacrifice, is an issue of con- 
siderable critical controversy. Maggie does claim, however, to sacri- 
fice Adam 'to everything and to everyone' (XXXVII), and given the 
intensity of the relationship we know the sacrifice to be huge. 
Not only does Maggie sacrifice her father. She also begins to 
sacrifice her friend Fanny in her 'blameless egoism'. She lets Fanny 
in on what she suspects but Fanny won't give anything- away. Maggie 
pretends to be mild to the Prince and Charlotte, but to Fanny she 
appears terrible. Maggie denies her power to terrorize, claiming that 
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she can 'bear' anything 'for love'. As if to justify her logic, she 
tells Fanny: "Ah, there wouldn't be any terror for them if they 
had nothing to hide. '' (XXX) Nevertheless Maggie won't gain knowledge 
directly because she still doesn't want to know : she would rather be 
denounced than discover that her suspicions are correct: ''She'' says 
Fanny ''stands off and off, so as not to arrive; she keeps out to sea 
and away from the rocks ... " 
(XXXI) 
What she doesn't know both fascinates and scares her; the 
Prince's sexual power over her is virtually irresistible: 'She loved 
him too helplessly, still, to dare to open the door, by an inch, to 
his treating her as if either of them had wronged the other. ' (XXXII) 
So she conducts a 'high fight', one which refrains from making the 
Prince aware of 'the nature of their struggle'. She decks herself in 
splendid gowns and jewels as if in armour. The battle's skirmishes 
take place at dinners: 
'Should he guess they were having, in their so occult 
manner, a high fight, and that it was she, all the 
while, in her supposed stupidity, who had made it 
high and was keeping it high--in the event of his 
doing this before they could leave town she should 
verily be lost. ' (XXXII) 
The passage echoes the Prince's words in chapter XIX when he complains 
that one had never 'to lie in wait with the dagger, or to prepare, in- 
sidiously, the cup'. 
With the rediscovered golden bowl in hand Maggie confronts Fanny, 
who renounces everything that Maggie intends it to represent. Fanny, 
as if to fulfil the prophecy of the antiquario, dashes the bowl against 
the marble floor, saying: ''Whatever you meant by it--and I don't want 
to know now--has ceased to exist. '' (XXXIV) Violence is done in the 
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name of preservation. The Prince's superstition is correct: "A 
crack is a crack--and an omen's an omen. ' (VI) Fanny, as Maggie's 
friend, 'never, in intention, visibly, so much her friend as at that 
moment', (XXIV) reveals the flaw in the golden bowl just as she wishes 
to reveal the 'crack' in Maggie's idea. As if to show Maggie what she 
must do next, she breaks the bowl in order to renounce her knowledge 
of evil. But Maggie, rather than renouncing that knowledge, must 
assimilate it in order to preserve her marriage. It is only her 
knowledge which holds the fragments together, just as it is only her 
hands which hold the pieces of the bowl together. The consequence of 
the break is not to shatter 'Maggie's idea (for she doesn't let go the 
pieces) but to let him see that she sees and is willing to allow him 
and Charlotte to arrange themselves upon this new basis. She suddenly 
sees how her husband 'would indeed, absolutely, by this circumstance, 
be really needing her for the first time in their whole connection': 
'No, he had used her, he had even exceedingly 
enjoyed her, before this; but there had been 
no precedent for that character of a proved 
necessity to him which she was rapidly taking 
on. The immense advantage of this particular 
clue, moreover, was that she should have now 
to arrange, to alter, to falsify nothing; 
should have to be but consistently simple and 
straight. ' (XXXIV) 
Maggie then tells him all she wishes him to know and exhorts him to 
''Find out the rest--! '' from whomever he dares. But she knows he 
won't dare, for his father-in-law thinks him perfect, and he mustn't 
do anything to shatter that image. Self-imposed silence makes the bars 
of his cage. 
In Part Five, which takes place entirely at Fawns, '`aggie makes 
Charlotte suffer for her actions by denying that she suspects anything 
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at all. Charlotte can't believe Maggie's denials, because the Prince 
has ceased to communicate with her. Yet she can't, of course, 
denounce Maggie's denials without admitting her own guilt. Here 
Maggie trusts implicitly that her husband shall help maintain the 
peace, for 'les grand seigneurs, persons of her husband's class and 
type, always know how to reestablish a violated order'. (XXxd) She 
resists the temptation to 'sound out their doom in a single sentence, 
a sentence easy to choose among several of the lurid' as the four of 
them sit there, Fanny partnering Mr. Verver, the Prince partnering 
Mrs. Verver. But the temptation passes, and she reflects on the odd 
mildness of her response. It is because she cannot give them up that 
the 'horror' of 'innocence outraged' fails her: 
'... the horror of finding evil seated, all at its 
ease, where she had only dreamed of good; the 
horror of the thing hideously behind, behind so 
much trusted, so much pretended, nobleness, clever- 
ness, tenderness. It was the first sharp falsity 
she had known in her life ... and yet, yes amaz- 
ingly she had been able to look at terror and dis- 
gust only to know that she must put away from her 
the bittersweet of their freshness. ' (XXXVI) 
Maggie must accept the evil she has encountered, and must somehow assi- 
milate it into her knowledge of self in order to forgive and love the 
Prince. It is for this reason that she deliverately lies to Charlotte. 
It takes all her will power: 
'It was only a question of not, by a hair's breadth, 
deflecting into the truth. So, supremely, was she 
braced. 'You must take it from me that your anxiety 
rests quite on a misconception. You must take it 
from me that I've never at any moment fancied I 
could suffer by you. ' And, marvellously, she kept 
it up--not only kept it up, but improved on it. 
'You must take it from me that I've never thought 
of you but as beautiful, wonderful and good. Which 
is all, I think, that you can possibly ask. '' 
(XXXVI) 
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Maggie uses her idea of love to justify any means of reclaiming the 
Prince: 
''My idea is this, that when you only love a 
little you're naturally not jealous--or are 
only jealous also a little, so that it doesn't 
matter. But when you love in a deeper and in- 
tenser way, then you are, in the same propor- 
tion, jealous; your jealousy has intensity 
and, no doubt, ferocity. When, however, you 
love in the most abysmal and unutterable way 
of all--why then you're beyond everything, 
and nothing can pull you down! '' (XXXVII) 
Stephen Spender claims that the force of Maggie's love restores the 
balance: 
'In James's world, a failure of intelligence-- 
that is to say, of intelligence in life--may 
amount to a moral failing. But Maggie's beha- 
viour shows us that it does not follow that 
intelligence alone is morality : for it is 
Maggie's love that saves the marriages. '19 
But James wants us to see that the medal is perfectly optional, that the 
case is more ethically complex. 
With Maggie's denial Charlotte begins to torture herself. She 
can't find out what ''aggie knows because the Prince won't tell her. She 
creates her own doom, for what she doesn't know - and doesn't want to 
know - imprisons her. Maggie has won her skirmish with Charlotte on the 
terrace at Fawns precisely by allowing Charlotte to think she has inti- 
midated ; iaggie into a denial. Maggie's ability to force Charlotte and 
the Prince into cages of guilt is terrifying. She has occult powers to 
direct her father's thoughts while they sit in the garden: 
'There was his idea, the clearness of which for an 
instant almost dazzled her. It was blur of light, 
in the midst of which she saw Charlotte like some 
object marked, by contrast, in blackness, saw her 
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waver in the field of vision, saw her removed, 
transported, doomed. And he had named Charlotte, 
named her again; and she had made him--which 
was all she had needed more. It was as if she 
had held a blank letter to the fire and the 
writing had come out still larger than she 
hoped. ' (XXXVII) 
Maggie's control is amazing because we do not expect such an exercise 
of power from a 'timid, creeping' thing. Maggie's self-confessed weak- 
ness catches us off-guard. We may be lulled into thinking that the 
inexorable force of good is working these 'miracles' but such an assump- 
tion is mistaken, for Maggie fully reckons every action she takes. 
Maggie guiltily imagines Adam's captive wife: 
'The likeness of their connection would not have 
been wrongly figured if he had been thought of 
as holding in one of his pocketed hands the end 
of a long silken halter looped around her beau- 
tiful neck. He didn't twitch it, yet it was 
there. He didn't drag her, but she came. ' 
(XXXVIII) 
h. aggie' s public denial of the affair has left Charlotte only with her 
connection to Adam, a connection she dare not disturb. There are sev- 
eral theories about the derivation of the novel's title, one of which 
suggests a verse from Ecclesiastes: 'Or ever the silver cord be loosed 
or the golden bowl be broken. ' (13: 6) The silver cord is the 
loose 
silken halter about Charlotte's neck. The biblical image denotes a 
positive source of pleasure, an attachment to material existence. 
'' You propose to me beautiful things, '' 
(XII) says Charlotte to edam 
as she considers his proposal in terms of the pleasure it will give 
her. But James has reversed the implication of the silver cord. Adam's 
proposal requires that she give up her freedom. The silver cord which 
gives her the means to be splendid also restrains her movement : 
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Charlotte risks losing all the power and wealth she has attained by 
marrying Adam if she breaks the cord. She cannot have both freedom 
and wealth as can Maggie. Charlotte can either cling to her acquired 
possessions or fall away, free yet powerless in a world impressed, 
seemingly, only with power. Charlotte gives up her freedom for that 
power. 
In the first volume the golden bowl 'belongs' to Charlotte and 
the Prince. It is the ricordo at first rejected but finally shared by 
them at Matcham: '' ... it passed between them that their cup was full; 
which cup their very eyes, holding it fast, carried and steadied and 
began, as they tasted it, to praise. ' (XXII) Fanny smashes that bowl 
and Maggie tries to create another: ''The golden bowl--as it was to 
have been ... the bowl with all happiness in it. The bowl without the 
crack. '' (XXXV) Here Joel Porte is quite specific about Maggie's 
cruelty and her impossible fantasy of a perfect world: 
'Her tortured awareness of evil causes a reaction 
that amounts to a refinement of cruelty : the 
desire to reconstruct for herself, and for the 
other protagonists, an illusion of prelapsarian 
innocence ... She insists on human relationships 
without admission of pain, secure from any con- 
fession of weakness or threat of discomposure. 
But this is impossible. Consequently, the 'per- 
fect' golden bowl that she refashions in her own 
way is a fraud, offering only the appearance of 
marriage and a poor imitation of friendship. '20 
But Maggie's bovl is filled with the consciousness of suffering which 
doesn't seep: to dissipate so much as colour her future experience. 
Devout Catholic though she is, she will not even seek for solace now in 
confession or devotions. Her cup is too full for such action now: 
'... just now she was carrying in her weak, stiffened hand a glass 
filled to the brim, as to whom she had recorded a vow that no drop 
should overflow. ' (XXXIX) Maggie's innocence is tainted by the 
sacrifices she makes and the suffering she must inflict in order to 
recover her husband. 
That Maggie recognizes and attempts to minimize the suffering 
ameliorates the vindictiveness of her final triumph over Charlotte. 
Stephen Spender sees Maggie's triumph more kindly: '... the nature 
of Maggie's victory is precisely in letting Charlotte enjoy her own 
value, which is greatly to triumph. ' 
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But Charlotte's indignant 
'triumph' is pathetically brave in the light of the sacrifice she has 
made to ? aggie: ''I want, strange as it may seem to you'' she tells 
Maggie '' to keep the man I've married. '' (XXXIX) She especially wants 
to keep him as he is all she has left. 
Sallie Sears comments on the amoral aspects of Maggie's triumph 
over Charlotte, having defined Jamesian morality as the power 'to pre- 
vent human beings from destroying one another': 
'Her personality represents a union of what always 
were for James the destructive traits of the soul. 
Thus, in the exercise of the manipulative instincts, 
in pure will and sheer energy, she is at last more 
than Charlotte's equal, but she lacks Charlotte's 
beauty and charm and the power to stir and move 
others that James sees as somehow self-justifying, 
or potentially so in some dream world where that 
power could be placed on the side of the angels. 
But 1_aggie does not have this; furthermore, she 
loses the innocence, the freshness, the genuine 
humility that were her angelic if less potent 
virtues and becomes a receptacle for will alone 
untempered by either animal beauty or divine. '2ý 
Sears sees nothing attractive about Maggie to redeem the 'exercise of 
the manipulative instincts' and furthermore she claims that whatever 
innocence Maggie had is lost in the struggle - the implication being 
that Maggie would have been better off innocent and husband-less. 
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F. 0. ratthiessen acknowledges that '... in James's scale of 
values there is a higher morality than that of 'high intelligence' , 
but finds that this higher morality involves a renunciation of cer- 
tain kinds of knowledge when he claims that '... James's neglect of 
the cruelty in such a cord, silken though it be, is nothing short of 
obscene'. Matthiessen is critical of the circumstances from which 
James expects his readers to make moral judgments, and concludes 
that: 
'Love is not enough to redeem a world like 
Maggie Verver's, as we can tell by a single 
glance ahead at the inevitably futile exis- 
tence that any such Prince and Princess must 
continue to lead. '23 
Maggie's final deception works so thoroughly to preserve 
Charlotte's pride that one wonders at the terrible force behind her 
motivations: 
''You want to take my father from me? ' 
The sharp, successful, almost primitive wail in 
it made Charlotte turn, and this movement attes- 
ted for the Princess the felicity of her deceit. 
Something in her throbbed as it had throbbed the 
night she stood in the drawing room and denied 
that she had suffered. She was ready to lie 
again if her companion would but give her the 
opening. Then she should know she had done 
all. ' (XXXIX 
Maggie manages to deceive Charlotte into thinking that all of Maggie's 
fury is inspired by her wish to keep her father - not her husband. 
She lets Charlotte think Maggie has failed when in fact she has pre- 
served what she wanted most of all. Maggie is in the end forced to see 
what she would never see before: 
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'Charlotte was hiding neither pride nor joy-- 
she was hiding humiliation; and here it was 
that the Princess's passion, so powerless 
for vindictive flights, most inveterately 
bruised its tenderness against the hard 
glass of her question. ' (XL) 
The question of Maggie's conscience provokes inner rebuke, and inter- 
estingly allows us to see Charlotte's inward struggle through 1Iaggie's 
own mental turmoil: 
'You don't know what it is to have been loved 
and broken with. You haven't been broken with, 
because in your relation what can there have 
been, worth speaking of, to break? Ours was 
everything a relation could be, filled to the 
brim with the wine of consciousness; and if 
it was to have no meaning, no better meaning 
than that such a creature as you could breathe 
upon it, at your hour, for blight, why was I 
myself dealt with all for deception? Why con- 
demned after a couple of short years, to find 
the golden flame--Oh, the golden flame: --a 
mere handful of black ashes? ' (XL) 
Nevertheless Maggie childishly refuses to understand why she should be 
forced to sacrifice her father. To Fanny she wails: 
''[we are] lost to each other much more, really, 
than Amerigo and Charlotte are; since for them 
it's just, it's right, it's deserved, while for 
us it's only sad and strange and not caused by 
our fault. '' (XL) 
Maggie still hasn't admitted any responsibility for the circumstances 
Which led to the adultery. 
Maggie does however take full responsibility for the change in the 
Prince's attitude towards her. He lives now in terror of her 'fifty 
ideas': 'It was more wonderful than she could have told; it was for 
all the world as if she was succeeding with him beyond her intention. ' 
(XLI) And then something breaks down between them, some barrier, the 
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wall of his self-imposed prison. With sea images James describes 
their reawakened passion: 
'He was with her as if he were hers, hers in a 
degree and on a scale, with an intensity and 
an intimacy, that were a new and a strange 
quantity, that were like the irruption of a 
tide loosening them where they had stuck and 
making them feel floated. ' (XLI) 
The passage echoes the earlier scene between Charlotte and the Prince: 
'Then of a sudden, through this tightened 
circle, as at the issue of a narrow strait 
into the sea beyond, everything broke up, 
broke down, gave way, melted and mingled. ' 
(XVIII ) 
But there is nothing to stop Charlotte and the Prince - no rock, no 
plank. They will drown but for their sacred pledge to keep Maggie and 
her father from all hurt. As the warm tide metaphorically swirls 
Maggie's impulse to clutch is strong, just as she had vainly clutched 
at her father before with the cold water of recognition over her head. 
(XXVI) The consequence of the tide in Chapter LI is to open the blocked 
line of communication between Maggie and the Prince. The dialogue which 
ensues is full of shared admissions and recognitions, unlike any other 
passage between them in the book. The walls are down and truth rushes 
in. First, Maggie admits, gratefully, solemnly, that Charlotte has 
virtually made their marriage: ''It's as if her unhappiness had been 
necessary to us--as if we had needed her, at her own cost, to build us 
up and start us. '' (LI) Maggie thus makes up to him and to her with 
such praise for having sacrificed Charlotte. The Prince, as if to 
justify everything, pleads ignorance; he had only been waiting for 
guidance from Maggie: ''If ever a man, since the beginning of time, 
acted in good faith--! '' Maggie takes it 'deeply and strangely', thus 
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recognizing and accepting her complicity. He had been acting the 
part he thought was expected of him. How was he to have known that 
she really wanted him unless she showed him? His question, unspoken, 
relates back to his concept of self in terms of action; her concept, 
as we have seen, involves a struggle of inner tensions. Maggie must 
not let the others sense the struggle taking part or the marriage will 
fall apart. This is what Fanny meant when she says: '' ... she'll 
carry the whole weight of us. '' (XXIV) 
Daniel Mark Fogel uses the concept of dialectic in his defence 
of Maggie, acknowledging the discovery of evil in self as a learning 
stage in the Hegelian spiral towards recovery of the Prince: 
'Maggie's conquest of the Prince in Volume II 
depends on her giving him precisely that, the 
moral sense, on her showing it to him in a 
light in which he can take it in, and also on 
her making it clear to him that she can manage 
life better than Charlotte. She succeeds on 
every count because her conduct, her method of 
personal and moral demonstration is aestheti- 
cally impeccable. ' 2! + 
Fogel incorporates the union of morality and aesthetics in his defini- 
tion of Maggie's conquest. He emphasizes that the beauty of her method 
wins over the Prince. But the emphasis is placed too much on aesthetic 
appreciation and not enough on consciousness. However, losing con- 
sciousness in love can be fatal for Jamesian heroines as Philip Sicker 
points out: 
'Losing oneself in love, James believed, was a 
kind of death, for to lose one's vital sense of 
otherness, to submerge one's vision and will in 
a lover's, was to destroy one's capacity to res- 
pond to other centers of unconsciousness in the 
external world. t25 
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We see how Maggie loses herself in the Prince before she learns how 
to resist him: 'she gave up, let her idea go, let everything go; 
her one consciousness was that he was taking her again into his 
arms ... ' 
(XXVI) Maggie only just escapes drowning in her endless 
power of surrender to the Prince, by waiting, at his request, until 
her father and his wife have really gone. Each must give up what they 
treasure before they may find each other. The Prince's idea is 'their 
plank now on the great sea'. The image of finding something solid to 
stand upon or to cling to recurs in other James novels we have studied 
here. Isabel, suddenly faced with Goodwood's passion, finds herself 
floating in fathomless waters: 'She felt herself sink and sink. In 
the movement she seemed to beat with her feet, in order to catch her- 
self, to feel something to rest on. ' (PL: LV) And Densher, in an 
attempt to rescue his secret self from discovery, clings to: 'a small 
emergent rock in the waste of waters, the bottomless grey expanse of 
straightness ... ' 
(WD: XXXVIII) The thematic relation of these images 
to an uncontrolled expression of passion is important to James's idea 
of love. As Maggie learns, when one surrenders to the impetus one 
loses altogether one's moral consciousness. It is significant that 
Maggie finds her 'plank' in the Prince's idea of waiting. Thus they 
save each other from drowning. 
In the final chapter, N, aggie's idea of Charlotte's greatness re- 
affirms her original idea of Charlotte (X): 
'The shade of the official, in her beauty and 
security, never for a moment dropped; it was a 
cool, high refuge, like the deep, arched recess 
of some coloured and gilded image, in which she 
sat and smiled and waited, drank her tea, 
referred to her husband and remembered her mis- 
sion. Her mission had quite taken form--it was 
but another home for the interest of her great 
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opportunity--that of representing the arts 
and the graces to a people languishing, 
afar off, in ignorance. ' (XLII) 
Charlotte's shade of the official is reminiscent of Jane Fairfax's 
cool reserve, a reserve which Emma found so irritating. For Maggie 
however it is the preservation of Charlotte's pride. For Adam it 
resonates for consolation. ''You see'' he tells Maggie, ''how right 
I was. Right I mean to do it for you. '' He takes Charlotte away for 
Maggie's happiness, just as he had married her for Maggie's sake. He 
knows she can't release him unless he actively replaces her: 'They 
were parting, in the light of it, absolutely on Charlotte's value ... ' 
Maggie and he take consolation in the fact that Charlotte 'wasn't to 
be wasted' - wasted in the fathomless sea of passion or in the empty 
sea of forms with which London bristles. Finally, the Prince takes it 
from her that Charlotte is 'too splendid': ''That's our help, you 
see. 11 Maggie thus points out her moral to him. Maggie sees it all 
the pain, the humiliation, the remorse and the saving pride. But the 
simple Prince cannot see anything but Maggie. He retains no linger- 
ing consciousness of his former love. Maggie understands now how much 
he depends on her and how great her responsibility will be and always 
should have been. The know ledge is terrifying. The final embrace 
evokes Densher's thought in The wings of the Dove, 'the knowledge of 
each other that they couldn't undo'. Maggie sees, forgives, and loves 
now in the light of that knowledge. 
Dorothea Krook has difficulty fitting the savagery of Charlotte's 
punishment into her scheme of Maggie's 'redemptive love'. She claims 
that Naggie's faith in the 'rightness' of her love for the Prince jus- 
tifies even her cruelty to Charlotte, and weighs this against 
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Charlotte's refusal to recognize any guilt. But as if to negate 
the force of her argument she gives a disclaimer : the presentation 
of material via an interpretative reflector, she says, creates 
ambiguity which casts 'the shadow of a huge doubt over the validity 
of any given interpretation'. 
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Some of Maggie's defenders attempt 
to expand and improve upon Krook's argument. Philip Sicker sees 
Maggie as guilty but awakened and transformed by love: 
'Through her extraordinary psychic sympathy, 
Maggie becomes the first and only Jamesian 
character to transcend the self-obliterating 
fusion of single love and to establish multiple 
circuits of relationship. She escapes both the 
constrictive prison of the ego and the dissolu- 
tion of self in another by recognizing two dis- 
tinct centers of consciousness through two 
equal loves. '27 
Sicker sees nothing destructive about Maggie's love; it not only 
redeems the marriage but redeems her from causing others to suffer. 
Effectively, he argues this love absolves her from the responsibility 
for her sins. 
Stephen Donadio sees Maggie's dialectical triumph unencumbered by 
disclaimers of ambiguity: 
'For James, the significance of Maggie's triumph 
is not intended to be the kind of toss-up 
implied by Miss Krook's formulation : as he 
conceives it, that triumph is absolute, not 
simply, as William James's remarks might lead 
us to expect, a function of one 'point of view' 
or another. Indeed, to the novelist's mind, 
precisely what is so extraordinary, so unequivo- 
cally 'splendid' about Maggie's success is that 
it embraces two antithetical and ostensibly 
irreconcilable possibilities, for it represents 
a triumph in the actual world as well as a tri- 
umph of the spirit. '28 
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But while Donadio is emphatic about the nature of Maggie's unequi- 
vocal success, he is less clear about just how she achieves that 
success. 
Going back to James's preface to The Princess Cassamassima, it 
is the character who feels most, who most deserves our sympathy. That 
Maggie consciously suffers with Charlotte, with the Prince, and with 
Adam, merits our sympathy. Nicola Bradbury brings the discussion back 
to the importance of consciousness to the denouement, with a convin- 
cing argument for Maggie's vindication: 
'Maggie is absolved of tyranny by the very 
insight most characteristic of her imagina- 
tive power : the recognition of the intrac- 
tability of every individual. Though all 
the main characters have some sense of the 
mystery of otherness, none demonstrates 
Maggie's ability to accept the existence of 
another point of view than their own ... '29 
Whereas the elder James would not allow evil in the house, James the 
son not only acknowledges its presence but also implies that acceptance 
and forgiveness of self is a necessary prerequisite to loving any other. 
In forgiving him and herself she effectively accepts and assimilates 
her knowledge of evil. The experience has transformed her from an 
unconscious innocent child to a fully conscious guilty woman. And, to 
use Fanny's phrase, she doesn't begin to 'live' until she has learned 
'one or two things' about life - until she makes the transformation 
from girl to woman. 
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Afterword 
I began this study with a set of categories deriving from the 
meaning of independence, which I then questioned in the context of 
discussions about women characters in the nineteenth century novel. 
It now seems appropriate to stand back in order to ask how well the 
categories held up. 
The concept of financial independence, which initially seemed 
quite straightforward and amenable to simple discussion, revealed 
unexpected complexities - since the sense of self is intimately tied 
up with one's sense of monetary worth and how society perceives this 
worth (and the worth of the self in question). Jane Austen clearly 
distinguishes between those who see themselves and others in terms of 
money, and those for whom money is a happy advantage instead of an 
all-consuming interest. Anne Elliott is disgusted by her father's 
sycophantic behaviour towards their very wealthy upper-class cousins 
the Carterets, when he completely ignores the kindly admiral and his 
wife for being classless Naval upstarts. 
In Trollope, too, we see the influence of society's perception of 
wealth on self-worth. Madame Max's money gives her the tremendous 
advantage of social access, especially because her deceased benefactor 
can put no restraints upon her movements. Nevertheless because of an 
obscure but extraordinarily powerful code of honour, no man may touch 
her money except in marriage. Even the sensitive Phineas Finn finds 
it difficult to be the recipient of such generosity. Glencora Palliser 
struggles vainly with the implications of the vast inheritance she is 
saddled with. Here perhaps her marriage with Palliser is less onerous 
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than at first glance, for he too grew up with money, and his life will 
be consumed not with how much money he has amassed but what he can 
achieve for his country as Prime Minister. Certainly Glencora's money 
assists Palliser in his career, and although legal control of her 
assets and income belonged to him upon her marriage, she can still 
speak of 'my carriage and my horses' when twitted by her duenna at the 
end of a ball. 
Henry James's novels deal more explicitly with the 'problem' of 
wealth and the moral problems uncovered by the heroine's discovery of 
their perceived worth. Isabel Archer believes that the Touchett bequest 
somehow enlarges and beautifies her soul by expanding the possibilities 
of self-development. Milly Theale is stricken by the recognition, in 
the middle of a splendid London dinner party in her honour, that her 
value for the other guests must be all in her fabulous wealth. Maggie 
Verver misses the importance money has for both Charlotte and the Prince 
until she learns how to use that power to her advantage when struggling 
to retain her husband. 
So it seems that financial independence is less distinct from the 
other categories than originally suggested. The same can be said for 
the second category, for what was defined in the beginning as 'intellec- 
tual independence' is in fact a corollary of the development of ontolo- 
gical independence - insofar as asserting one's self in the terms which 
society recognises is the observed consequence of an inward struggle 
for a knowledge of self. Having said that, Austen isn't concerned with 
discussions of the ontology of self - nor am I suggesting that she 
should be. She sticks close to her knitting, namely, to render the 
observed consequences of the struggle with conscience. Emma does 
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struggle with her conscience on a few notable occasions (after Elton 
proposes to her, and on the way home from Box Hill), but her creator 
never lets us see the attempts without a trace of irony in the narra- 
tive. In contrast, Anne Elliott's struggles with herself seem much 
more quiet and sincere, protected as they are from the cutting edge 
of irony. Anne's struggles are, not surprisingly, viewed more seri- 
ously and sympathetically than are Emma's. It is important here to 
make a distinction between being close to a character in narration (as 
we are in Emma) and feeling close to a character in responsive sympathy 
(as we feel for Anne in Persuasion). The near relation between the two 
kinds of closeness (narrative and moral) requires that we examine why 
we are expected to be critical of Emma and not of Anne. To some extent 
the narrative closeness of Emma's life demands a stepping-back, as we 
are always made aware of Emma's perspective. In Persuasion the narra- 
tive is more distant, but without irony in reference to Anne; we are 
encouraged to move closer to Anne and consequently feel we have a more 
direct line to her interior life where these struggles are thrashed 
out. 
The preoccupation with ontological independence in the latter part 
of the nineteenth century has much to do with the development of the 
psychological novel - and by this I refer to the 
increasing dominance 
of character portrayed in intimate detail - over the same period. 
Anthony Trollope's earliest sketches of Glencora only hint at the 
dimensions her character achieves in The Prime Minister; even her ghost 
casts a long shadow over the lives of the characters 
in The Duke's 
Children. Like his contemporaries, Trollope concerned himself with the 
effects upon the soul of the sound and fury of London 
life, a throbbing 
mass whose tentacles stretched out even to the mild village of 
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Silverbridge, where the importance of cork-soled boots in winter 
reminds us that what for Palliser is a refuge of small talk is for 
Harriet Smith in Highgate, with her difficult choice of ribbons, a 
matter of astounding importance. Hutton's comment rings out with 
clarity : whereas in Austen's novels 'You hardly ever see the crush 
of the world on anyone', in Trollope's novels people are'very often 
much distorted from their most natural selves'. 
1 In another example, 
Irving Howe comments that James's The Bostonians shows how disorder in 
public life affects even the most seemingly private areas of individual 
experience: 
'The Bostonians charts the parallel disarrangement, 
sometimes verging on a derangement, of public and 
private, political and sexual life. James was 
bold enough to see that the two spheres of experi- 
ence could not be kept apart, and that it would be 
a fatal error for a novelist if he tried to. He 
was even bolder in supposing that the ideological 
obsessions which form so constant a peril for pub- 
lic life will leave their mark, not merely on 
social behaviour, but also on the most intimate 
areas of private experience. '2 
A further example, the woman in the third of T. S. Eliot's Preludes, is 
at the end (or one deterministic end) of the idea of the self being 
deformed or even in-formed and 'constituted' by the outside world and 
society: 
'You dozed, and watched the night revealing 
The thousand sordid images of which your 
Soul was constituted. ' 
The word constitutes the woman - the way in which the soul is formed 
here implies that the woman can have no independent self because modern 
life is what it is. 
3 These examples suggest that not only are writers 
seeing life differently but responding to it very differently. 
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James, the master of the psychological novel, revels in the 
struggle for knowledge of self, so much so that in his preface to The 
Golden Bowl he wanted his readers to experience the novel as if one 
were down in the ring with the characters with one's own share of the 
bruises and the gore. Each of his heroines is consumed with the 
desire to know what constitutes the self. Financial independence and 
intellectual independence, as we have seen, are very much a part of 
this. But the presiding intelligence steers us in each case towards 
ontological independence. The turning point in each novel - Isabel 
staying up all night alone in front of the fire; Milly roaming alone 
in the park; Maggie encountering the fabulous pagoda - is James's 
attempt to render as closely as possible that struggle to know what 
the self is. This struggle could be defined as 'inner freedom' : 'the 
inner achievement of the soul's self-determination through its actual- 
ization in the world'. That definition fits Isabel Archer's desire 
perfectly; its post-Kantian flavour reminds us that Isabel spent hours 
in her grandmother's Albany home attempting to march her thoughts 
across the dusty plain of German philosophy. Ontological independence 
isn't the exclusive province of feminists, for it has a universal con- 
stituency; it would be impossible to discuss these pressing questions 
in terms which segregate explicitly female experience from explicitly 
male experience, insofar as these are questions of human experience. 
Here, I submit, we see an advantage in that kind of critical approach 
which rather emphasises similarity. 
My own arguments did indeed move from the categories of 
indepen- 
dence towards larger questions about identity and the self, precisely 
because such questions become more pressing and complex as we move 
from 
Austen to James; this makes it ever more difficult to preserve sharp 
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distinctions between the three categories of independence. Further- 
more, these more pressing questions about identity and the self reson- 
ate not only for the women characters in the novels but also for the 
men, as well as for the male and female creators of character. 
The nineteenth century saw a number of cultural, psychological and 
critical shifts which help to explain the increasing complexity of the 
problems of identity and selfhood. These changes include the trend of 
liberalism in economics and politics, the rise of feminism, the influ- 
ence of Marx, Nietzsche and Feud, the sociological changes accompanying 
rapid industrialisation, and the terrific importance placed upon the 
family amid the tumult of changes. In this context the emergence of a 
preoccupation with the buffeted self in the voices of nineteenth cen- 
tury writers isn't surprising. Arnold's wistful recognition of the 
buried self becomes more plaintive as the echoes recede into the twen- 
tieth century: 
'A longing to inquire 
Into the mystery of this heart that beats 
So wild, so deep in us, to know 
Whence our thoughts come and where they go'S 
One of the leading characteristics of modernism is that the dis- 
tinct categories of independence come under increasing pressure, forcing 
one to a more radical interpretation of independence and the self. The 
representative samples below are not arbitrary but are intended rather 
to suggest possibilities in which the interrogative method I have 
employed could be useful within a larger context. 
Twenty years after the appearance of The Golden Bowl and ten years 
after the outbreak of an unspeakably devastating war, three writers 
published works reflecting the fulfilment of the prophetic vision of 
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Henry James : socially determined man is doomed to despair and des- 
truction; only by a supreme effort of will can the fragments of the 
self be contained; the soul's survival in a world of hollow men 
depends upon communion (Maggie's golden bowl, Mrs. Dalloway's parties), 
renunciation (Isabel's flight to Rome, Lou Witt's flight to New 
Mexico), or self-sacrifice (Milly Theale's death, Septimus Smith's 
suicide). The year is 1925, and the writers are D. H. Lawrence, 
T. S. Eliot, and Virginia Woolf. Each of the passages below taken 
from their work in that year expresses the horror of formless, mean- 
ingless existence: 
'She seemed to be talking to handsome young bare- 
faced unrealities, not men at all : as she slid 
about with them, in the perpetual dance, they 
too seemed to have been conjured up out of air, 
merely for this soaring, slithering dance- 
business. And she could not believe that, when 
the lights went out, they wouldn't melt back into 
thin air again, and complete nonentity. The 
strange nonentity of it all! Everything just 
conjured up, and nothing real. 'Isn't this the 
best ever! ' they would beamingly assert, like the 
wraiths of enjoyment, without any genuine sub- 6 
stance. And she would beam back : 'Lots of fun'. '' 
(D. H. Lawrence, St. Mawr) 
'We are the hollow men 
We are the stuffed men 
leaning together 
Headpiece filled with straw. Alas! 
Our dried voices, when 
We whisper together 
Are quiet and meaningless 
As wind in dry grass 
Or rats' feet over broken glass 
In our dry cellar 
Shape without form, shade without colour, 
Paralysed force, gesture without motion; 
Those who have crossed 
With direct eyes to death's other kingdom 
Remember us--if at all--not as lost 
Violent souls, but only 
As the hollow men, 
The stuffed men. '7 
(T. S. Eliot, 'The Hollow Men', I) 
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'But often now this body she wore ... this body, 
with all of its capacities, seemed nothing-- 
nothing at all. She had the oddest sense of 
being herself invisible; unseen; unknown; 
there being no more marrying, no more having 
of children, now, but only this astonishing 
and rather solemn progress with the rest of 
them, up Bond Street, this being Mrs. Dalloway; 
not even Clarissa any more; this being Mrs. 
Richard Dalloway. '8 (Virginia Woolf, 
Mrs. Dalloway) 
They are 'wraiths of enjoyment', formless shapes, 'unseen; unknown', 
walking dead who have not yet crossed to 'death's other kingdom', men 
who have no souls. Septimus Smith's suicide suggests meaning to 
Clarissa Dalloway in an otherwise meaningless world: 
'A thing there was that mattered; a thing, 
wreathed about with chatter, defaced, obscured 
in her own life, let drop every day in corrup- 
tion, lies, chatter. This he had preserved. 
Death was defiance. Death was an attempt to 
communicate; people feeling the impossibility 
of reaching the centre which, mystically, evaded 
them; closeness drew apart; rapture faded; one 
was alone. There was an embrace in death. ' Mrs. 
Dalloway, pp. 280-281) 
Lou Witt's wraithlike dancing partners have no substance because they 
have no souls; in Lawrence's terminology the 'Pan' in them 
has fallen. 
To preserve herself from being 'undermined' by the soul-less 
Flora 
Manbys and Eddie Edwardses, Lou must renounce that world 
in which they 
exist. Her hope lies in an escape to the unspoiled wilds of 
New Mexico. 
Eliot's hollow men have no escape; they have no hope even of 
being 
remembered. 
9 Clarissa Dalloway's hope lies in her ability to bring the 
world together, for one fleeting moment, 
in her drawing room. Only an 
effort of will enables her to compose her scattered, 
incompatible parts 
(her 'faults, jealousies, vanities, suspicions') into 'one centre, one 
diamond, one woman who sat in her drawing room and made a meeting- 
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point ... '. Anthony Trollope knew that purely socially-determined 
beings risked losing their self-integrity in the process of always 
accommodating themselves to changing social conditions. Such crea- 
tures found nothing to cling to when their world was swept away by 
war. Many ghosts walk the streets of London in 1925. The souls which 
survive are fragments held together only by a fierce will to exist. 
Hence we witness the artist's preoccupation with willing into existence 
the world of art, itself increasingly 'ontologically independent'. 
Marianne Dashwood's claim that she has been betrayed by the whole 
world rings more insistently and ominously into the twentieth century. 
Clarissa Dalloway hears the leaden circles dissolving into the air: 
'First a warning, musical; then the hour, irrevocable. ' (p. 5) It is 
too late now to return to Bourton and choose between men and cabbages. 
There is no Colonel Brandon for Clarissa; her narrow bed is made and 
she must lie in it. Eliot's honourable dead, 'Those who have crossed/ 
With direct eyes to death's other kingdom', have, like Milly Theale, 
preserved their souls by dying, as does Septimus Smith, who plunges 
'holding his treasure'. Eliot's hollow men, Lawrence's 'wraiths of 
enjoyment', and Mrs. Dalloway's companions on Bond Street exemplify 
Robert Langbaum's belief that the self has form and substance only 
because it is bounded by social and moral rules. 
10 
But the writings of 
D. H. Lawrence and Virginia Woolf suggest that they still believe in a 
kind of essence of self : for Lawrence, the 'unfallen Pan', a wild, 
free, noble nature which is embodied in the horse St. Mawr; for Woolf 
a brutal monster of self-love which inhabits 'that leaf-encumbered 
forest, the soul'. 
The experience of the self's gradual disintegration into fragments 
of dark and light is not, of course, exclusive to women characters. 
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What is distinctive about their experience is that they are forced 
to suppress their terror (the beast which leaps at one's throat) and 
to hold the fragments of a disintegrating self together (as Maggie 
holds together the fragments of the golden bowl). That women were 
meant to 'hold things together' is taken for granted in Mrs. 
Dalloway's drawing room. John Ruskin's essay 'Of Queens' Gardens' 
(1864) was meant to console and congratulate women for their important 
influence on men, but his argument implies a curious dependency in 
that women are blamed for the wrongs perpetrated by men: 
'Men, by their nature, are prone to fight; they 
will fight for any cause, or for none. It is for 
you to choose their cause for them, and to forbid 
them when there is no cause. There is no suffer- 
ing, no injustice, no misery in the earth, but 
the guilt of it lies with you. '11 
Rate Millet has noted the irony of his implication: 
'There is a certain humour in the proclamation 
that woman, confined throughout history to a 
vicarious and indirect existence, deprived of a 
deciding voice in any event, with so much of the 
burden of military, economic, and technological 
events visited upon them, with so little of 
their glory, are nevertheless accountable for 
morality on the planet. '12 
The expectation that women ought to bear the responsibility for 
the world's ills and to save men from themselves led to Virginia 
Woolf's essay Three Guineas. The essay is a fully-documented, well 
thought out response to an imaginary letter she receives: 'a letter 
perhaps unique in the history of human correspondence, since when 
before has an educated man asked a woman how in her opinion war can be 
prevented? ' Woolf develops her argument along clear logical lines. 
If women are being asked to prevent war, they must be expected to have 
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some influence to exert. She then traces this influence and finds, 
of course, that it can hardly result in thoughts and actions indepen- 
dent from men: 
... she was forced to use whatever influence 
she possessed to bolster up the system which 
provided her with maids; with carriages; with 
fine clothes; with fine parties--it was by 
these means that she achieved marriage. Con- 
sciously she must use whatever charm or beauty 
she possessed to flatter and cajole the busy 
men, the soldiers, the lawyers, the ambassadors, 
the cabinet ministers who wanted recreation 
after their day's work. Consciously she must 
accept their views, and fall in with their 
decrees because it was only so that she could 
wheedle them into giving her the means to marry 
or marriage itself. '13 
Such 'drawing room influence' is hardly sufficient to stop war. The 
blind expectation that women, who have been forced to accommodate, sup- 
press, or otherwise sacrifice themselves to men and the social and 
political circumstances created by then, should be saddled with the 
moral responsibility of changing these circumstances, is both ironic 
and tragic. 
In these examples of modernism I have tried to suggest how the 
questions of independence and selfhood remain with us in different 
guises, and how the interrogative approach can help to clarify such 
questions. Of the similarity of the experience of questioning for men 
and women Betty Friedan writes: 
'In the second stage, perhaps, the daughters will 
stop looking for supermen. They've begun to 
understand that their own superwoman drive and 
assertion of absolute independence is a mask for 
that residue of soft need to remain dependent. 
They have begun to realize that a little depen- 
dence is nothing to be afraid of and that they 
won't drown in it--they wouldn't have to drive 
themselves so hard if they let themselves have 
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those feelings once in a while. And they have 
also begun to see that those young men are just 
as afraid as they are--maybe more afraid, if 
they're still expected to be supermen. The 
sons are just beginning to be able to express 
those feelings the daughters now know are their 
life's blood. '14 
The extent to which self has become a product of cultural thought 
indicates the direction taken by some writers later in the twentieth 
century. Clifford Geertz suggests that there has been: 
'... a general shift in modern anthropological 
discussion of culture ... a shift from a concern 
with thought as an inner mental state or stream 
of such states to a concern with thought as the 
utilization by individuals in society of public, 
historically created vehicles of reasoning, per- 
ception, feeling, and understanding--symbols, in 
the broadest sense of the term. '15 
The struggle for a balance between independence and dependence is 
still very much with us, as is the questioning self who wishes to 
explore beyond the self's limits in fiction: 
'The characters in my novels are my own unrealized 
possibilities. That is why I am equally fond of 
them all and equally horrified by them. Each one 
has crossed a border (the border beyond which my 
own 'I' ends) which attracts me most. For beyond 
that border begins the secret the novel asks about. 
The novel is not the author's confession; it is 
an investigation of human life in the trap the 
world has become. '16 
As long as writers investigating 'human life' continue to create char- 
acters, the questions of independence and selfhood, valid 
for both 
sexes, will remain with us. 
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